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Examination of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) phenomenology in genetic syndromes 
can aid our understanding of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD. The current 
thesis directed attention to the specific study of Theory of Mind (ToM) development in 
syndrome groups with a high prevalence of ASD but fractionated social profiles. In an 
initial group comparison study, Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) was highlighted as a 
syndrome group of interest. When compared to Down syndrome (DS), Fragile X syndrome 
(FXS) and idiopathic ASD, RTS showed a comparatively high prevalence of ASD but a 
fractionated ‘sociable’ social profile. As traditional ToM tasks load heavily on cognitive 
processes they are unsuitable for some individuals with intellectual disability. 
Consequently, a scaled battery of ToM ‘precursor’ tasks was developed and validated 
using a normative sample.  This scale was then applied, alongside Wellman and Liu’s 
(2004) ToM scale, to examine the development of ToM in RTS. An analysis of overall 
ability indicated that RTS may evidence relatively ‘spared’ early social cognitive skills. 
However, later ToM skills may be delayed due to memory difficulties.  Developmental 
trajectory analysis indicated that RTS followed a different developmental sequence to the 
normative sample. Gaze understanding was found to be significantly harder than expected. 
These findings are discussed in relation to their theoretical implications for models of ToM 
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This chapter details and synthesises the key research findings that have informed 
the focus, design and conduct of the empirical studies described in this thesis.  The chapter 
begins by describing associations between autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) and several 
neurodevelopmental disorders of genetic origin. These associations are then examined by 
presenting evidence that highlights how subtle qualitative differences – such as 
fractionated social profiles – exist when ‘finer grained’ comparisons are made between 
genetic syndromes and idiopathic ASD.  Evidence for a ‘fractionation’ of the triad of 
impairments in ASD is discussed at the behavioural, genetic, cognitive and neural levels, 
and it is argued that research examining the core impairments in ASD, and the pathways 
underpinning them, may be better understood if studied separately. The chapter then draws 
attention to the specific study of social behaviour and capacity for Theory of Mind (ToM) 
in genetic syndromes. Prevailing methodological constraints are discussed: the limitations 
of single task methodologies and the cognitive demands of typical ToM tasks (making 
them inappropriate for many individuals with genetic syndromes). In an attempt to 
overcome these constraints, research from the developmental literature is reviewed and a 
possible solution is presented, combining the use of a developmental trajectory approach 
with tasks that assess ‘precursors’ to ToM. Consequently, the empirical work in this thesis 
presents the development of a ‘ToM precursor’ social cognition scale suitable for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities (ID). The scale is validated using a normative 








1.2. The Association between Autism Spectrum Disorder and Genetic Syndromes. 
As classified by DSM-IV-TR (APA,20001) and ICD-10 (WHO, 1992), Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterised by the presence of three core features: the 
presence of repetitive behaviour and restricted interests, and qualitative impairments in 
communication and social interaction. ASD is estimated to occur in around 1% of children 
in the general population (Baird et al., 2006) and around 40% of individuals with 
intellectual disability (ID; La Malfa et al., 2004). Over the last decade there has been 
increasing interest in the association between ASDs and neurodevelopmental disorders of 
genetic origin (genetic syndromes2), with a number of syndromes including a high 
proportion of children and adults reaching above the cut-off for ASD on autism spectrum 
assessments. For example, estimates for the proportions of  individuals who score above 
the cut-off for ASD range between: 50-81%  for Angelman syndrome, 50-67% for 
Cornelia de Lange syndrome; 21-50% for Fragile X syndrome, 25%- 97% for Rett 
syndrome and 24-60% for Tuberous Sclerosis Complex (see Moss & Howlin, 2009 for a 
review). Associations with ‘autistic like’ characteristics have also been described in 
Williams syndrome, Coffin-Lowry, Cohen Laurence-Moon-Biedel, Moebius syndrome, 
Phenylketonuria, Down syndrome (see Fombonne, 1999; Moss & Howlin, 2009 for 
reviews), and a number microdeletion syndromes including: 8p23 deletion, 3q29 deletion, 
and 9p partial duplication syndrome (Abu-Amero et al., 2010; Fisch, Grossfeld, 
Youngblom, Simensen & Battaglia, 2010; Quintero-Rivera, Sharifi-Hannauer & Martinez-
Agosto, 2010).   
It has previously been argued that such associations may simply be the result of the 
level of impaired intellectual ability (Skuse, 2007) but more recently it has been reported 
that the degree to which ID accounts for ASD in these groups is varied and it is not the 
                                                 
1 Please note that this chapter was written prior to DSM-5 becoming available. 




case that more severe ID is necessarily associated with autistic like characteristics (Moss & 
Howlin, 2009). These findings are of interest as it has been suggested that such syndrome 
associations can aid our understanding of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD 
(Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). However, ‘finer grained’ analyses of ASD phenomenology 
in genetic syndromes are of particular interest as they suggest that although a high 
proportion of individuals with a given syndrome may meet diagnostic ‘cut off’ scores for 
ASD, these ‘broad level’ diagnostic descriptions may mask important qualitative 
differences across the triad of impairments when compared to a typical profile of 
idiopathic ASD.   
 
1.3. The Phenomenology of ASD in Genetic Syndromes 
Fragile X syndrome (FXS), Angelman syndrome (AS) and Cornelia de Lange 
syndrome (CdLS) are three genetic syndromes that illustrate how ‘broad level’ diagnostic 
descriptions can mask important qualitative differences in ASD phenomenology. All three 
syndrome groups have been reported to show strong associations with ASD (Moss & 
Howlin, 2009), but the finer grained analysis of ASD phenomenology in these groups 
highlights that subtle differences exist when compared to idiopathic autism.  
A recent study using the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, 
Bailey, & Lord, 2003) found that despite scoring above the cutoff for ASD, individuals 
with FXS showed a milder presentation of ASD symptomatology across all domains of the 
SCQ when compared to an idiopathic ASD group (Moss, Oliver, Nelson, Richards & Hall, 
2013). It has also been found that there may be significant differences in the profile of 
social and communicative symptomatology in FXS compared to idiopathic ASD. Hall, 
Lightbody, Hirt, Rezvani & Reiss (2010) examined ASD phenomenology in 120 children, 




Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002) and the SCQ (Rutter et al, 2003). Results indicated 
that although there were no differences in the repetitive behaviour domain, FXS were 
significantly less impaired across a large number of social and communicative behaviours 
including social smiling, range of social expressions, joint attention, gestures and 
imitation. Furthermore, other studies examining the social profile of FXS, have indicated 
that despite shyness, social anxiety and gaze avoidance, individuals with FXS may show 
preserved emotion sensitivity and willingness to interact (Cornish, Turk & Levitas, 2007; 
Hall, deBernardis & Reiss, 2006; Turk & Graham, 1997; Udwin & Dennis, 1995). These 
more ‘specific’ characteristics are certainly different to the ‘prototypical’ severe social 
withdrawal noted by Leo Kanner in his original descriptions of ASD (Kanner, 1943). 
Although studies examining the prevalence of ASD in AS have implicated a strong 
association (Bonati et al., 2007; Trillingsgaard, & Østergaard, 2004) the social behaviour 
that is characteristic of the syndrome appears inconsistent with this conclusion. The 
behavioural phenotype of AS is characterised by excessive sociability, high levels of 
laughing and smiling behaviour and a strong desire to seek out and interact with adults 
(Horsler & Oliver, 2006; Oliver, Demetriades & Hall, 2002), a social profile very different 
to that described in idiopathic autism. This inconsistency was highlighted more recently in 
a study by Moss, Howlin, et al. (2013) who examined ASD characteristics and social 
behaviour in three genetic syndromes, including AS. Their findings for AS showed a social 
profile of increased positive affect and spontaneous social initiation alongside a high 
proportion of the group scoring above the ‘cut off’ for ASD on an autism specific 
assessment. 
Moss, Howlin, Magiati and Oliver (2012) compared the presentation of ASD 
symptomatology in CdLS to a matched group of individuals with idiopathic ASD using the 




Findings indicated that although a large proportion of the CdLS group reached the cut off 
for autism on the total ADOS score, domain and item level analysis indicated that 
individuals with CdLS displayed more eye contact, more gestures, less repetitive 
behaviour, and less stereotyped speech than the ASD group. The CdLS group also showed 
higher levels of anxiety. When taken together with previous reports of prolonged eye gaze 
and increased social anxiety (Collis, Oliver & Moss, 2006; Goodban, 1993; Nelson, 2010), 
the authors suggest that the social impairments in CdLS may be quite different to those 
observed in ASD. More specifically, they hypothesised that the frequent eye contact 
indicates a desire for social interaction but that this may be hampered by social and 
communication impairments and social anxiety. Furthermore, the differences noted 
regarding repetitive behaviour adds to previous findings that have suggested that this part 
of the triad contributes less to the ASD profile in the group than impairments in 
communication and social interaction (Oliver, Berg, Moss, Arron, & Burbidge, 2011).  
Delineation of the profile of ASD in these groups clearly highlights how subtle 
differences in phenomenology can be masked if associations with ASD are based purely 
on clinical cut off scores. Comparisons between these syndrome groups have shown that 
even when these groups show similar proportions of individuals scoring above the cut off 
score on autism specific assessments, they may do so for different reasons. For instance, in 
Moss, Oliver, et al.’s (2013) study both FXS and CdLS were found to show similar 
proportions of individuals scoring above the ASD cut off. Both groups showed milder 
presentations of ASD symptomatology when compared to idiopathic ASD, but importantly 
the profile that contributed to this milder presentation differed between the groups. For 
FXS the milder presentation was accounted for by less severity across all domains of the 
ASD triad, while in CdLS; it was more specifically due to less severity in the repetitive 




characteristics across genetic syndromes including AS and CdLS, Moss and colleagues 
found that although both groups achieved similar scores on the SCQ, they demonstrated 
different social behaviour profiles (Moss, Howlin, et al. 2013). These findings are of 
interest as they suggest a possible fractionation within the triad of impairments.  
 
1.4. Fractionation of the Triad of Impairments.  
The findings relating to ASD phenomenology in genetic syndromes is just one line 
of research that contributes to an increasing body of evidence pointing towards a 
fractionation of the triad of impairments. Happé & Ronald (2008) argued that, for many 
years, research has been limited by the assumption that all ASD symptomatology proceeds 
from the same cause. In a review of the literature they demonstrate numerous examples 
that point towards the three diagnostic domains being fractionable and with independent 
causes.  
Happé and Ronald (2008) outline that one of the previous barriers in establishing 
whether the ASD triad was unitary or fractionable was the emphasis on examining 
‘diagnosed’ populations. These populations, by very nature of the diagnostic criteria, often 
show impairments in all three of areas of the triad.  Instead, the authors drew attention to 
the study of the relationship between social, communicative, and restricted/repetitive traits 
within the general population. Ronald et al., (2006) asked parents of over 3000 eight year 
old twin pairs to complete the Childhood Asperger Syndrome Test (CAST; Scott, Baron-
Cohen, Bolton, & Brayne, 2002), a screening measure used to assess ASD characteristics 
in mainstream populations. Findings indicated that although autistic-like traits were highly 
heritable, the subscales for the three core areas of the triad showed low covariation. It was 
also highlighted that a large proportion of children displayed isolated difficulties in only 




only social impairments and not comorbid communication difficulties or 
restricted/repetitive behaviours. Approximately 10% of the sample showed only 
restricted/repetitive behaviours or only communication difficulties or only social 
impairment. Although findings showed that having one trait was a ‘risk factor’ for having 
a second or third trait, this ‘risk’ was relatively low and so the authors argued that their 
findings provided evidence for a fractionation in the ASD triad.  
In their review, Happé and Ronald (2008) cite evidence to suggest that the 
fractionation in the triad of impairments is also evident at the genetic level. They report 
findings from large scale family studies that examine the ‘broader autism phenotype’ 
(subclinical manifestations of the triad) in relatives of individuals with ASD. These 
studies, using the Family History Schedule (FHS), indicate that not only do these relatives 
(siblings and first/second degree relatives) show higher rates of impairments across the 
triad than control comparison group, but that they often show only one or two of the three 
core features (Bolton et al. 1994; Pickles et al. 2000; Piven et al., 1997). The authors argue 
that this pattern of results suggests that that the genes that contribute towards ASD 
segregate among relatives and have separable influences on the different parts of ASD 
phenomenology. Additionally, they present findings from a multivariate, model-fitting 
analysis of cross-twin, cross-trait correlations in their twin studies (Ronald, Happé & 
Plomin, 2005; Ronald et al., 2006). These analyses indicated genetic heterogeneity across 
the three core ASD features. More specifically, both communicative impairments and 
restricted/ repetitive behaviours had genetic influences that were typically not shared with 
the other variables. They also showed that, for example, more than half of the genes that 
contributed to the variation in social impairment were independent from those that 





1.5. Fractionation of Cognitive Impairments. 
Evidence for the fractionation of impairments extends to cognitive explanations of 
ASD. Cognitive theories for ASD originated in the 1980s when Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and 
Frith (1985) published a paper that outlined how children with ASD failed simple tasks 
assessing ‘Theory of Mind’. Theory of Mind (ToM) relates to the social cognitive ability 
to attribute mental states (i.e. beliefs, desires, intentions) to others, and the understanding 
that other’s actions will be governed by these states. Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued 
that it was a deficit in this area of understanding that led to the social interaction and 
communicative impairments in ASD.  Tasks commonly used to assess children’s 
understanding of mental states involve making the inference that someone has a ‘false 
belief’ (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For example, in a typical false belief task – the 
‘Smarties’ task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) – the child is shown a Smarties box 
and asked what they think is inside. Following the typical response of “smarties” or 
“sweets” the box is opened to reveal pencils inside. The box is then closed and a toy figure 
(‘Peter’) is produced. The child is informed that Peter has never seen inside the box before. 
Children are then asked what Peter will think is inside the box. Children demonstrate an 
understanding of false belief if they can reason that Peter will believe that there are 
Smarties inside. Although typically developing children pass such tasks at around 4 or 5 
years (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), Baron-Cohen et al., (1985) demonstrated that 80% of 
lower functioning children with ASD (mean verbal age 5.5 years; mean chronological age 
11.11 years) failed such a task.  
Shortly after, Baron-Cohen (1989) proposed that this same impairment in ToM 
may also underpin other aspects of the ASD triad, including repetitive behaviours. It was 
suggested that repetitive behaviours develop as a coping strategy to reduce the anxiety 




position was not held for long. Such an account would predict that levels of repetitive 
behaviour would increase during social interactions or unpredictable social scenarios. 
Instead, a number of studies examining rates of these behaviours in different situations 
indicated lower levels of repetitive behaviour during social interactions and higher levels 
during periods of no interaction (Clark & Rutter, 1981; Donnellan, Anderson & Mesaros, 
1984; Runco, Charlop, & Schreibman, 1986). Furthermore, as outlined by Happé and 
Ronald (2008), repetitive behaviours can be as frequent/severe in higher functioning 
individuals (who show greater levels of social insight) as lower functioning individuals. 
These findings, along with others, demonstrated that a deficit in ToM cannot fully account 
for both the social and non social aspects of the triad (Happé, 2001).  
Later theorists proposed an ‘executive function’ hypothesis of ASD (Hughes, 
Russell, & Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Russell, 1997). 
‘Executive Function’ (EF) is an umbrella term used to describe a set of higher order 
cognitive processes used in the conscious control and regulation of lower-level thought 
and action, such as inhibition, planning, working memory, emotional regulation, 
generativity,  and set-shifting (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). In the initial EF hypothesis, 
similarities drawn between the characteristics of ASD and neuropsychological patients 
with frontal lobe damage led to the suggestion that frontal deficits and their subsequent 
cascading effects may also account for the core impairments seen in ASD (Russell, 1997). 
Indeed, there is now a large body of evidence that links impairments in EF to the 
restricted/repetitive behaviours seen ASD (see Turner 1997 for a review). However, the 
ability for the EF hypothesis to fully account for all parts of the triad, including the social 
interaction and social communicative impairments, is limited. For instance, it has been 




individuals do not show the same level of social and communicative impairment that 
characterises ASD (Ozonoff & Jenson, 1999).  
Alternative cognitive theories of ASD include the ‘weak central coherence’ theory 
(Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe 1994), and the ‘extreme male brain’ theory (Baron-Cohen, 
2002). The weak central coherence theory posits a specific information processing style 
characterised by piecemeal or ‘detailed focussed’ processing rather than the ability to 
process information in its context. Such a theory can account for some of the deficits (i.e. 
the preoccupation with ‘parts’ and an inability to see the ‘bigger picture’) and assets 
(exceptional perceptual abilities) seen in ASD. The ‘extreme male brain’ theory (or 
empathising – systemising account) views ASD difficulties as an extreme of the ‘normal’ 
male profile, with limitations in empathising (the drive to identify another person’s 
thoughts), and strengths in systemising (the drive to construct systems).  
Although it is clear that all of the theories described above go some way toward 
describing the causal cognitive mechanisms involved in ASD phenomenology. No one 
account can fully explain all three aspects of the ASD triad together, leading to the 
conclusion drawn by Happé, Ronald, and Plomin (2006) that the cognitive underpinnings 
for social, communicative, and restricted/repetitive behaviours are likely to be independent 
of each other. Findings from neuroimaging studies would certainly support this assertion. 
Happé, Ronald and Plomin (2006) cite evidence that outlines how restricted/repetitive 
behaviours have been linked to caudate abnormality but social cognitive processes have 
been linked to other regions of the brain including the temporal poles, temporoparietal 
junction, superior temporal sulcus, and medial frontal cortex (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Sears 






1.6. Interim Summary 
The previous sections of this review have outlined evidence for a fractionation in 
the ASD triad of impairments at the behavioural, genetic, cognitive and neural levels. 
When taken together, these findings challenge the assumption that all aspects of the ASD 
triad can be, or should be, explained together. Instead, the evidence suggests that research 
examining the three core impairments, and the pathways underpinning them, may be better 
understood if studied separately.  
Evidence from ASD phenomenology in genetic syndromes demonstrated that 
although high proportions of individuals may meet the diagnostic ‘cut off’ for ASD, the 
profile of behavioural characteristics that contribute to these scores can vary between 
syndromes and provide further evidence for fractionation. As outlined before, it has been 
argued that the study of ASD phenomenology in genetic syndromes can aid understanding 
of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). 
Consequently, syndrome groups that display fractionated ASD profiles can potentially 
provide a useful opportunity to study each aspect of the triad separately. With this in mind, 
the current thesis directs attention to the specific study of social behaviour and the 
development of ToM.  
As described above in section 1.3, a number of syndrome groups reported to be 
associated with ASD, show social profiles that are very different to idiopathic ASD. To 
recap, despite seemingly high levels of ASD, individuals with AS show excessive 
sociability and a strong desire to seek out and interact with adults (Horsler & Oliver, 2006; 
Oliver, Demetriades & Hall, 2002); individuals with FXS are suggested to have a 
preserved emotion sensitivity and willingness to interact (Cornish, Turk & Levitas, 2007; 
Hall, deBernardis & Reiss, 2006; Turk & Graham, 1997; Udwin & Dennis, 1995); and 




alongside social anxiety (Collis et al., 2006; Goodban, 1993; Moss et al, 2012; Nelson, 
2010). Given the link between ToM and the social interaction and communicative 
impairments in ASD, the question arises: How does the development of ToM relate to the 
social behaviour of syndrome groups that show a high prevalence of ‘ASD’ but 
fractionated social profiles?  
 
1.7. Theory of Mind in Genetic Syndromes. 
Despite an obvious rationale, the question outlined above has received surprisingly 
little attention in the literature.  In fact, the examination of ToM across genetic syndromes 
in general has been extremely limited and has predominately focussed on FXS and 
Williams syndrome (WS), with these studies often yielding inconsistent results. Some 
studies have included participants with Down syndrome (DS), however these individuals 
are often involved only as control group comparisons for studies focussing on ASD or 
FXS (e.g. Losh, Martin, Klusek, Hogan-Brown & Sideris, 2012; Wong & Leung, 2010; 
Yirmiya, Solomonica, Shulman, & Pilowsky, 1996). 
Although 7% of children with WS meet diagnostic criteria for ASD (Leyfer, 
Woodruff-Borden, Klein-Tasman, Fricke, & Mervis, 2006), individuals with WS are 
typically described in the literature as ‘hypersociable’ (Jones et al, 2000). As characteristic 
social behaviours include being ‘very empathic towards other people’ (Gosch & Pankau, 
1994), it has been suggested that the social phenotype of WS may represent the polar 
opposite of ASD and may be underpinned by a relative sparing of ToM (Karmiloff-Smith, 
Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron- Cohen, 1995). Indeed, in an initial series of studies, 
Karmiloff-Smith et al. (1995) found that individuals with WS passed a number of standard 
ToM tasks that children with ASD typically fail, leading to the suggestion that ToM ability 




participants used were much older (9- 23 years) than the age in which children typically 
pass these tasks (4 or 5 years). In contrast, more recent studies, using control groups and 
younger participants with WS, have suggested that ToM ability in WS is delayed (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & Boshart, 1997), leading authors to 
discount the originally proposed dissociation between impaired ToM in ASD and ‘intact’ 
functioning in WS (Brock, Einav & Riby, 2008).  
In contrast to WS, and as described in section 1.3, individuals with FXS show a 
stronger association with ASD and a social profile including shyness and gaze avoidance 
(Moss & Howlin, 2009; Turk & Graham, 1997; Udwin & Dennis, 1995). Garner, Callias, 
and Turk (1999) assessed ToM in eight boys with FXS (without autism) using the 
‘Smarties’ false belief task. They found that significantly more boys with FXS failed this 
task than a matched heterogeneous intellectual disability (HID) comparison group, initially 
suggesting that those with FXS may show ToM deficits similar to individuals with ASD. 
However, when the authors used another false belief task, the ‘Sally-Anne task’, no 
significant differences between the groups were found,  thus leaving it unclear as to 
whether ToM deficits were a specific feature in FXS or simply related to overall level of 
ability. In a similar study, Cornish, Burack, Rahman, Munir, Russo, and Grant (2005) 
assessed ToM in a group of children with FXS (without autism) using the Sally-Anne false 
belief task. Findings indicated that these children performed similarly to a Down syndrome 
(DS) group, matched for age and verbal ability. Just under half of each group passed the 
task, leading the authors to conclude that individuals with FXS did evidence difficulties 
with ToM but that these difficulties were not as severe as in autism, as a poorer 
performance than DS would otherwise have been expected.  
In a more recent study, Grant, Apperly, and Oliver (2007) drew attention to the 




the children with FXS did not have a diagnosis of ASD, no measure of ASD 
symptomatology was obtained. As many children with FXS show ASD symptomatology 
even when they do not meet diagnostic criteria (Dykens & Volkmar, 1997), Grant et al. 
(2007) assessed ASD symptomatology using the SCQ (Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & 
Bailey, 1999) and then compared ToM performance between a FXS group who showed 
many ASD features, a FXS group who showed few ASD features, and a HID control 
group.  Findings showed that both groups of boys with FXS showed poorer ToM 
performance than the HID group thus suggesting that ToM difficulties are likely to form a 
part of the FXS profile. However, the nature of this ToM deficit was of particular interest. 
Grant et al. (2007) used new ToM methodology which enabled them to separate out the 
processing demands required for the task. A standard false belief task not only requires an 
individual to reason about another person’s belief (i.e. ToM), it also requires an individual 
to remember a sequence of events (working memory), and resist interference from their 
own knowledge (inhibitory control). When Grant et al. (2007) conducted comparison trials 
that required working memory but no ToM, both FXS groups still performed worse, 
suggesting that ToM difficulties in the group may be underpinned by a more basic 
difficulty with working memory.  
 
1.8. Constraints in Current Research: The Need for a Different Approach? 
Until recently the methodology used to investigate the cognitive abilities/deficits in 
genetic syndromes, developmental disorders, and ID has typically been to compare the 
performance on a cognitive task to the performance of two matched comparison groups. In 
most studies one comparison group is matched for chronological age (CA) and the other is 
matched for mental age (MA). It is assumed that if the syndrome group of interest 




the group is considered developmentally delayed on this task. Alternatively, if the 
syndrome group demonstrate a deficit relative to both the MA and CA comparison groups, 
it is instead considered to be developmentally atypical (Hodapp, Burack & Zigler, 1990). 
As section 1.7 demonstrates, the studies investigating ToM in genetic syndromes 
typically use a similar methodology. Studies generally compare the performance on a 
single standard false belief task to the performance of matched controls, finding the sample 
either comparatively delayed or atypical. However, it is now widely believed that the 
attainment of false belief understanding represents just one of many social cognitive3 
developments that emerge progressively during childhood (e.g. Flavell & Miller, 1998; 
Gopnik, Slaughter & Meltzoff, 1994; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). Therefore, the methods 
currently being used to assess ToM in genetic syndromes actually provide very limited 
information with little insight into the developmental pathway or causal mechanisms that 
occur prior to, or following the understanding of false belief. More specifically, such 
single task methodologies cannot inform us whether false belief impairments in genetic 
syndromes are preceded by earlier impairments in less complex social cognitive abilities, 
and whether they are subsequently followed by further impairments in more complex 
social cognitive abilities.  
 
1.9. A Developmental Trajectory Approach 
One possible solution to this problem would be to adopt a developmental trajectory 
approach to the study of ToM. Such an approach has been undertaken recently by 
Wellman and Liu (2004) who established a scaled battery of five tasks that captured the 
developmental progression of ToM in preschoolers. Their analysis revealed that ToM tasks 
assessing Diverse Desire, Diverse Belief, Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief, and 
                                                 
3 Throughout this thesis the term ‘social cognition’ is used as an umbrella term to encompass both 




Real-Apparent Emotion formed a highly scalable set i.e. typically developing preschool 
children tended to pass earlier tasks, reached a task that they failed, and then failed all 
subsequent tasks. The advantages of such a scale are twofold. Firstly, on a theoretical 
level, assessing individuals in this manner provides insight into the social cognitive 
development of ‘typical’ populations. More specifically, this method can go some way 
toward determining whether the development of later, more complex social cognitive 
skills, is dependent on the acquisition of earlier skills. For example, it may be the case that 
later skills can only be acquired if earlier skills are present. Secondly, by assessing atypical 
individuals in this way, using a scaled set of tasks, one can explore a number of different 
possibilities. One possibility is that atypical individuals progress along the same 
developmental trajectory as typically developing individuals, acquiring the same skills in 
the same order, but demonstrating developmental delay. Another possibility is that these 
individuals do not follow the typical developmental trajectory but instead display a unique 
profile of cognitive strengths and weaknesses.  
The application of such an approach has been demonstrated by Peterson, Wellman, 
and Liu (2005) in their study comparing the performance of individuals with autism, late 
signing deaf children, and typically developing children on the five item ToM scale 
developed by Wellman and Liu (2004). Their findings showed that, albeit delayed in age 
of attainment, the ToM developmental sequence for late signing deaf children was 
matched exactly to the sequence shown in typically developing children. However, 
children with autism displayed a different sequence of development. Analysis indicated 
that for this group the last two tasks in the scale were reversed i.e. children with autism 
found the Contents False Belief task harder than the Real Apparent Emotion task. The 
authors have subsequently hypothesised explanations for the delayed and atypical 




deaf children, departures from a normal experience with social interaction, language and 
conversation led to their delayed yet consistent progression of understanding. Conversely, 
for the autism group, high functioning individuals with autism may have developed a 
‘work around’ solution to emotional situations that allows them to bypass false belief 
understanding. Importantly, the use of this method highlighted findings that may have 
been overlooked if social cognitive ability was assessed using just a single task. 
As illustrated above, Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM scale provides a platform to 
examine the interplay between social cognitive development and related factors in 
individual difference research. Such a methodology could provide valuable information 
about the ToM development of syndrome groups that show fractionated social profiles. 
However, although the five ToM tasks included in the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale 
require the assessed individual to reason about mental states, the tasks also load quite 
heavily on other cognitive processes as highlighted in the Grant et al. (2007) study 
discussed in section 1.7. To recap, tasks such as the Smarties task (contents false belief) 
not only require an individual to reason about false belief (that Peter will think there are 
smarties inside), but also place substantial demands on working memory and executive 
inhibitory control. Individuals must remember critical facts about the story and also resist 
interference from their own knowledge (the fact that there are pencils inside). Due to their 
cognitive requirements, these tasks are not suitable for individuals with ID who are too 
young or too cognitively impaired to complete them. This is of critical importance given 
that many genetic syndromes are associated with moderate to severe ID and deficits in 
expressive and receptive language. Such difficulties may explain why there is a dearth of 






1.10. Social-Cognitive ‘Precursors’ to Theory of Mind: A Possible Solution? 
Fortunately, recent work in the developmental literature has begun to examine the 
early social cognitive abilities that develop prior to fully fledged ToM in typically 
developing individuals. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll (2005) propose that the 
foundational skill underlying the understanding of beliefs is, in fact, the understanding of 
intentions which begins emerge around 12 months of age. Tomasello and colleagues have 
developed a number of simple tasks that demonstrate a wide range of social cognitive 
competencies that occur in children at different developmental points prior to ToM 
acquisition. For example, from 9 months infants demonstrate an ability to perceive others 
as intentional agents (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), by 14 months show the 
understanding and motivation to assist others with their unachieved goals (Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2007), by 18 months make inferences about the communicative intention of 
gestures (Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005), and by 24 months show signs of joint 
intentionality by cooperating with another person in problem solving activities and social 
games (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). What is particularly pertinent about these 
tasks is that they require very little or no receptive/expressive language, meaning that they 
can potentially provide a valuable means of assessing the social cognitive abilities of 
individuals with genetic syndromes who are too young, or too cognitively impaired to 
comprehend and complete ‘typical’ ToM tasks.   
 
1.11. Interim Summary 
Given the constraints of single task methodologies discussed in section 1.8, and the 
potential benefits of a developmental trajectory approach discussed in section 1.9, if these 
‘precursor’ tasks could be scaled in a similar manner to the ToM scale by Wellman and 




question:  How does the development of ToM relate to the social behaviour of syndrome 
groups that show a high prevalence of ‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles? 
 
1.12. Chapter Summary and Thesis Outline 
The current chapter has detailed key research findings that provided the rationale 
for the empirical work in this thesis. Associations between ASDs and genetic syndromes 
were outlined and their nature questioned by presenting evidence that highlighted how 
subtle qualitative differences (including fractionated social profiles) exist when ‘finer 
grained’ comparisons are made between genetic syndromes and idiopathic ASD. Evidence 
for a fractionation of the ASD triad of impairments was discussed and it was argued that 
research examining the core impairments in ASD, and the pathways underpinning them, 
may be better understood if studied separately.  
It was proposed that the study of ASD phenomenology in genetic syndromes can 
aid understanding of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD (Persico & Bourgeron, 
2006). Consequently, the chapter highlighted how syndrome groups that displayed 
fractionated ASD profiles could provide a useful vehicle to study each aspect of the ASD 
triad separately. More specifically, the chapter drew attention to the potential study of 
ToM development in syndrome groups that showed a high prevalence of ASD but 
fractionated social profiles.  
Despite the potential benefits of studying ToM in genetic syndromes, the chapter 
outlined two main methodological constraints in the area: the use of single task 
methodologies and the cognitive demands of typical ToM tasks (making them 
inappropriate for many individuals with genetic syndromes). The goal of the work 
described in this thesis is to overcome these constraints by combining a developmental 




Chapter 2 of this thesis begins by highlighting Rubinstein Taybi syndrome (RTS) 
as a syndrome of interest. Examination of the behavioural phenotype points towards a 
dissociation in ASD characteristics, with a fractionated social profile. It is proposed that 
RTS might therefore be used as model syndrome from which to study the development of 
ToM. In chapter 3 the development of a ‘ToM precursor’ social cognition scale, suitable 
for individuals with ID, is described. In chapter 4, this scale is then validated using a 
normative sample of typically developing infants and then in chapter 5 the performance of 
individuals with RTS on this scale is assessed and described. Finally, in chapter 6 the main 
findings of the thesis are discussed and the work is evaluated by considering the strengths 
and limitations of the methodologies used. Clinical and research implications are 
considered and the possibilities for future study are suggested. 
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 In chapter 1 it was suggested that understanding the presentation of ASD 
characteristics in genetic syndromes that display a fractionation of the triad of impairments 
may be helpful in extending our understanding of the aetiology of ASD (Persico & 
Bourgeron, 2006). More specifically, the chapter drew attention to the specific study of 
ToM development in syndrome groups that showed a high prevalence of ASD but 
fractionated social profiles. The current chapter introduces Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome 
(RTS) as syndrome from which to do this.  
The behavioural profile of RTS noted in the literature suggests a fractionation of 
the triad of impairments – with high levels of repetitive behaviour but good social 
interaction and social communication skills. However, to date, the majority of studies 
detailing behavioural characteristics in RTS are case studies or cohort descriptions. Such 
methodologies are limited as they cannot establish whether the behaviours reported are 
more likely to be found in RTS relative to other individuals with ID. Consequently, the 
current chapter aims to extend the behavioural phenotype of RTS by using a group 
comparison design to examine ASD symptomatology and other behavioural characteristics 
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2.2. Introduction  
 
A behavioural phenotype is defined by Dykens, Hodapp, and Finucane (2000) as a 
heightened probability that individuals with a given genetic syndrome will show certain 
behavioural characteristics relative to those without that syndrome. Over the last decade, 
the association between genetic syndromes and particular behavioural profiles has been 
increasingly recognised (O’Brien & Yule, 1995; Flint, 1996) and as a result behavioural 
phenotypes have now been established for a number of different genetic syndromes 
(Horsler & Oliver, 2006; Oliver, Arron, Sloneem, & Hall, 2008; Turk, 1992; Udwin & 
Yule, 1991). Although studies are beginning to emerge, there is a dearth of research 
examining the behavioural characteristics of Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS). Extending 
the behavioural phenotype of RTS is of particular pertinence to this thesis because 
preliminary research suggests that the group may present with a fractionation of the triad 
of impairments – with high levels of repetitive behaviours but good social interaction and 
social communication skills. If this is the case then the group could potentially provide a 
useful vehicle to study the question posed in section 1.6. 
RTS is a multiple congenital anomaly syndrome estimated to occur in 
approximately 1 in 125,000 live births (Hennekam, Stevens & Van de Kamp, 1990). The 
syndrome has been linked to mutations of the CREB binding protein (CREBPP) (Petrij et 
al., 2002), microdeletions within 16p13.3 (Lacombe, Saura, Taine & Battin, 1992) and 
mutations of the E1A binding protein (p300) located at 22q13.2 (Roelfsema et al., 2005). 
However, genetic markers are only found in around 55% of cases (Hennekam, 2006) and 
therefore individuals are typically diagnosed through the identification of clinical 
characteristics.  
The physical characteristics associated with RTS have been well documented and 
include postnatal growth deficiency, dental abnormalities, broad thumbs and toes, and 
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microcephaly (Hennekam & Van Doorne, 1990; Hennekam, Van Den Boogaard, Dijkstra, 
& Van de Kamp, 1990; Partington, 1990; Rubinstein, 1990; Stevens, Carey & Blackburn, 
1990a; Stevens, Hennekam & Blackburn, 1990b). Health and medical difficulties are also 
common in RTS. Feeding and related weight difficulties have been reported in the 
literature, with descriptions of poor appetite, vomiting and failure to thrive during infancy 
followed by enhanced appetite and weight gain in adolescence (Hennekam, Van Den 
Boogaard, Sibbles & Van Spijker, 1990; Hennekam, 2006; Stevens et al., 1990b). Other 
health problems include renal abnormalities, recurrent upper respiratory infections and 
keloids (Rubinstein, 1990).  
Intellectual disability (ID) is an associated characteristic of RTS. Although 
estimates regarding the degree of ID have varied across studies (Padfield, Partington & 
Simpson, 1968; Stevens et al., 1990a) it is thought that most individuals lie within the mild 
to moderate range (Hennekam, 2006). Although research outlining the cognitive ability of 
RTS is limited, genetics studies have started to link the molecular abnormalities to 
cognitive dysfunction in RTS. The CREB binding protein implicated in RTS has been 
shown to underlie long term memory formation (Bourtchuladze et al., 1994; Yin et al., 
1994; Bartsch et al., 1995) and consequently it has been suggested that ID may occur as a 
result of impaired long term memory (D’Arcangelo & Curran, 1995; Weeber & Sweatt, 
2002). 
Although still in its infancy, the literature outlining the behavioural phenotype of 
RTS is growing. Studies have described “stubbornness”, sleeping difficulties and a 
tendency for individuals to be emotional and excitable (Gotts & Liemohn, 1997; 
Hennekam, 2006; Stevens, 2007; Stevens et al., 1990b). The presence of ADHD-type 
behaviours such as impulsivity and hyperactivity have also been described (Hennekam, 
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2006; Stevens et al., 1990b; Stevens, Pouncey & Knowles, 2011). However, the two most 
frequently noted characteristics relate to social behaviour and repetitive behaviour.  
In a recent questionnaire study involving 45 adults with RTS, 43% were described 
as being “overly friendly” (Stevens, et al., 2011). Numerous other reports have described 
those with RTS as “happy”, “loving”, and “friendly” individuals who “ love adult 
attention” and “know no strangers” (Baxter & Beer, 1992; Hennekam, 2006; Padfield, et 
al., 1968; Rubinstein & Taybi, 1963; Stevens, et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 1990a). Such 
descriptions have led to the suggestion that individuals with RTS may show superior social 
competency and social communication skills when compared to those with other causes of 
ID (Hennekam et al., 1992). Recent findings appear to support this suggestion. Galéra et 
al. (2009) compared 39 children with RTS to a matched heterogeneous intellectual 
disability (HID) group and found that those with RTS scored significantly lower than the 
HID group on a scale assessing ‘reduced contact and social interest’. More specifically, 
findings showed that those with RTS showed superior performance on several items 
including acceptance of physical contact, initiating play with other children, and quality of 
eye contact. More recently, Nelson, Moss, Powis, Waite & Oliver, (in review) assessed 
levels of sociability in six genetic syndromes using a novel questionnaire measure suitable 
for individuals with ID. The study asked caregivers of individuals with RTS, Down 
syndrome (DS), Angelman syndrome (AS), Fragile X syndrome (FXS), Cornelia de Lange 
syndrome (CdLS) and ASD to rate levels of behaviour across a range of defined social 
situations with familiar and unfamiliar people. Findings indicated that the RTS, DS and 
AS groups were more sociable (scored significantly higher) than the CdLS, FXS and ASD 
groups with both familiar and unfamiliar people.  
‘Repetitive behaviour’ is an umbrella term used to describe a broad range of 
behaviours including  insistence on sameness, stereotyped behaviour, adherence to routine, 
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and a preoccupation with circumscribed and narrow interests (Turner, 1997). Behaviours 
such as these have been said to form an important part of the behavioural phenotype of 
RTS. Stereotyped behaviours such as rocking, spinning, and hand flapping have frequently 
been described (Baxter & Beer, 1992; Hennekam et al., 1992; Stevens et al., 1990a), and 
Galéra et al. (2009) recently found that individuals with RTS displayed significantly higher 
scores than matched HID controls on questionnaire items assessing the stereotypies ‘flaps 
arms/hands when excited’, ‘extremely pleased with certain movements/keeps doing them’ 
and ‘makes odd/fast movements with fingers/hands’.  Other repetitive behaviours noted in 
around three quarters of individuals with RTS include an adherence to routine and an 
insistence on sameness (Hennekam et al., 1992; Stevens et al., 1990a; Stevens et al., 2011). 
When taken together, the descriptions of repetitive behaviour and social behaviour 
in RTS are of particular interest. As outlined in section 1.2, ASDs are characterised by the 
presence of three core features: the presence of repetitive behaviour and restrictive 
interests, and qualitative impairments in communication and in social interaction (APA, 
2000; WHO, 1992). The behavioural profile of RTS described in the literature suggests 
that individuals in this group may present with a dissociation of these core features. 
However, it is of note that the majority of studies detailing the behavioural characteristics 
of RTS are case studies or cohort descriptions.  Such methodologies are limited as they 
cannot establish whether the behaviours reported are more likely to be found in RTS 
relative to other individuals with ID. If a behavioural phenotype is to be established, group 
comparison designs need to be employed. At present, only one study examining the 
behavioural phenotype of RTS has utilised such a design (i.e. Galéra et al., 2009).  
The following chapter aims to extend the behavioural phenotype of RTS by using a 
group comparison design to examine ASD symptomatology and other behavioural 
characteristics that have yet to be fully described elsewhere; affect and overactivity. 
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Although not central to the overarching aims of this thesis, identifying information 
regarding affect and overactivity is important to further delineate the behavioural 
phenotype in RTS. Assessing affect provides valuable information regarding a person’s 
quality of life and can subsequently highlight groups at particular risk of low mood, 
interest and pleasure. Assessing levels of overactivity is valuable as research has indicated 
that the presence of ADHD or ADHD-type behaviours such as overactivity and 
impulsivity can be a risk factor for challenging behaviours such as self injury and 
aggression (Arron et al., 2011). Furthermore, ADHD-type behaviours such as overactivity 
are known to adversely affect other areas of an individual’s life including education and 
family wellbeing (Harpin, 2005). Identifying which syndrome groups are at particular 
‘risk’ from these difficulties will enable the implementation of early intervention 
strategies. 
In the behavioural phenotype literature, group comparison designs typically consist 
of a group of participants with HID matched for mental and chronological age. However, 
as the profile of ASD symptomatology is of particular interest in this group, an alternative 
strategy has been adopted. Establishing whether profiles of behaviour are ‘ASD-like’ 
would be difficult without comparisons to individuals with (and without) idiopathic ASD. 
Consequently, the study uses an idiopathic ASD comparison group alongside a FXS and a 
DS group. The use of these comparison groups allows the positioning of RTS relative to 
idiopathic ASD as well as two genetic syndromes of known aetiology with differing 
behavioural profiles and associations with ASD.  
FXS and DS are the two most common causes of ID with known genetic aetiology. 
FXS results from an expansion of a trinucleotide repeat sequence, cytosine-guanine-
guanine (CGG) on the FMR1 gene (Fragile X Mental Retardation 1 gene) of the long arm 
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of chromosome Xq27.3 (Dykens, Hodapp, & Finucane, 2000). DS results primarily from 
non-disjunction of chromosome 21 during meiosis (Connor & Ferguson-Smith, 1997).  
A number of studies have suggested a strong association between FXS and the 
presence of ASD symptomatology (Clifford et al., 2007; Oliver, Berg, Burbidge, Arron & 
Moss, 2011). Although it has been questioned whether ASD characteristics in FXS are 
qualitatively different to those evident in idiopathic ASD (see Moss & Howlin, 2009), the 
heightened probability of repetitive behaviour in the group has been repeatedly described 
(Backes et al., 2000; Hagerman & Lampe, 1999; Mazzocco et al., 1998; Moss et al., 2009), 
alongside clear social communication deficits such as gaze avoidance, and social anxiety 
(Turk & Graham, 1997; Udwin & Dennis, 1995). In contrast,  individuals with DS have 
been noted for their social competence (Rosner, Hodapp, Fidler, Sagun & Dykens, 2004) 
and have been described as charming, social, friendly, and engaging individuals (Dykens 
et al., 2000), with evidence to suggest lower levels of repetitive behaviour than those with 
a  diagnosis of ASD (Hepburn & MacLean, 2009). If the repetitive behaviour and social 
profile of RTS described in the literature is correct, then when compared to ASD, FXS, 
and DS, one might expect RTS to be positioned more closely to ASD and FXS with regard 
to repetitive behaviour but closer to DS on measures of social behaviour.  
The role of ID needs to be considered carefully when studying behavioural 
characteristics in genetic syndromes, particularly in relation in ASD symptomatology. As 
noted by Moss, Richards, Nelson and Oliver (2013) many of the core diagnostic features 
of ASD are developmentally weighted, meaning that a person might reach diagnostic 
criteria simply because they have not yet reached the developmental level required for a 
behaviour to be shown. However, controlling for ID when comparing across ASD, FXS, 
DS and RTS is difficult due to the differing degree of intellectual ability typically 
associated with each disorder.  Although the process of matching participants is one 
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obvious strategy, this can significantly decrease sample size and thus limit how accurately 
each sample represents the population. Consequently, this study adopts two approaches. A 
total sample approach is initially used to position and describe RTS relative to 
representative group samples and then a matched contrast group approach is then used to 
control for ID.   
 
The aims of the study were: 
 
 To extend the behavioural phenotype of RTS by adopting both a total and matched 
sample approach to position RTS relative to three comparison groups on behavioural 
characteristics relating to affect and over activity.  
 
 To examine the prevalence and profile of ASD symptomatology across groups using 
both total and matched sample approaches.  
 
2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Recruitment.  
 Parents and carers of individuals with RTS, ASD, FXS and DS were contacted for 
participation as part of an ongoing study investigating behavioural phenotypes in rare 
genetic syndromes and neurodevelopmental disorders (Arron, Oliver, Berg, Moss & 
Burbidge, 2011; Burbidge et al., 2010; Oliver, Berg, Burbidge, Arron & Moss, 2011). 
Participants were invited via their relevant support groups. 202 participants with RTS were 
contacted via the Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome support group. 1467 participants with ASD 
were contacted via the National Autistic Society.  432 participants with FXS were 
contacted via the Fragile X Society, and 500 participants with DS were contacted via the 
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Down Syndrome Association. Overall, 2601 participants were contacted and 748 
responded (return rate of 28.8%) 
 
2.3.2. Participants  
Following exclusion, 643 participants were included in the study. 41 participants 
were excluded because they had no confirmed diagnosis from a Clinical Geneticist, 
Paediatrician, Neurologist or General Practitioner. One participant was excluded because 
they had an additional chromosomal abnormality.  Eight participants were excluded 
because more than 25% of information was missing from at least one of their 
questionnaires. A further 19 participants were excluded because they had no confirmed age 
or were under the age of four. Participants under the age of four were excluded as one 
measure was not appropriate for young children. Finally, the presence of ASD in the ASD 
group was verified using the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Berument, 
Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999).  Thirty six participants with ASD were excluded 
because they either did not reach the cut off criteria for ASD (by attaining a score of 15 or 
above on the SCQ) or because they had not completed the SCQ.  
 
2.3.3. Total Sample 
For the initial analysis, a total sample approach was employed. Although this 
approach introduces confounds of group differences such as degree of disability, it 
maximises sample size and thus enables RTS to be positioned and described relative to 
representative group samples.  The demographic characteristics of the total group sample 
are displayed in Table 1 (left hand side). Of the 643 participants included in the total 
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sample, 77.1% were male; 89.1% were able or partly able4; 85.2% were mobile; and 
93.4% were verbal. 85.6% of the group had normal vision; and 89.2% had normal 
hearing5. The mean age of the group was 17.20 years (SD: 10.29; Range; 4.10-62.00). 
 
2.3.4. Matched Sample 
For the second analysis, a matched sample approach was employed. Such an 
approach allows for the control of varying degrees of intellectual and physical disability 
across groups. A subset of 168 participants (42 from each group) were selected and 
matched for chronological age, verbal ability, and self help score (+/- 2; derived from the 
Wessex Scale: Kuschlick et al., 1973). Self-help scores were employed as an indicator of 
degree of disability. The demographic characteristics of the matched group are displayed 
in Table 1 (right hand side).  Of the 168 participants included in the matched sample, 
69.6% were male; 89.9% were able or partly able; 83.2% were mobile; and 92.9% were 
verbal. 81.5% of the group had normal vision; and 83.9% had normal hearing. The mean 
age of the group was 15.70 years (SD: 7.40; Range; 4.95-45.84).
                                                 
4 Scoring six or above on the self help subscale of the Wessex Scale (Kuschlick et al. 1973). The 
self-help score is derived from summing three items regarding independent feeding, washing and 
dressing. Items are scored from one to three resulting in a total score ranging between three and 
nine. 
5Information regarding mobility, verbal ability, vision, and hearing was derived from the Wessex 
Scale (Kuschlick et al. 1973) 
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Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the total group and matched samples broken down by syndrome group 
 Total Sample Analysis Matched Sample Analysis 
Syndrome group  Syndrome group  
A B C D     A B C D    
ASD FXS RTS DS Df χ²/ 
Kruskal 
Wallis* 
p value Post hoc 
analyses 
(<.01) 
ASD FXS RTS DS χ²/ 
Kruskal 
Wallis* 
p value Post hoc 
analyses 
(<.01) 
Na  228 196 87 132  42 42 42 42  
Ageb Mean 12.01 17.48 19.98 23.91 3 103.52* <.001 B,C,D>A 
D>B 
15.55 15.50 15.86 15.90 0.30* .960 - 
SD 
 



















Gender % male 86.0 100f 54.0 43.2 3 180.83 <.001 B>A>C,D 
 
83.3 100 f 57.1 38.1 44.91 < .001 B>A>C,D 
 
Abilityc % able or 
partly abled 
89.9 90.8 77.0 93.1 3 16.03 .001 A,B,D>C 90.5 90.5 83.3 95.2 3.34 .342 - 
Mobilityc % mobilee 95.2 72.0 77.9 92.4 3 54.52 <.001 A,D>B,C 90.5 71.4 82.9 88.1 6.49 .090 - 
Verbal ability c %verbal 92.5 96.3 84.9 96.2 3 14.55 .002 B,D>C 90.5 95.2 88.1 97.6 3.59 .309 - 
Hearingc % normal 
hearing 
96.9 97.4 85.1 65.9 3 101.68 <.001 A,B>C>D 
 
97.6 97.6 78.6 61.9 27.67 < .001 A,B>C,D 
 
Visionc % normal 
vision 
96.5 88.1 85.1 63.4 3 75.66 <.001 A>B,C>D 
 
97.6 88.1 78.6 61.9 19.42 < .001 A> C, D 
B>D 
Groups: ASD Autism Spectrum Disorder, FXS Fragile X Syndrome, RTS Rubinstein- Taybi Syndrome, DS Down Syndrome 
a N may vary across analyses due to missing or incomplete data 
b in years 
c  information obtained from the Wessex self help scale (Kushlick et al, 1973) 
d Those scoring six or above on the self help subscale. Self help is derived from summing three items regarding independent feeding, washing and dressing. Items are scored between one 
and three resulting in a total score ranging between three and nine.  
e  defined as scoring six on the Wessex mobility subscale 
f  due to the X linked nature of the disorder 100% of FXS participants were male 
Note. A letter missing from the post hoc analyses column indicates that the group did not differ from the other groups.  
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2.3.5. Measures.  
Questionnaires included measures developed for use with individuals with ID. 
These included6 a demographic questionnaire, the Wessex Scale (Kuschlick et al., 1973), 
the Social Communication Questionnaire7 (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, Lord, & Berument, 
2003), the Mood Interest and Pleasure Questionnaire – Short form (MIPQ-S; Ross, Arron, 
& Oliver 2008), and The Activity Questionnaire (TAQ; Burbidge & Oliver, 2008; 
Burbidge et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.5.1. Demographic questionnaire.  
The demographic questionnaire obtains information regarding participants’ age, 
gender, mobility, verbal ability and diagnosis. The questionnaire also collects data relating 
to when and by whom the participant was diagnosed.  
 
2.3.5.2. Wessex Scale (Kuschlick et al., 1973.) 
 The Wessex Scale is an informant measure used to assess ability in children and 
adults with IDs. Five subscales measure literacy, mobility, continence, speech, and self 
help skills. This scale also includes items relating to vision and hearing. Informants are 
asked to rate the ability of the person they care for on a 3-point scale. Low scores on this 
measure indicate lower ability levels. In this study, the scale was used to establish the 
                                                 
6 As this paper is part of a wider study examining behaviour in genetic syndromes, other 
questionnaire measures were also included but are described elsewhere (Arron, Oliver, Berg, Moss 
& Burbidge, 2011; Burbidge et al., 2010; Oliver, Berg, Burbidge, Arron & Moss, 2011) 
7 The FXS group completed an earlier version of the SCQ (Autism Screening Questionnaire; 
Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999). However, one item (item 20: social chat) differs 
for non verbal individuals between the ASQ and the SCQ. Consequently, to ensure consistency, this 
item was treated as a missing item and prorated for all nonverbal participants. A mean item score 
was calculated based on the other completed items of the communication domain. This method has 
been used previously (Moss, Oliver, Nelson, Richards & Hall, 2013) and current analysis indicated 
that the use of this prorated item did not impact on the between group differences in SCQ scores.  
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degree of disability of participants. The scale has good inter-rater reliability at subscale 
level for both children and adults (Kushlick et al., 1973; Palmer & Jenkins, 1982). 
 
2.3.5.3 The Activity Questionnaire (TAQ; Burbidge & Oliver, 2008; Burbidge et al., 
2010).  
The Activity Questionnaire (TAQ) assesses overactive and impulsive behaviours in 
individuals with ID. The measure includes 18 items that comprise three subscales: 
Overactivity, Impulsivity and Impulsive Speech. Items are scored on a 5 point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (never/almost never) to 5 (always/almost all of the time). High scores on 
this measure indicate high levels of overactivity. To ensure comparability of scores across 
a wide range of ID, different scoring protocols are employed for immobile and non verbal 
individuals. Inter-rater reliability for verbal and non verbal participants is .74 and .78 
respectively. Test-retest scores for verbal and non verbal participants are .88 and .94 
respectively. Overall internal consistency is .94. 
 
2.3.5.4. Mood, Interest and Pleasure Questionnaire Short-form (MIPQ-S; Ross, Oliver 
& Arron, 2008).  
The MIPQ-S is used to assess affect in individuals with ID, including those with 
profound ID.  Based on observations over a two week period, informants rate 12 items on 
a five point Likert scale. The MIPQ-S yields an overall score and two subscale scores – 
‘Mood’ and ‘Interest and Pleasure’. Low scores indicate low mood, interest and pleasure. 
The measure has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients: total = .88, 
Mood = .79, Interest and Pleasure = .87) and good test-retest and inter-rater reliability, 
with Kappa values of .97 and .85 respectively.  
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2.3.5.5. Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, Lord, & Berument, 
2003). 
 Based on the Autism Diagnostic Interview, the SCQ was developed as a tool for 
screening for ASD in children and adults.  The measure contains 40 items which are 
grouped into a total score and three subscales: Communication; Social Interaction; and 
Repetitive and Stereotyped patterns of behaviour. Informants are asked to respond ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ to items corresponding to the presence or absence of certain behaviours. Higher 
scores on this measure indicate a greater degree of ASD symptomatology. The authors 
employ a cut off score of 15 as the standard optimal cut off for distinguishing individuals 
with ASDs (including autism) from other diagnoses. The SCQ shows good concurrent 
validity with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule and the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview (Howlin & Karpf, 2004).  Internal consistency is good (α = .90 for the total 
scale; Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999). 
As the number of non-verbal participants varied across groups, a proportional 
communication subscale score was used. Items 2 to 7 of the SCQ are only scored for 
verbal participants, yet items 2 to 40 are used in the SCQ scoring algorithms. As a result, 
nonverbal individuals can only score on 8 of the 13 communication domain items and this 
introduces a scoring bias between groups of different abilities. The proportional 
communication subscale uses a mean item domain score (score on communication 
subscale / 8 x 13) to control for this bias.   
 
2.3.6. Procedure 
Participants were sent a pack consisting of a covering letter, consent form, 
information sheet, and questionnaire booklet (see Appendix A-D). To avoid priming, the 
study was entitled ‘Understanding behaviour in people with neurodevelopmental 
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disorders’. Participants were asked to return completed questionnaires and consent forms 
to the University in prepaid envelopes.  
2.3.7. Data Analysis 
Data were inspected for normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (for n >50) 
and Shapiro-Wilk tests (for n <50). Where data were not normally distributed (p<.05), non 
parametric tests were used. To examine differences in demographic characteristics 
between groups, Kruskal-Wallis tests were employed for ordinal data and Chi-square 
statistics for categorical data. To compare RTS to the comparison groups across the areas 
of affect, overactivity, impulsivity, and autism spectrum behaviour, Kruskal Wallis tests 
were employed for subscales of the MIPQ, TAQ and SCQ. Significant differences were 
examined using post-hoc Mann- Whitney U tests. Chi square statistics were employed to 
examine differences in the proportions of each group reaching criteria for ASD. All 
analyses were conducted for both the total group and matched samples. Due to the large 
number of statistical analyses being conducted, a conservative alpha value of <.001 was 
utilised throughout.  
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Total Sample Analysis 
2.4.1.1. Demographic characteristics 
 Between group analyses indicated that significant differences were found between 
groups on all demographic measures. These results are presented in Table 1 (left hand 
side). For ability, post hoc comparisons revealed that individuals with RTS were 
significantly less able than all other groups. Individuals with RTS also showed 
significantly lower verbal ability than the FXS and DS groups. For age, the ASD group 
was significantly younger than all other groups, and the FXS group was significantly 
younger than the DS group. Due to the X linked nature of the disorder (Garber, Visootsak 
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& Warren, 2008); the FXS group contained a significantly higher proportion of male 
participants than all other groups. Also, as expected (Fombonne, 2003), the ASD group 
contained a higher proportion of male participants than the RTS and DS groups. 
Individuals with FXS and DS were less mobile than individuals with ASD and DS. 
Individuals with DS and RTS evidenced poorer hearing than the ASD and FXS groups, 
and the DS group also showed poorer hearing than the RTS group. For vision, the ASD 
group had a significantly higher proportion of individuals showing ‘normal vision’ than all 
other groups. It was also found that individuals with DS had poorer vision than the FXS 
and RTS groups.  
2.4.1.2. Overview 
The aim of the total sample analysis was to position and describe RTS relative to 
representative samples of ASD, FXS, and DS on measures of affect, 
overactivity/impulsivity and ASD symptomatology. To achieve this, between group 
analyses were conducted on subscales of The Activity Questionnaire, The Mood, Interest 
and Pleasure Questionnaire and The Social Communication Questionnaire. The results of 
these analyses are shown in Table 2. 
2.4.1.3. Impulsivity, overactivity and impulsive speech 
Between group analyses revealed significant group differences on all three 
subscales of the TAQ. Post hoc comparisons revealed that both the ASD and FXS groups 
scored significantly higher impulsivity and overactivity scores than both the RTS and DS 
groups. Individuals with RTS were also found to score significantly higher on these 
subscales than individuals with DS. For the impulsive speech subscale the ASD group 
scored significantly higher scores than the RTS and DS groups. Individuals with FXS also 
scored significantly higher on this domain than the DS group.
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  Syndrome Group  
A B C D 
ASD FXS RTS DS 
Mean (SD) df χ² p value Post hoc Mann 
Whitney tests (<.001) 








3 139.13 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS>DS 








3 148.47 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS>DS 
 








3 89.92 < .001 ASD>RTS,DS 
FXS>DS 








3 102.14 < .001 FXS,RTS,DS>ASD 








3 94.22 < .001 FXS,RTS,DS>ASD 
DS>FXS 








3 117.23 < .001 FXS,RTS,DS>ASD 
DS>FXS 








3 188.84 < .001 ASD>FXS>RTS>DS 
 








3 210.69 < .001 ASD>FXS,RTS>DS 
 








3 187.36 < .001 ASD>FXS,RTS>DS 












< .001 ASD>FXS>RTS>DS 
 
 % ASDc 100 83.5 64.9 19.2 3 266.90 < .001 ASD>FXS>RTS>DS 
 
 % Autismd 78.1 48.3 23.4 9.6 3 161.73 <.001 ASD>FXS>RTS,DS 
 
ASD Autism Spectrum Disorder, FXS Fragile X Syndrome, RTS Rubinstein- Taybi Syndrome, DS Down Syndrome 
a calculated only for verbal participants 
b a higher score on the social communication questionnaire indicates greater impairment 
c percentage of participants scoring a total of 15 or over on the social communication questionnaire (Berument et al, 1999) 
d percentage of participants scoring a total of 22 or over on the social communication questionnaire (Berument et al, 1999) 
Note. A letter missing from the post hoc analyses column indicates that the group did not differ from the other groups. 
Table 2: Total sample mean scores and standard deviations for all measures and results of statistical analyses comparing syndrome groups 
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2.4.1.4. Mood, interest and pleasure 
Between group analyses revealed significant group differences on both subscales of 
the MIPQ. For both the mood, and interest and pleasure subscales, post hoc comparisons 
revealed that individuals with ASD displayed significantly lower mood, interest, and 
pleasure than all other groups. Comparisons also revealed that the FXS group displayed 
significantly lower interest and pleasure than the DS group.  
 
2.4.1.5. Communication, social interaction and repetitive behaviour 
Between group analyses revealed significant differences on each of the three 
domains of the SCQ. For the communication subscale, post hoc comparisons indicated that 
the ASD group scored significantly higher (greater impairment) than all other groups. The 
FXS group scored significantly higher than the RTS and DS groups, and the RTS group 
scored significantly higher than the DS group. For the repetitive behaviour and social 
interaction subscales, post hoc comparisons indicated that the ASD group scored 
significantly higher on both these subscales (more impaired social interaction, more 
repetitive behaviour) than all other groups. For these subscales, it was also found that both 
the FXS and RTS groups scored significantly higher than the DS group.  
The proportions of each group scoring at or above the cut off for ASD (scoring 15 
or above on the SCQ) and Autism (scoring 22 or above on the SCQ) are also displayed in 
Table 2. Between group analysis revealed significant differences in the proportion of 
participants scoring above the ASD and Autism cut offs. For the ASD cutoff, post hoc 
comparisons indicated that the ASD group contained a significantly higher proportion of 
participants meeting the cut off than all the other groups. The FXS group contained a 
significantly higher proportion than the RTS and DS groups, and the RTS group contained 
a significantly higher proportion than the DS group. For the Autism cut off, post hoc 
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comparisons indicated that the ASD group contained a significantly higher proportion of 
participants meeting the cut off than all the other groups and the FXS group contained a 
significantly higher proportion than the RTS and DS groups. 
 
2.4.2. Matched Sample Analysis 
2.4.2.1. Demographic characteristics 
Between group analyses of the matched samples indicated that participants in all 
four groups did not differ with regards to age, ability, mobility and verbal ability. 
However, significant group differences were found for gender, hearing, and vision. These 
results are presented in Table 1 (right hand side). As expected, the FXS group contained a 
significantly higher proportion of male participants than all other groups and the ASD 
group contained a higher proportion of male participants than the RTS and DS groups. 
Individuals with DS and RTS evidenced poorer hearing than the ASD and FXS groups. 
For vision, the ASD group had a significantly higher proportion of individuals showing 
‘normal vision’ than the RTS and DS groups. It was also found that the DS group had 
poorer vision than the FXS group.  
 
2.4.2.2. Overview 
The total sample analysis above allowed the RTS group to be positioned and 
described relative to representative samples of ASD, FXS, and DS. However, it is of note 
that in this analysis individuals with RTS were significantly less able than all other groups. 
Consequently, the aim of the matched sample analysis was to investigate whether the same 
pattern of results remained after controlling for age, ability, verbal ability, and mobility.  
To achieve this, between group analyses were repeated on a subgroup of participants 
matched on these variables. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Matched sample mean scores and standard deviations for all measures and results of statistical analyses comparing groups. 
 Syndrome Group  
A B C D 
ASD FXS RTS DS 
Mean (SD) df χ² p value Post hoc Mann 
Whitney tests (<.001) 








3 30.60 < .001 ASD,FXS>DS 








3 30.85 < .001 FXS>RTS,DS 
ASD>DS 








3 13.86 .003 - 








3 24.16 < .001 RTS,DS>ASD 








3 41.84 < .001 FXS,RTS,DS>ASD 








3 44.45 < .001 FXS,RTS,DS>ASD 








3 53.11 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS,DS 








3 44.53 < .001 ASD,FXS,RTS>DS 








3 62.26 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS,DS 








3 71.81 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS,DS 
RTS>DS 
 % ASDc 100 100 65.7 29.4 3 66.81 < .001 ASD,FXS>RTS,DSe 
 % Autismd 83.3 62.2 22.9 14.7 3 47.95 <.001 ASD,FXS>RTS,DS 
ASD Autism Spectrum Disorder, FXS Fragile X Syndrome, RTS Rubinstein- Taybi Syndrome, DS Down Syndrome 
a calculated only for verbal participants 
b a higher score on the social communication questionnaire indicates greater impairment 
c percentage of participants scoring a total of 15 or over on the social communication questionnaire (Berument et al, 1999) 
d percentage of participants scoring a total of 22 or over on the social communication questionnaire (Berument et al, 1999) 
e The difference between RTS and DS approached significance at 0.003 
Note. A letter missing from the post hoc analyses column indicates that the group did not differ from the other groups. 
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2.4.2.3. Impulsivity, overactivity and impulsive speech 
Between group analyses of the matched sample revealed that significant group 
differences were now only apparent for the impulsivity and overactivity subscales of the 
TAQ. The previously noted group differences on the impulsive speech subscale were no 
longer significant. Post hoc comparisons for the impulsivity subscale revealed that the 
ASD and FXS groups evidenced significantly higher impulsivity scores than the DS group. 
Individuals with RTS were no longer significantly different to any other group on this 
subscale. Post hoc comparisons for the overactivity subscale indicated that FXS group 
evidenced significantly higher overactivity scores than the RTS and DS groups, and the 
ASD group scored significantly higher than the DS group. However, individuals with RTS 
were no longer significantly different to those in the ASD or DS groups.  
 
2.4.2.4. Mood, interest and pleasure 
Between group analyses of the matched sample indicated that significant group 
differences remained for both subscales of the MIPQ. However, post hoc comparisons 
revealed a different pattern of results. For both the mood, and interest and pleasure 
subscales, individuals with ASD still displayed significantly lower mood, interest, and 
pleasure than the RTS and DS groups. However, results showed that the ASD group no 
longer scored significantly lower than the FXS group on these subscales. Furthermore, on 
the interest and pleasure subscale, the FXS group no longer scored significantly lower than 
the DS group.     
 
2.4.2.5. Communication, social interaction and repetitive behaviour. 
Between group analyses of the matched samples revealed that significant group 
differences remained on each of the three domains of the SCQ. However, post hoc 
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comparisons now revealed a different pattern of results for each subscale. For the 
communication and social interaction subscales, findings showed that the ASD and FXS 
groups scored significantly higher (greater impairment) than both the RTS and DS groups. 
These results indicate that following matching, the ASD group no longer scored 
significantly higher than the FXS group, and the RTS group no longer scored significantly 
higher than the DS group. For the repetitive behaviour subscale, findings showed that the 
ASD, FXS, and RTS groups all showed significantly higher scores than the DS group. 
This result indicated that following matching the ASD group no longer differed from the 
FXS and RTS groups on this subscale.  
  The proportions of each subgroup scoring at or above the cut off for ASD (scoring 
15 or above on the SCQ) and Autism (scoring 22 or above on the SCQ) are also displayed 
in Table 3. Between group analysis revealed significant differences in the proportion of 
participants scoring at or above the ASD and Autism cut offs. For the ASD cut off, post 
hoc comparisons indicated that the ASD and FXS no longer differed in the proportions of 
participants reaching the cut off, but both groups contained a significantly higher 
proportion of participants meeting the cut off than both the RTS and DS groups. The RTS 
group contained more participants reaching ASD cut-off than the DS group, but this 
difference now only approached significance (p=.003). For the Autism cut off, post hoc 
comparisons indicated that the ASD and FXS no longer differed in the proportions of 
participants reaching the cut off, but both groups contained a significantly higher 











The current chapter aimed to extend the behavioural phenotype of RTS by using 
both total and matched sample approaches to position the group relative to ASD, FXS, and 
DS on behavioural characteristics relating to affect, overactivity, and ASD 
symptomatology. A strength of this study is that the use of standardised, valid measures 
applicable to people with ID along with the inclusion of comparable contrast groups 
enabled the consideration of the specificity of findings to RTS. Comparative analysis 
revealed several important findings.  
The presence of ADHD- type behaviours such as impulsivity and hyperactivity 
have previously been described in RTS (Hennekam, 2006; Stevens et al, 1990b; Stevens et 
al, 2011). However, these studies were cohort descriptions and therefore unable to 
establish the specificity of these behaviours to the group. In the current study, between 
group comparisons provide evidence that these behaviours do occur at relatively high 
levels in RTS. Analysis of the total sample revealed that although the ASD and FXS 
groups scored significantly higher on measures of impulsivity and overactivity than both 
the RTS and DS groups, individuals with RTS scored significantly higher on these 
subscales than the DS group. Although DS is not known to be characterised by particularly 
high levels of impulsivity and overactivity (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000), this finding 
indicates that the presence of these behaviours in the total group sample of RTS is 
comparatively higher than at least one syndrome group of known genetic aetiology.  
When the samples were matched, thus controlling for level of ID, individuals with 
RTS were no longer significantly different to any of the groups on the impulsivity 
subscale, but ASD and FXS scored significantly higher on this subscale than DS. The 
matched comparisons for the overactivity subscale indicated that the FXS group scored 
significantly higher overactivity scores than the RTS and DS groups, and the ASD group 
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scored significantly higher than the DS group. High levels of overactivity have been 
reported in FXS (Oliver et al, 2011) so the description and positioning of RTS as ‘less 
overactive’ than this group when matched is informative.   
Findings from the Mood, Interest, and Pleasure Questionnaire revealed that 
individuals with RTS scored significantly higher scores (more positive affect) than the 
ASD group on mood, interest, and pleasure, for both the total sample and matched sample 
analyses. The RTS group were found to be comparable to both DS and FXS on these 
subscales for both analyses. Prior to this study, individuals with RTS had been described 
as ‘emotional and excitable’ and ‘happy, loving and friendly’ (Baxter & Beer, 1992; Goots 
& Liemohn, 1977; Hennekam, 2006; Padfield et al, 1968; Rubinstein & Taybi, 1963; 
Stevens et al, 2011) but no study had specifically looked at the behavioural characteristics 
of affect and made comparisons to other groups. The presence of low mood in ASD has 
been previously described (Hill & Furniss, 2006). In contrast, individuals with FXS have 
been found to display higher levels of mood than a number of other genetic syndromes 
(Oliver et al, 2011) and reports for DS suggest a sociable and engaging demeanour (Fidler, 
Most, Booth-LaForce, & Kelly, 2008).  When considered alongside these descriptions, the 
current findings suggest that RTS is not characterised by low mood, interest, and pleasure, 
but instead appear to display levels that are at least comparable to two other groups of 
known genetic aetiology.  
The proportions of individuals with RTS meeting the cut-off for ASD on the Social 
Communication Questionnaire were relatively high at 64.9% and 65.7% for the total and 
matched groups respectively. The proportions of these individuals meeting the cut off for 
Autism were 23.4% and 22.9 % for the total and matched groups respectively. These 
findings are novel as although the presence of ‘autistic like behaviours’ have been 
previously noted in the group (Galéra et al. 2009; Stevens et al, 2011), no study has 
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specifically examined the proportions of individuals reaching cut-off criteria.  Between 
group comparisons for the total sample indicated that both the ASD and FXS groups 
contained significantly more individuals reaching the ASD cut-off than the RTS and DS 
groups, and the RTS group contained significantly more individuals reaching cut-off than 
the DS group. When the groups were matched, the ASD and FXS groups continued to 
have significantly more individuals reaching cut-off than the RTS and DS groups, but the 
difference between the RTS and DS group only approached significance. However, the 
difference in proportions between the RTS and DS groups was still relatively large (65.7% 
and 29.4% respectively) and it is likely that this difference did not reach significance 
because power was differentially affected by missing SCQ data in these groups resulting in 
a smaller n. For the Autism cut off, between group comparisons for the total sample 
indicated that the ASD group contained a significantly higher proportion of participants 
meeting the cut off than all the other groups and the FXS group contained a significantly 
higher proportion than the RTS and DS groups. When the groups were matched ASD and 
FXS no longer differed with regards to the proportions of participants reaching the cut off, 
however both groups continued to have significantly more individuals reaching cut-off 
than the RTS and DS groups. 
Although the proportions of ASD across the groups allows RTS to be positioned 
relative to other groups in a way that has not been done previously, it is the profile of ASD 
symptomatology across the three subscales of the SCQ that is of particular interest. As 
discussed in section 2.2, anecdotal descriptions in the literature would suggest a 
dissociation across the ASD triad of impairments in RTS, with a high level of repetitive 
behaviour but competent social functioning. Given these descriptions it was expected that 
when compared to ASD, FXS, and DS, RTS might be positioned more closely to ASD and 
FXS on measures of repetitive behaviour, but closer to DS on measures of social 
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behaviour. Findings from the total sample analysis partly confirmed these predictions. 
More specifically, with regards to repetitive behaviour, the analyses indicated that the RTS 
group showed higher levels than the DS group, comparable levels to the FXS group, but 
lower levels than the ASD group. For social communication, the RTS group showed less 
impairment than the ASD and FXS groups but more impairment than the DS group, and 
for social interaction the RTS group showed less impairment than the ASD group but more 
impairment than the DS group. However, as noted previously, the role of ID needs to be 
considered carefully when studying the ASD symptomatology as many of the core features 
of ASD are developmentally weighted (Moss et al., 2013). In the total sample, the RTS 
group was significantly less able than all three other groups and therefore this may have 
masked some of the differences across the groups.  
When the groups were matched, the noted dissociation between the ASD 
characteristics in RTS and subsequent group differences became more apparent. As 
predicted, for the social aspects of the ASD triad (social communication and social 
interaction) RTS and DS were comparable and both significantly less impaired than the 
ASD and FXS groups.  However, for repetitive behaviour, RTS was comparable to the 
ASD and FXS groups, all of whom showed significantly higher levels of repetitive 
behaviour than the DS group. These findings are of interest as they demonstrate that 
although a relatively large number of individuals with RTS may meet the ‘cut-off score’ 
for ASD, it suggests that the behaviours that contribute to this ‘score’ are qualitatively 
different in RTS than in idiopathic ASD. This highlights the importance of examining 
ASD phenomenology in genetic syndromes beyond the level of clinical cut off scores.  
The findings of the current chapter need to be considered alongside methodological 
limitations. Although the questionnaire measures used are standardised and validated for 
people with ID, they rely on retrospective carer reports and so have obvious limitations. 
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The use of observational assessments such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 2000) were not possible within the current study 
but would have been preferable and should be used in future studies to refine the 
assessment of behavioural characteristics in the group.  Limitations relating to statistical 
analysis should also be noted. Due to different group sizes in the total sample analysis and 
missing data in the matched sample analysis, power was differentially affected. This 
means that despite similar levels of difference, analysis between smaller groups did not 
reach significance. However, the use of the total sample and matched sample approaches 
together allowed the consideration of which findings may have been affected by 
difficulties with power.  Finally, participants with RTS were recruited via a syndrome 
support group and so it is possible that these participants may not be representative of the 
wider population of individuals with RTS as a whole. However, group comparisons remain 
valid as the comparison groups used in the study were recruited in the same way meaning 
that any potential bias would be consistent across groups.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
It has been suggested that understanding the presentation of ASD characteristics in 
genetic syndromes that display a dissociation of the triad of impairments may be helpful in 
extending our understanding of the aetiology of ASD (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). 
Chapter 1 drew attention to the specific study of ToM development in syndrome groups 
that showed a high prevalence of ASD but divergent social profiles. Overall, the current 
chapter has provided evidence that points towards RTS as a syndrome group from which 
to do this. The chapter has described that although a large proportion of the RTS group 
meet the ‘cutoff’ criteria for ASD, the profile of ASD symptomatology in the group shows 
a divergent social profile relative to repetitive behaviour. 
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In chapter 1 it was argued that the study of ASD phenomenology in genetic 
syndromes can aid understanding of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD. It was 
subsequently highlighted how syndrome groups that displayed fractionated ASD profiles 
could provide a useful vehicle by which to study each aspect of the ASD triad separately. 
More specifically the chapter drew attention to the potential study of ToM development in 
syndrome groups that showed a high prevalence of ASD but fractionated social profiles. In 
chapter 2, a total group and matching approach was used to examine the behavioural 
phenotype of a potential syndrome of interest; Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS). 
Findings from this chapter confirmed RTS as a syndrome group that showed a 
comparatively high prevalence of ASD but a dissociation across the ASD triad of 
impairments. For social aspects of the ASD triad, RTS was comparable to Down syndrome 
(DS) and significantly less impaired than an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) group and a 
Fragile X syndrome (FXS) group. However, for repetitive behaviour RTS was comparable 
to the ASD and FXS groups, and showed significantly higher levels of repetitive behaviour 
than the DS group. In the following chapter, the focus returns to the study of Theory of 
Mind (ToM) development in genetic syndromes. As highlighted in chapter 1, despite the 
potential benefits of studying ToM in genetic syndromes, research in this area is 
constrained by the use of single task methodologies and the cognitive demands of typical 
ToM tasks. In an attempt to overcome these constraints, the current chapter describes the 
development of a ‘ToM precursor’ social cognition scale, suitable for individuals with 











ToM refers to the social cognitive ability to attribute mental states (i.e. beliefs and 
desires) to others. This ability is fundamental to human social development as it allows a 
person to predict, explain and manipulate the behaviour of others (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). For instance, if you see your friend looking inside a cookie jar, you are likely to 
explain this by making the assumption that he wants a cookie, and he believes that there is 
one in there. Importantly, you can understand his behaviour even if you know that there are 
no cookies left. Alternatively, you might find it funny if you know that you have hidden 
them in a different place but that he does not know this.  The understanding of mental 
states is also crucial for typical reciprocal social interaction: for understanding the intended 
meaning in communication; for understanding humour and sarcasm; for understanding 
if/when a person may not want to talk to you; and for comprehending the difference 
between imaginary and real events (Frith, 1989).  
As discussed in section 1.5, there is a wide body of evidence linking the 
characteristic social interaction and communicative impairments in ASD to deficits in 
ToM (Baron-Cohen, 2000). The impact of these deficits on social functioning has been 
illustrated in first person accounts of Autism that detail how the social world can be a 
confusing a frightening place. In a personal account of autism, Joliffe, Landsdown & 
Robinson (1992) describe the difficulties that ensue from the inability to understand 
others’ mental states: 
Human beings are the hardest of all to understand because not only do you 
have to cope with the problem of seeing them, they move about when you are 
not expecting them to, they make varying noises and along with this, they place 
all kinds of demands on you which are just impossible to understand.  
(Joliffe, Lansdown & Robinson, 1992, p.16). 
 
Given how important understanding others’ mental states can be for navigating the social 
world, the study of ToM and its relationship to social behaviour has now extended to many 




other disorders characterised by social difficulties including: rare genetic syndromes 
(Campbell et al. 2011; Cornish et al. 2005; Karmiloff-Smith et al. 1995);  Schizophrenia 
(Frith & Corcoran, 1996); Dementia (Gregory et al. 2002); Deafness (Peterson et al. 2005); 
and Anorexia Nervosa (Russell, Schmidt, Doherty, Young & Tchanturia, 2009). 
The field of ToM research is extensive and hundreds of studies have examined the 
age at which ToM ability typically develops in children. The ‘false belief task’ has 
dominated much of this research, with authors of studies debating the age at which 
children pass the task reliably and thus demonstrate their understanding of belief (Doherty, 
2008). However, it is now widely accepted that, regardless of task manipulations, typically 
developing children fail false belief tasks at around three years old but then undergo a 
conceptual change at around four-to-five years and start passing reliably (Wellman, Cross, 
& Watson, 2001).  
In more recent years, research has broadened to include the study of the 
development of social cognitive abilities that occur during the first two years of life. 
Research has examined the presence of implicit false belief understanding (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005) and the presence of other early developing explicit abilities such as 
joint attention, and shared intentionality (e.g. Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne & Moll, 2005; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). There has been 
evidence for impairment in both of these implicit and explicit abilities in ASD (Leekam & 
Ramsden, 2006; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; Senju, 
Southgate, White & Frith, 2009). The current thesis focuses on early explicit abilities. It 
has been proposed that these early abilities lay the foundations for later ToM development. 
For instance, Baron-Cohen (1989, 1993, 1995) discussed the concept of joint attention; the 
shared focus of two individuals on an object (indicated by behaviours such as proto-
declarative pointing and gaze following). He argued that the understanding of ‘attention’ in 




these episodes was a ‘critical precursor’ to ToM understanding. Similarly, Tomasello and 
colleagues (1993, 2005) discussed the understanding of intentions and shared 
intentionality. They propose that infants’ understanding of others as ‘intentional agents’ is 
one of the earliest developing social cognitive abilities and subsequently paves the way for 
more sophisticated social cognitive understanding. Recent longitudinal studies have started 
to provide evidence for these proposed developmental sequences.  
Charman et al. (2000) conducted a study that examined joint attention, imitation, 
and play in 13 children aged 20 months. The children were followed up longitudinally at 
44 months with a battery of ToM tasks. Although imitation ability was found to be 
longitudinally associated with expressive language, only early joint attention abilities were 
found to be associated with later ToM ability at 44 months.  In a similar study, Wellman, 
Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii & Lalonde (2004) used data from Philips, Wellman, & Spelke’s 
(2002)  preferential looking study that assessed 32, 14-month olds’ understanding that 
actors’ intentional actions are directed by their perceptual-emotional regard. Wellman et al. 
(2004) followed up 18 of the original infants and tested them on Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
ToM scale. Their findings indicated that 14 month olds’ habituation to human intentional 
action significantly predicted their later ToM. In the most recent of these longitudinal 
studies, Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops & Perucchini (2008) displayed convergent findings. The 
authors examined whether pointing gestures and intention understanding at 12 and 15 
months was related to later ToM performance at 39 months in 35 infants.  Results 
indicated that infants’ understanding of adult’s pointing at 12 and 15 months, and 
understanding others’ intentions at 15 months did indeed contribute to the understanding 
of mental states 2 years later.   
Taken together these studies certainly strengthen the suggestion of a causal 
relationship between early social cognitive ability and later ToM understanding. This 




finding is critical because, as discussed in section 1.8, the literature examining ToM in rare 
genetic syndromes is currently constrained by the cognitive demands of typical false belief 
tasks. As the evidence suggests that early social cognitive skills pave the way for later 
ToM understanding, the studies point to the potential that tasks assessing these early skills 
have for assessing the ToM development of individuals with ID who are too young or too 
cognitively impaired to complete traditional false belief tasks.  
 As outlined in section 1.11, the aim of this thesis is to address the question: How 
does the development of ToM relate to the social behaviour of syndrome groups that show 
a high prevalence of ‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles? Section 1.9 also outlined the 
potential benefits of adopting a developmental trajectory approach, particularly because it 
is proposed that there is not a ‘single’ ToM but rather a developmental succession of 
different accomplishments (e.g. Flavell & Miller, 1998; Gopnik et al. 1994; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992). Although a scale mapping the sequential steps of preschool ToM 
development has been devised and validated by Wellman and Liu (2004), there is currently 
no battery that maps the developmental progression of the more recently studied ‘early 
precursor skills’. Consequently, the aim of the current chapter is to develop a scaled 
battery of early social cognitive ‘ToM precursor’ tasks suitable to study the developmental 
trajectory of ToM abilities in individuals with ID. This scale can then be used to examine 
the development of ToM in RTS, a model syndrome of interest.  
 
3.3. Selecting Tasks for Inclusion 
3.3.1. Search strategy 
In order to select the tasks that would be used in the social cognition scale a 
literature review was conducted that examined tasks that assessed early developing, 
explicit social cognitive abilities. The review yielded a number of possible research studies 
for consideration.  However, tasks to be selected were required to fit inclusion criteria in 




order for them to be appropriate for a scale that would ultimately be used to assess 
individuals with ID. The selection criteria are outlined below. 
 
3.3.2. Selection criteria: 
 To enable tasks to be stacked in terms of developmental difficulty (and thus form 
a scale), studies needed to report findings that outlined an age at which infants 
demonstrated a particular skill/ability.  
 Tasks should be interesting and engaging for typically developing individuals and 
individuals with an ID. 
 Tasks should place minimal demands on expressive and receptive language. 
 Tasks should be short in duration so the entire battery can be administered in the 
same day. 
 Tasks should be appropriate to perform in participants’ homes with limited space. 
 Tasks should only require simple equipment that can be built by the experimenter 
and transported to participants’ homes easily. 
 Tasks should require a maximum of two experimenters. 
 Selected tasks should aim to examine a diverse range of early social cognitive 
skills to enable the examination of the possibility that certain skills may be 
selectively preserved or impaired in atypical individuals. 
 
3.4. Selected Tasks  
The following section describes the tasks that were selected following the review 
of the literature. Each task is discussed with reference to its social cognitive underpinnings, 
original methodology and findings, and specific rationale for selection.  Necessary 
modifications and the rationale for these modifications are also discussed. For instance, as 




each task was now required to form part of a scale, to be administered to a single 
participant at a time, changes to the number of trials or experimental procedure was 
sometimes necessary so a pass/ fail scoring criteria could later be applied.   
 
3.4.1. ‘Helping’ 
Warneken & Tomasello (2006, 2007) developed and carried out tasks to assess 
helping behaviour in infants. They argued that in order to help someone, a person must 
possess two skills: the altruistic motivation to act on behalf of another; and the social 
cognitive ability to understand another person’s intentions and unachieved goals. 
Subsequently, it was reasoned that evidence of helping behaviours in infants would 
therefore indicate the acquisition of these skills.  Warneken & Tomasello (2006, 2007) 
carried out two studies to examine the age at which helping behaviour (and thus 
underpinning abilities) developed in infants.  
The studies presented twenty four, 18 month old infants and twenty four, 14 month 
old infants with a set of experimental situations. In each situation an experimenter was 
observed to experience a problem that would require help from the infant. For instance, in 
one situation infants observed an examiner ‘accidentally’ dropping a pen and then 
unsuccessfully reaching for it. To ensure that each situation was actually assessing an 
infant’s helping behaviour and not just an aim to reinstate the original situation, each 
experimental situation had a corresponding control task. In each control task the same 
basic situation was present but there was no indication that there was a problem for the 
experimenter. For instance, in the ‘pen’ control condition the experimenter threw the pen 
on the floor intentionally and did not attempt to reach for it. Each experimental situation 
and corresponding control condition used by Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007) is 
outlined in Table 4.  A total of six situations were developed and each infant in the study 




participated in three experimental trials and three control trials. Each task was analysed 
between subjects with N= 12 in each condition. 
Results from the studies indicated that the 18month old infants reliably helped in 
all six tasks, and did so significantly more often in the experimental than the control 
conditions (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). However, findings showed that the 14 month 
old infants only reliably helped in the ‘out of reach’ trials (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). 
The authors concluded that, although not yet as general as at 18months, 14 months old 
infants possess the early social cognitive understanding of another person’s intentions and 
goal directed action, and they demonstrate this by handing out-of reach objects to a person 
who requires their help.    
 
3.4.1.1. Selection rationale and modifications 
The specific selection of these tasks from the literature was determined not only 
because they fulfilled the initial selection criteria (i.e. allowing the assessment of social 
cognitive understanding in individuals with ID), but also because they could potentially tap 
other interesting differences between typical and atypical populations as well. In section 
1.3 of chapter 1 it was outlined  how different syndrome groups associated with ASD 
exhibit fractionated social profiles, and in section 2.2 of chapter 2 it was outlined how 
individuals with RTS can be described as ‘over friendly’ (Stevens et al., 2011). Given that 
Warneken & Tomasello’s (2006, 2007) helping scenarios require an individual to possess 
altruistic social motivation in addition to social cognitive understanding, when used in the 
assessment of a number of syndrome groups, they may enable understanding of whether 
behavioural difference (such as fractionated social profiles) impacts upon the 
developmental trajectory of a fundamental skill. For instance, it may be that differences in 
social profiles might affect or alter the point at which these tasks are passed relative to 




other tasks in the scale.  In summary, the inclusion of these tasks not only allows 
assessment of the social cognitive development of individuals with ID but also when used 
to assess a number of syndrome groups with differing social profiles they could potentially 
provide other useful information.   
  Due to time constraints it would not be feasible to include all the helping situations 
used in the original studies by Warneken and Tomasello. Instead, the situations that 
evidenced helping at the youngest age (the ‘out-of-reach’ trials) were considered and the 
‘pen’ and ‘paper balls’ trials were selected to form task one of the experimental battery. 
The rationale for selecting these particular tasks was twofold. Firstly, the age of attainment 
of the ‘out-of-reach’ trials fulfilled the aim of developing a battery of tasks of increasing 
difficulty as they fit developmentally alongside the other tasks that were being considered 
(the out of reach tasks were developmentally ‘younger’ than the other tasks being 
considered for the battery). Secondly, the ‘pen’ and ‘paper balls’ were specifically selected 
as they were the tasks that elicited the highest rate of helping behaviours in the original 
study. 
As the control trials and experimental trials had been administered previously 
between infants, the procedure needed to be changed so it was suitable for within 
participant testing. To achieve this, the procedure was modified so that the control trials 
would be administered first by experimenter 1, and then the experimental trials 
administered separately by experimenter 2. 
 
3.4.1.2. Estimated age of acquisition 
The age at which the literature would suggest that typically developing infants 
would reliably pass this task is 14 months.











Experimental: The experimenter used clothespins to hang towels on a line. He accidentally dropped a clothespin and 
unsuccessfully reached for it. To help, the infant was required to pass the clothespin to the experimenter. 
Control: The experimenter intentionally threw the clothespin on the floor and did not reach for it. 
 
 Pen Experimental: The experimenter used a pen for writing, accidentally dropped it and unsuccessfully reached for it. To help, the 
infant was required to pass the pen to the experimenter. 
Control: The experimenter intentionally threw the pen on the floor and did not reach for it. 
 
 Paper Ball Experimental: The experimenter sat at a table opposite the infant. The experimenter collected three balls with tongs from his 
side of the table and put them in a container. The experimenter then unsuccessfully reached for three balls that were on the 
infant’s side of the table. To help, the infant was required to pass the balls to the experimenter. 
Control: The experimenter picked up each of the three paper balls and placed them back down. 
 
Wrong Means Flap Experimental: While E1 was outside the room, E2 showed a box to the infant and showed the infant a side flap that could be 
opened to access things inside. When E1 returned he put his teacup on the box so his spoon ‘accidentally’ slipped through a hole 
in the top of the box. E1 then attempted to reach through the hole, which was too small for his hand. To help, the infant was 
required to access the teaspoon through the flap at the side. 
Control: The experimenter intentionally threw the spoon in the box, and then placed his hands on the box. 
 
Wrong End Books Experimental: The experimenter put a stack of books next to where the infant was sat at the table. He then sat at the other end of 
the table and repeatedly attempted to put another book on top of the stack but kept missing so that the book landed next to the 
stack. To help, the infant was required to place the book on top of the stack. 




Cabinet Experimental: The experimenter opened the door of a cabinet, then took a pile of parcels from the side of the room and placed 
them inside the cabinet. He then closed the doors and fetched more parcels. On returning he tried to put them away but instead 
bumped into the closed doors as his hands were full. To help, the infant was required to open the door for the experimenter. 
Control: The experimenter initially put the parcels on top of the cabinet. Upon return he bumped into the doors as he tried to lift 
the parcels on to the cabinet top. 
Table 4: Warneken & Tomasello (2006, 2007) ‘Helping’ tasks: experimental and corresponding control trials. 
 





Effective social understanding involves the ability to understand the perception, 
attention and knowledge of others. An important early social cognitive skill is the ability to 
know what other people ‘do’ and ‘do not know’ based on what they have previously 
experienced. Moll & Tomasello (2007) carried out research to investigate at what age, and 
under what conditions, infants develop this early social cognitive understanding.  
In their study, infants observed an adult experiencing two objects under one of 
three conditions: in the ‘joint engagement’ condition, the infant and adult played with the 
two objects together; in the ‘individual engagement’ condition, the infant observed the 
adult playing with, and manipulating the objects herself; and in the ‘on-looking’ condition, 
the infant observed the adult simply ‘watching on’ as they played with the object 
themselves. For each condition, the adult then left the room and the infants played with a 
third object together with an assistant while the adult was outside. After a short period the 
adult returned to the room and exclaimed “Ohhh look! Look at that! Can you give it to 
me?” The authors reasoned that if infants possess an understanding of what others ‘do’ or 
‘do not know’ based on their previous experiences, then they should pass the adult the 
third (unexperienced) object. 
Eighty four, 18 month old infants and eighty four, 14 month old infants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Each infant received a 
single trial. Moll and Tomasello’s (2007) findings showed that 18 month olds reliably 
handed over the target item in the joint engagement condition and individual engagement 
condition, but not the on-looking condition. For 14 month olds, findings showed that they 
reliably handed the target item in only the joint engagement condition. The authors 
therefore concluded that infants register an adult’s experience only under specific 
circumstances, and these circumstances change with age. However, importantly, the results 




of the study demonstrate that by14 months, although not yet as general as 18 month olds, 
infants demonstrate the early social cognitive understanding of ‘what others know’. 
 
3.4.2.1. Selection rationale and modifications 
The specific selection of this study from the literature was because the design used 
by Moll & Tomasello (2007) fulfilled the selection criteria and thus would enable the 
assessment of social cognitive understanding in individuals with ID. To fit 
developmentally with other tasks selected in the battery it was decided that the condition 
that demonstrated social cognitive understanding at the youngest age would be used- the 
joint engagement condition (14 months). However, as the original study assessed the 
average performance of a group of infants, the number of trials needed to be modified so a 
pass/fail scoring criteria could be applied. Modifications were made so that each infant 
would receive two trials of the joint engagement condition, using new materials for each 
trial. Modifications to the task materials were also made. In the original study, the objects 
included a gardening utensil, a birdcage item, and a slide rule. However, as these tasks 
were to be used with individuals with ID it was deemed important to change the materials 
so that they would be more appealing and improve the likelihood that participants would 
not become bored and disengage from the task. The new materials that were selected were 
toys that all made a different sound by being manipulated in a particular way. All were 
distinguishable by colour and shape, approximately the same size, and deemed equal in 
terms of attractiveness. 
 
3.4.2.2. Estimated age of acquisition 
The age at which the literature would suggest that typically developing infants 
would pass this task reliably is 14 months. 




3.4.3. ‘Re-enactment of intended acts’ 
Studies have shown that infants can imitate adults’ behaviour from a young age 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983, 1992). This imitation can occur on a purely physical 
basis, with an infant mimicking an adult’s surface behaviour, without any social cognitive 
understanding of what the adult is intending or wanting to do. Bellagamba and Tomasello 
(1999) used a behavioural re-enactment procedure designed by Melztoff (1995) to 
demonstrate that by a certain age infants not only imitate surface behaviours, but that they 
also possess the social-cognitive understanding to interpret behaviour in terms of a 
person’s underlying intentions and goals. 
In their study, Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999) randomly assigned forty, 12-
month olds and forty, 18-month olds to one of four different re-enactment conditions. In 
each condition there were five pairs of objects that could be manipulated to perform a 
target act. These were: a dumbbell that could be pulled apart to form two separate pieces; a 
buzzer that could be switched on using a stick; a loop that could be hung over a protruding 
peg; some beads that could be dropped into a cup; and a square with a hole in it that could 
be stacked onto a vertical peg (Figure 1). In the ‘Demonstrate Target’ condition infants 
were presented with each object pair in its initial state and then the target act was modelled 
by the experimenter. For example, for the loop, the experimenter picked up the loop and 
placed it so that it hung over the protruding peg. Following this demonstration the object 
was returned to its original state and placed in front of the child. In the ‘Demonstrate 
Intention’ condition the experimenter did not demonstrate the target act. Instead, the 
experimenter was seen ‘trying’ but failing to achieve the act. For example, for the loop, the 
experimenter repeatedly tried but failed to put the loop over the prong. The loop was 
released slightly too low, or too far to the left or right so that each time it fell to the table 
instead of being hung over the prong. For each object the experimenter modelled the 




intention to perform the act, but not the actual target act. The object was then returned to 
its original state and placed in front of the child. In the ‘Demonstrate Endstate’ condition 
the experimenter did not explicitly demonstrate the target act. Instead, the experimenter 
presented each object already in its end state, then took each object behind her back and 
restored it to the initial state. For example, for the loop, the experimenter presented the 
equipment to the infant with the loop already hung over the prong. She then took the 
objects behind her back, returned the objects to their original state and placed in them front 
of the infant. Finally, in the ‘Control Manipulation’ condition the experimenter did not 
demonstrate the target act. Instead the experimenter presented the objects in their initial 
states and then modelled an arbitrary act. For example, for the loop, the loop was moved 
along the edge of the screen below the prong and then released. Therefore, the 
experimenter released the loop but showed no evident intention that she was attempting to 
place the loop over the prong. The object was returned to its original state and placed the 
object in front of the infant. For each object trial the infant’s behaviour was coded for 
whether or not they performed the target act. As there were five different object trials per 
condition, each infant could perform up to five target acts.  
It is important to note that an additional control trial was included in Meltzoff’s 
(1995) original study that ruled out the possibility that the objects themselves held certain 
behavioural ‘affordances’ that were elicited just from seeing the objects. It was found that 
when infants were presented just with the objects, and no adult demonstration, the target 
acts were not common baseline behaviours. More specifically, the infants did not reliably 
produce the target acts spontaneously through chance or because the objects ‘afforded’ a 
particular response. 
Bellagamba and Tomasello’s (1999) findings indicated that for 12-month olds, the 
mean number of target acts performed between conditions differed only for the 




‘Demonstrate Target’ condition. More specifically, the younger infants only imitated adult 
acts when they saw a full demonstration of the act. They did not perform the target act 
when they saw an adult intending but failing to perform the act or when only the end state 
was presented. However, for 18- month olds the findings were quite different. The mean 
number of target acts performed in the ‘Demonstrate Target’ condition and ‘Demonstrate 
Intention’ condition did not differ significantly from each other (mean number of target 
acts being 4.2 and 3.6 respectively) but both these conditions did differ from the ‘Control 
Manipulation’ and ‘Demonstrate Endstate’ conditions (2.2 and 1.4 respectively). These 
findings indicate that although not yet prolific in producing target behaviours when only an 
endstate is presented, by 18-months infants possess the social cognitive understanding to 




Figure 1: The five test objects used by Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999): a) dumbbell b) 








3.4.3.1. Selection rationale and modifications 
The specific selection of this study from the literature was because the design used 
by Bellagamba & Tomasello (2007) fulfilled the selection criteria and thus would enable 
the assessment of social cognitive understanding in individuals with ID. However, due to 
the time constraints of administering a number of different tasks to one child in a scale, 
modifications to the number of conditions and trials included for this method were made. It 
was decided that only the ‘Demonstrate Intention’ condition would be included in the test 
battery. This was because it was felt that the control trials in previous studies had 
successfully ruled out other alternative explanations and it was considered that this 
condition was the critical condition in assessing whether an infant possessed the social 
cognitive understanding of intentions of this kind.  To reduce test time further it was 
decided that only three of the object pairs needed to be used.  The ‘loop’, ‘beads with cup’, 
and ‘square with hole’ were chosen due to the ease of which these object pairs could be 
built. 
 
3.4.3.2. Estimated age of acquisition 
The age at which the literature would suggest that typically developing infants 
would reliably pass this task is 18 months. 
 
3.4.4. ‘Gestures’ 
Nonverbal point and gaze gestures are often used to direct one’s attention to 
something of interest or relevance. However, in order to comprehend the communicative 
intention of a gesture one must not only be able to follow the direction of the gesture but 
also possess the social cognitive ability to understand that a person intends to direct 
attention. Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2005) used a simple hiding game to 




demonstrate the age at which infants acquire this ability. They presented twenty, 14 month 
old; twenty, 18 month old; and twenty, 24 month old infants with a pair of empty 
containers and a small toy. If the infants showed interest in the toy, the experimenter 
placed a screen in front of the containers and hid the toy in one of the containers saying 
“Look! Now I’ll hide it”.  After hiding the toy the experimenter removed the screen and 
gave either a communicative point or gaze gesture to indicate where the toy was hidden. 
The infants were then prompted to retrieve the toy.  All infants participated in four point 
trials and four gaze trials and the mean percentage of their correct and incorrect responses 
was recorded. 
Results indicated differences in performance between the three age groups: the 24- 
month old infants showed a very high success rate on both the point and gaze trials; the 18-
month old infants showed a very high success rate on the point trials but less so on the 
gaze trials; and the 14-month old infants made a number of errors with both 
communicative cues.  
Importantly, in order to check that the infant’s success was indeed due to a social 
cognitive understanding and not simply a result of low level attentional cueing, the authors 
also ran a control study. Similar ‘surface behaviours’ were used after the hiding procedure 
but these behaviours lacked communicative intent. More specifically, instead of a 
communicative gaze the adult looked at the container ‘absent- mindedly’. Similarly, 
instead of a communicative point the adult extended her hand in the same manner as a 
point but instead of looking communicatively at the infant, stared distractively at her wrist. 
In this study infants’ search performance did not differ significantly from chance.  
Taken together these results indicate that by 18months infants have acquired the 
social-cognitive ability to make inferences regarding the communicative intention of 




pointing gestures. Furthermore, by 24 months this ability has been extended to include the 
understanding of the communicative intention of gaze gestures. 
 
3.4.4.1. Selection rationale and modifications 
The specific selection of this study from the literature was not only because it 
fulfilled the initial selection criteria but also because the methodology allowed the ease of 
assessment of two developmentally stacked abilities (point and gaze understanding) in one 
task. Furthermore, as it has been documented that some syndrome groups with fractionated 
social profiles show differences in eye gaze (i.e. the gaze avoidance in FXS and prolonged 
eye gaze in CdLS discussed in Section 1.3 of chapter 1), it was considered that when used 
in the assessment of a number of syndrome groups, the methodology may enable us to 
disentangle whether behavioural difference (e.g. in eye gaze) is reflected in the 
developmental trajectory of these given skills. For instance, it may be that differences in 
social profiles might affect or alter the point at which the ‘gaze’ trials are passed relative to 
the ‘point’ trials as well as other tasks in the scale.   
As the original study assessed the average performance of each group of infants, 
the number of trials each participant would receive needed to be modified so a pass/fail 
scoring criteria could be applied. Modifications were made so that each participant would 
now receive two point trials (with two corresponding control trials) and two gaze trials 
(with two corresponding control trials). Furthermore, as the control trials and experimental 
trials had previously been administered in a separate study, this procedure needed to be 
changed so it was suitable for within subject testing. To achieve this, the procedure was 
modified so that the control trials would be administered first by experimenter 1, and then 
the experimental trials administered separately by a different experimenter. 
 




3.4.4.2. Estimated age of acquisition 
The age at which the literature would suggest that typically developing infants 




In order to cooperate successfully with someone, a person must possess the social 
cognitive ability to share intentions with them. More specifically, they not only have to 
react to another’s actions but they must also read the intentions of the other and 
incorporate them with their own intention. Warneken, Chen, and Tomasello (2006) 
developed a number of tasks to assess the age at which infants can successfully coordinate 
their actions with others in cooperative activities. The tasks required the infants to form a 
‘joint goal’ with another and to develop joint intentions for achieving that goal. The 
authors discussed that having a joint goal implies commitment to a goal. Therefore, if one 
person reneges, the other should try and re-engage them. The presence of re-engagement 
attempts was therefore used by Warneken et al. (2006) as evidence that infants possessed 
the social cognitive understanding to form a joint goal. 
The authors developed four tasks for their study, each outlined separately in Figure 
2. Two of the tasks were problem solving tasks and two were social games. Each required 



















Figure 2: The ‘cooperation’ tasks designed by Warneken, Chen and Tomasello (2006). 
 
The general procedure for each task was very similar. Each task began with a 
familiarisation period during which infants were shown the apparatus. A demonstration 
period then followed with two experimenters demonstrating how the game/task was 
completed. Following the demonstration period, each infant was invited to participate in 
Elevator Task (Problem solving task with complimentary roles): 
The goal of this task was to retrieve the object that was inside a 
vertically moveable ‘elevator’ tube. However, in order for a 
person to retrieve the object from one side (role A), another 
person has to push the cylinder up from the other side (role B). 
Due to the transparent screens of the apparatus it is impossible for 
a person to carry out the task on their own. In order to complete 
the task, both partners have to develop a joint goal and perform 
their actions simultaneously. 
Tubes with Handles (Problem solving task with parallel roles):   
The goal of this task was to retrieve an object that was hidden 
inside a large tube. The tube can be opened by two people pulling 
it from either end simultaneously.  Due to the length and size of 
the tube it is impossible for a person to carry out the task on their 
own. In order to complete the task, both partners have to develop 
a joint goal and perform their actions simultaneously. 
Double tube task (social game with complimentary roles): 
 This game involves two tubes that are mounted on a box to form 
two shutes.  Playing the game involves one person dropping a 
wooden block in the top of the tube (role A), and the other 
person catching it at the other end (role B). Due to the nature of 
this game, it cannot be played alone and therefore both partners 
have to develop a joint goal to play the game together. 
Trampoline task (social game with parallel roles):  
This game involves bouncing a wooden block up and down on 
a handheld trampoline.  The trampoline has two joints on either 
side and therefore will collapse if not held by two people either 
side. Due to the joints in the trampoline, this game cannot be 
played alone and therefore both partners have to develop a joint 
goal to play the game together. 
 




the game by the experimenter alternating his gaze between the apparatus and the infant. If 
the infant was successful this trial was deemed trial 1. However, if the child was not 
immediately successful, up to two more demonstrations, with additional cues, were given 
before the task was terminated. For infants that were successful in trial 1, trial 2 followed 
immediately and was an exact replication of trial one. Trials 3 and 4 were administered in 
exactly the same way except that each of these trials were characterised by an ‘interruption 
period’ where the experimenter stopped his actions for 15 seconds. For instance, in the 
elevator task  the experimenter  let the tube drop when the infant was reaching for the 
object (role A) or reached towards the object when the infant pushed up the tube but then 
withdrew his hand (role B).  
In their study Warneken et al. (2006) tested sixteen, 18 month olds and sixteen, 24 
month olds on all tasks twice, in two separate sessions, three days apart. For tasks with 
complimentary roles each infant performed each role once. All task orders and roles were 
counterbalanced across infants. To code infants’ performance, each trial received one score 
on a rating scale that assessed the infant’s level of coordination. For interruption periods 
the infant’s behaviour was coded for whether they made re-engagement attempts, waited 
for the experimenter to continue, made individual attempts, or disengaged from the game. 
The authors then examined: the age difference in infants’ level of overall coordination and 
the age difference in infants’ behaviour during the interruption periods. Analysis of the 
interruption periods across tasks revealed that re-engagement attempts occurred in both 
groups with only a tendency to increase with age. However, in three out of four of the 
tasks (elevator task, tubes with handles task and double tubes task) children at 24 months 
coordinated their actions with that of a partner more skilfully than 18 month olds. Only the 
trampoline task failed to elicit differences between ages. For this task, infants of both ages 




displayed low levels of engagement with play consisting of passive play and / or frequent 
stopping. 
Based on the above findings, the authors concluded that at both ages infants 
comprehended their own and their partner’s actions as interconnected parts of a joint 
activity towards a joint goal. However, they argued that it was not until 24 months old that 
infants demonstrated the ability to coordinate their actions successfully enough to reliably 
execute a joint intention towards a joint goal. 
 
3.4.5.1. Selection rationale and modifications 
Due to time constraints it was decided that only the ‘Tubes with handles’ and the 
‘Trampoline’ tasks would be selected to form part of the battery. The specific rationale for 
selecting these two tasks was that both tasks required complementary rather than parallel 
roles and therefore would reduce administration time. The fact that the trampoline task was 
shown not to be successfully acquired by either 18 month olds or 24 month olds was 
considered during the selection process. However, in a similar manner to the helping task 
outlined in section 3.4.1.1, due to the inherently ‘social’ nature of ‘play’ it was felt that the 
inclusion of the cooperative social game might tap interesting differences between 
populations with fractionated social profiles. More specifically, it is possible that 
performance on this task (and subsequent developmental positioning) may be different for 
more ‘sociable’ populations. Including this task allows examination of whether 
behavioural difference may alter the developmental trajectory and the point at which this 








3.4.5.2. Estimated age of acquisition 
The age at which the literature would suggest that typically developing infants 
would reliably pass these tasks is: 24 months for the ‘Tubes with Handles’ trial; and >24 
months for ‘Trampoline’ trial.  
 
3.5. The Experimental Scale 
  
            The studies described above outline the ages at which infants have been found to 
possess the social cognitive abilities necessary to successfully complete a range of 
different tasks. By arranging these tasks in terms of increasing age (as depicted in Figure 
3) we can gain some insight into how these skills may be developmentally ordered and 


















- ‘Seeing Is Knowing’ 
18 MONTHS 
- Gestures (Point) 
- ‘Re-enactment of intended acts’ 
24 MONTHS 
- Gestures (Gaze) 
- Cooperation (Tubes) 
> 24 MONTHS 
- Cooperation  (Trampoline) 





          At present there is no scaled task battery that enables the measurement of social 
cognitive development in individuals with ID who are too young or cognitively impaired 
to pass standard false belief tasks. This chapter has outlined the background, rationale and 
selection process used to compile a selection of tasks that will be scaled to map the 
developmental progression of early social cognitive skills in typical development. In turn, 
this will provide an invaluable normative measure from which to compare individuals with 
genetic syndromes, developmental disorders and ID.













VALIDATING THE SOCIAL COGNITION 























Chapter 1 highlighted how, at present, most studies examining ToM in genetic 
syndromes typically compare the performance of a single standard false belief task to the 
performance of matched controls, finding the sample either comparatively delayed or 
atypical. However, it was argued that such methods provide relatively limited information 
with no insight into the developmental pathway or causal mechanisms that occur prior to, 
or following false belief understanding. The chapter outlined a rationale for moving away 
from the traditional methodology used to investigate the cognitive abilities/ deficits in 
genetic syndromes and towards a developmental trajectory approach. The application of 
this methodology for studying ToM in atypical populations was demonstrated by Peterson, 
Wellman and Liu (2005) in their study utilising Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM scale to 
examine the developmental progression of ToM in late signing deaf children and 
individuals with autism.  
However, it was argued that despite the advantages of Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
scale, the tasks included in the scale loaded heavily on cognitive processes therefore 
making them unsuitable for individuals with ID who were too young or too cognitively 
impaired to meet these general cognitive demands. Consequently, chapter 3 outlined the 
development of a preliminary scale that was designed to enable a developmental trajectory 
approach to be applied to the measurement of social cognitive development in younger and 
less able individuals with ID. The scale incorporated a set of tasks that assessed early 
social cognitive skills that are considered ‘precursors’ to fully fledged ToM. Based on 
findings from the developmental literature, tasks included in the scale were predicted to be 
of increasing difficulty and thus were hypothesised to form a progressive developmental 
scale. 
 





The current chapter aims to test the hypothesis that the tasks selected in chapter 3 
would be of increasing difficulty and thus form a progressive developmental scale. The 
scale is validated by examining the performance of a group of typically developing infants 




4.3.1. Recruitment  
Infants were recruited from 13 private nurseries schools from across Birmingham 
and the surrounding local area. Local nurseries were sent a letter describing the nature of 
the study (Appendix E) and then telephoned to enquire if they would like to participate. 
The recruited nurseries then distributed opt out consent forms to parents (Appendix F).  
 
4.3.2. Participants  
Ninety eight infants were recruited into the study. However, 12 infants were not 
tested due to an inability to settle with the experimenters (mean age = 21 months, range = 
14 months – 25 months). Therefore, eighty- six infants were tested on the battery of tasks 
(mean age = 22 months, range = 14 months – 34 months).  Figure 4 demonstrates the 
distribution of ages for the infants recruited. Nursery leaders were consulted to ensure that 
all infants were considered to be of typical development with no known developmental 
disorder or difficulties.   





Figure 4: The distribution of ages across the infants recruited. 
 
To enable later analyses, order was imposed on the continuous range of ages. As 
the subsequent research question aimed to test for age-related change rather than for 
changes at particular ages, the sample was split into bands of equal size rather than by age. 
Splitting groups into equal size avoids the potential for smaller groups to have their mean 
disproportionally inflated or deflated by a few individuals.  A similar methodology was 
adopted by Wellman and Liu (2004). Age band one contained 29 infants aged between 14 
and 18 months (mean = 16.03 months; 13 females and 16 males); age band two contained 
29 infants aged between 19 and 24 months (mean = 22.10 months; 17 females and 12 
males); and age band three contained 28 infants aged between 25 and 34 months (mean = 
28.18 months; 10 females and 18 males). Infants were predominately White British, but 
approximately 10 % of infants were of other ethnicities. 
 
4.3.3. Procedure 
Infants were tested in a quiet room in their nursery. Before each experimental 
session the experimenters conducted a ‘warm up phase’ and played with each infant for 
around 10 to 15 minutes. This was to ensure that infants felt comfortable with the 
experimenters before testing began. Each infant was tested on all tasks in the experimental 
battery which were presented in one of four orders (outlined in Table 5). Each order began 




with two tasks deemed particularly engaging. This was to encourage the infant to feel 
comfortable and to avoid early frustration. The experimental battery was administered over 
two separate test sessions to ensure that infants did not become tired. All infants completed 
the two sessions on the same day. 
 







































‘Cooperation’: Tubes Helping – Control ‘Helping’  
(Control) 
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‘Gestures’  
















As outlined in chapter 3, each task was selected as the age of acquisition suggested 
that, when examined together, they would form a scale of increasing difficulty. However, 
to analyse whether these tasks did indeed form a series of progressive accomplishments, it 
was essential that infants’ performance on each task could be coded as either ‘pass’ or 
‘fail’. Consequently, a pass/fail coding criterion was applied to each task. The coding 




criterion and rationale is outlined below for each measure. As experimenters were not 
permitted to video record, coding was conducted live. As outlined below, the vast majority 
of coding was very simple (i.e. whether the infant performed a target behaviour or not). 
However, for tasks that required slightly more subjective coding (i.e. level of cooperation 




4.3.5.1. ‘Helping’  
To ‘help’ someone, one must possess the social cognitive ability to understand 
another person’s intentions and unachieved goals (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). 
This task enables the assessment of this social cognitive skill. To ensure infants’ responses 
indicated their motivation to help the experimenter, rather than a desire to reinstate the 
original situation or get the adult to repeat the action, infants received two corresponding 
control trials before the two experimental trials.  In these trials the same basic situation 
was present but there was no indication that there was a problem for the experimenter. 
Control trials were administered first because it was felt that a previous experience of 
someone requiring help in a very similar situation could potentially prime the same 
response even if help was not required. To further avoid possible ‘carry over effects’ from 
the control to the experimental conditions, the experimental and control trials were 
administered over two separate testing sessions and by different experimenters. 
 
4.3.5.1.1. Control trials 
Following a short warm up period infants were sat at a table opposite experimenter 
one (E1). For the ‘pen’ condition, E1 was seen to use a pen for drawing. The experimenter 
then stopped drawing, put the lid on the pen, intentionally threw it on the floor and did not 




reach for it. For the ‘paper balls’ condition, E1 set up three paper balls on her side of the 
table and three paper balls on the infant’s side of the table. The experimenter then sat back 
down and picked up each of the paper balls ‘one-by-one’ using a pair on tongs and then 
placed them back on the table. 
 
4.3.5.1.2. Experimental trials 
 For the ‘pen’ condition, experimenter two (E2) was seen to use a pen for drawing, 
she then ‘accidentally’ dropped the pen on the floor and unsuccessfully reached for it. For 
the ‘paper balls’ condition, E2 picked up each paper ball with a pair of tongs and placed 
them in a cardboard container. She then attempted to reach for the three papers balls on the 
infant’s side of the table but failed because they were too far away.  
 
4.3.5.1.3. Coding 
  In each trial, infants’ behaviour was coded for whether or not they performed the 
required target behaviour. For the pen trial this involved the infant passing the pen back to 
the experimenter. For the paper balls trial, it involved the infant passing or pushing the 
paper balls towards the experimenter. To control for the possibility that the infant may 
have collected the object primarily for themselves, rather than to help the experimenter, 
each infant’s behaviour was also coded for whether or not they took possession of the 
object before handing it over. More specifically, it was noted whether or not the 
experimenter was reaching for the object while the infant kept it in their hands - creating a 








4.3.5.1.4. Pass/ fail criterion and rationale   
Infants were coded as having ‘passed’ the helping task if they successfully 
demonstrated one of the target behaviours. This was considered appropriate as unlike some 
of the other tasks included in the scale, ‘helping’ behaviour was considered unlikely to 
occur by chance. Therefore one demonstration was deemed sufficient to indicate that the 
infant had acquired the skill and passed the task. 
 
 4.3.5.2. ‘Seeing-is-knowing’  
An important social cognitive skill is the ability to know what other people ‘do’ 
and ‘do not’ know based on what they have previously experienced. This task enables the 
assessment of an infant’s social cognitive ability to understand the perception, attention 
and knowledge of others. For this task each infant first received a pre-test to ensure that 
they could understand what was to be asked of them in the subsequent experimental trials. 
The infants then received two experimental trials that were administered over two separate 




 In the pre-test the infant sat at a table with two experimenters and played with a 
ball, a teddy bear and a toy car one at a time for 30 seconds each. E2 then placed each toy 
on a tray and held it out in front of the infant. E1 then requested the infant to pass each toy 
successively by name. To pass the pre-test each infant had to successfully pass at least one 
of the first two toys requested by the experimenter. 
 
 




4.3.5.2.2. Experimental trials 
In each trial the infant sat at a table with two experimenters. E2 began the trial by 
bringing out the first toy, handing it to E1, and saying “Look what I’ve got here”. E1 and 
the infant then played with the toy together for 60 seconds. During this time E1 showed the 
infant that the toy could make an interesting sound if you handled it a particular way. The 
experimenter also made comments during the play such as “Oh look at that”, “That’s 
exciting” and “How nice!” Following the 60 seconds play, E2 took the object and placed it 
on a tray saying “I’ll put this here now”. E2 then brought out a second toy and the 
procedure was repeated.  After play with the second toy had finished and E2 had placed it 
on the tray, E1 announced that she was leaving “I am going outside now – bye bye” and 
left the room.  After E1 had left, E2 then looked at the infant and said “E2 is outside, she 
can’t see us, but we’ll keep playing anyway”. E2 then brought out the third and final 
(target) toy and played with the infant for 60 seconds. After 60 seconds E2 placed the toy 
on the tray along with the other two toys saying “I’ll put this here now”. At this point E1 
returned to the room and exclaimed “Oh look, look at that! Wow! Look at that!” pointing 
in the general direction of the tray which E2 then held towards the infant. E1 then added 
“Wow...Can you pass it to me?” with an outstretched hand pointed in the general direction 
of the tray. E1 was allowed to repeat this request up to five times if necessary, during this 
time E1 did not look directly at the target object but looked only at the infant or the general 
direction of the tray.  
 
4.3.5.2.3. Materials 
The materials in each trial consisted of toys that were easily distinguishable by 
colour and shape. All toys were of similar size and made a sound or action when 
manipulated in a particular way. In trial one the toys used were:  a tambourine with a 




mirror on the back, a maraca, and the target item was a yellow block with a button on the 
top which when pressed opened a door on the side of the block.  For trial two the toys used 
were: a soft snail rattle with a stretchy tail and ears, a water filled jelly car with sparkles 
that moved when shaken, and the target item was a blue block with a button on the top 
which when pressed made a butterfly and bee spin around. 
 
4.3.5.2.4. Coding 
 For each trial each infant’s behaviour was coded for whether or not they passed the 
target item. 
 
4.3.5.2.5. Pass/ fail criterion  
Infants were coded as having passed the task if they successfully passed the correct 
target item in both experimental trials. This pass/fail criterion was deemed necessary to 
reduce the possibility that infants might ‘pass’ the task simply by selecting the correct item 
by chance. It was considered much less likely that infants would select the correct item by 
chance on two consecutive experimental trials.  
 
4.3.5.3. ‘Re-enactment of intended acts’ 
Infants can imitate an adult’s behaviour on a purely physical basis, without social 
cognitive understanding (Meltzoff, 1988). In contrast, this task assesses an infant’s social 
cognitive ability to interpret a person’s behaviour in terms of their underlying intentions 
and goals when they try but fail to undertake an action. For this task infants were sat at a 
table opposite the experimenter. Three experimental trials were administered to each infant 
and all followed the same procedure. For each trial the experimenter presented the infant 
with an object pair that could be used to perform a target act– a loop that could be hung 




over a protruding peg, some beads that could be dropped into a cup, or a square with a hole 
in it that could be stacked upon a protruding peg. For each trial the experimenter modelled 
the intention to perform the target act but ultimately failed to perform the act.  
For the loop and peg, the experimenter picked up the loop and moved her hand 
towards the peg but released it inappropriately each time so that instead of hanging over 
the peg, the loop ‘accidentally’ fell to the table. Initially the loop was released slightly too 
far to the left, then too far to the right and then too low.  
For the beads and cup, the experimenter picked up the beads and attempted to drop 
them into the cup but released them inappropriately each time so that they ‘accidentally’ 
fell to the table instead. Initially the beads were lowered just so that they touched the lip of 
the cup but then released so that they fell to the side. On the next attempt the beads were 
suspended too far in front of the cup and so fell to the table when released. On the final 
attempt the experimenter gathered the beads loosely in her hand but then scraped her hand 
over the top of the cup so that the beads fell to the side rather than inside the cup. 
For the square and protruding peg the experimenter picked up the square and 
attempted to place it upon the peg, however each time the experimenter failed to align it 
correctly so that it ‘accidentally’  overshot the peg. Initially the square overshot to the 
right, then to the left and finally to the front. 
After the experimenter had demonstrated the three failed attempts she offered the 
object pair to the infant. During the experimental procedure the experimenter did not 
provide the infant with any prompts or cues , however the experimenter gained the infant’s 








4.3.5.3.1. Coding  
  For each trial infant’s behaviour was coded for whether or not they went on to 
perform the target act themselves: for the loop and peg this involved them hanging the 
loop over the protruding peg; for the beads and cup this involved them dropping the beads 
inside the cup; and for the square and peg this involved them stacking the square over the 
protruding peg. 
 
4.3.5.3.2. Pass/ fail criterion  
Infants were coded as having passed the task if they successfully performed the 
target act in two or more of the three trials. This pass/fail criterion was deemed necessary 
to reduce the possibility that infants might ‘pass’ one trial simply by chance or because the 
apparatus ‘afforded’ a particular response from that infant. It was decided that two or more 
target acts were less likely to occur ‘just by chance’ and therefore it was deemed that this 
provided sufficient evidence that the infant possessed the social cognitive skill.  
 
4.3.5.4. ‘Gestures’ (point and gaze) 
In order to comprehend the communicative intention of gestures one must not only 
be able to follow the direction of the gesture but also possess the social cognitive ability to 
understand that a person intends to direct attention. The following task enabled the 
assessment of this social cognitive skill. Although the developmental literature proposes 
that infants comprehend the communicative intent of ‘points’ before they comprehend  
‘gaze’ (Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005),  due to the identical experimental 
procedures used to assess these communicative cues, trials for both cues were administered 
together in one procedure.  
 




4.3.5.4.1. Warm up phase 
Before the task began each infant took part in a warm up phase. This was to 
familiarise them with the hiding procedure and the containers used. Infants were sat at a 
table next to E2 and across a table from E1. E1 placed a pair of open containers in front of 
the infant and then brought out a small toy. E1 then announced “Look, I’ll hide it”. As the 
infant watched, E1 placed the toy in one of the containers and then placed the lids on both. 
E2 then encouraged the infant to retrieve the toy by saying “Where’s the toy?” and “Can 
you get the toy?” This warm up hiding procedure was repeated three times with three 
different sets of containers.  
 
4.3.5.4.2. Control trials 
Following the warm up phase each infant participated in four control trials. These 
control trials were administered to check that search performance was indicative of 
understanding the experimenter’s intentions and not simply due to low level attentional 
cueing. For each control trial E1 placed a pair of open containers on the table then 
produced a small toy. If the infant showed interest in the toy E1 then placed a movable 
screen in front of the two containers, lowered the toy behind the screen and said ‘Now I’ll 
hide it’. At this point E1 then quickly pushed the containers together, hid the toy in one, 
and then moved them apart again. The distance between each container ensured that the 
infant could not grab both containers at the same time. Following the hiding procedure E1 
removed the screen and gave one of two non-communicative control cues:  
 
 Control Point - E1 performed a ‘distracted point’ by holding out her hand and 
slightly extending her index finger. E1 simply looked down at her hand with an 
expression that indicated she was preoccupied by something on her hand. 





 Control Gaze - E1 gazed at the container with an absent minded facial expression, 
eyes unfocussed and a neutral facial expression. 
 
Following each non communicative cue E2 then encouraged the infant to retrieve the toy 
by saying “Where’s the toy?” and “Can you get the toy?” Each infant received two control 
gaze trials and two control point trials which were presented in one of four different 
counterbalanced orders. 
 
4.3.5.4.3. Experimental trials 
After the control trials had been completed the experimenters moved positions so 
that E2 was sat opposite the infant and E1 was knelt at the side of the table midway 
between E2 and the infant. The four experimental trials then followed. As before, for each 
trial E1 placed a pair of containers in front of the infant and produced a toy. If the infant 
showed interest in the toy E1 then placed a movable screen in front of the two containers, 
lowered the toy behind the screen and said ‘Now I’ll hide it’. During this hiding procedure 
E2 showed the infant that she was watching by alternating her gaze between the containers 
and the infant then announcing “I can see”. After the hiding had been completed E1 
pushed the containers apart and removed the screen. E1 then turned away from the table in 
order to place the screen behind her. At this point, while E1 was not looking, E2 
established eye contact with the infant and gave one of two communicative gestures:  
 
 Point - E2 extended her index finger and pointed at the container expressing intent 
through raised eyebrows. 
 




 Ostensive Gaze - E2 gazed at the target container and then back to the infant 
expressing intent through raised eyebrows.  
 
Following each communicative cue E1 then turned back to the table and encouraged 
the infant to retrieve the toy by saying “Where’s the toy?” and “Can you get the toy?”. 
Each infant received two gaze trials and two point trials which were presented in one of 
four different counterbalanced orders. 
To minimize the possibility of perseveration errors being made, each pair of 
containers were different in both colour and shape and the same pair were never used on 
successive trials. For each trial, if the infant attempted to open a container but could not 
quite manage to, then one of the experimenters assisted the infant. Furthermore, if the 
infant chose the incorrect box and did not find the toy, then the experimenters opened the 
correct box and gave the toy to the infant. This was done to ensure that the infant did not 
become frustrated and disengage from the task. 
 
4.3.5.4.4. Coding 
For each trial the box that the infant first selected and attempted to open was 
recorded. If the infant selected the container that the toy was hidden in this was coded as 
correct. If the infant selected the container without the toy this was coded as incorrect. 
 
4.3.5.4.5. Pass/ fail criterion  
Infants were coded as having passed the point trials if they successfully chose both 
of the correct containers following each point gesture.  Similarly, infants were coded as 
having passed the gaze trials if they successfully chose both the correct containers 
following each gaze gesture. This pass/fail criterion was deemed necessary to reduce the 




possibility that infants might ‘pass’ the task simply by selecting the correct location by 
chance. It was considered much less likely that infants would select the correct location by 
chance on two consecutive experimental trials. 
 
4.3.5.5. ‘Cooperation’ (tubes with handles and trampoline) 
In order to cooperate successfully with someone a person must possess the social 
cognitive ability to read the intentions of another and incorporate them with their own 
intention.  The following two tasks assess this social cognitive ability by testing infant’s 
ability to form a ‘joint goal’ with another. A joint goal implies commitment to a goal and 
thus if one person reneges then the other should try and re-engage them. The following 
tasks utilize the presence/absence of reengagement attempts to assess infant’s social 
cognitive understanding. 
4.3.5.5.1. Tubes with handles 
In the ‘tubes with handles’ task the infant’s goal was to retrieve a toy that had been 
hidden inside a tube. This tube could be pulled apart by pulling the handles on each end of 
the tube. However, the length of the tube made it impossible for the infant to perform this 
goal alone and therefore to be successful the infant was required to ’work together’ and 
cooperate with the experimenter.  For each infant, the experimental procedure included a 
number of steps.  
 Familiarisation and demonstration: The task began with a brief familiarisation 
period in which the infant was shown the tube and encouraged to hold each of the handles. 
After the infant was familiar with the apparatus, E1 and E2 pulled the tube apart and E1 
placed an attractive object inside. The two experimenters pushed the tube back together 
and placed it on the floor. E1 and E2 then proceeded to demonstrate how the toy could be 
retrieved by each of them pulling the handles at each end. Following this demonstration E1 




produced another attractive object and placed it inside the tube as before, then pushed it 
back together with E2. 
Experimental trial one: Following the familiarisation and demonstration period 
E1 invited the infant’s participation by alternating gaze between the infant and the tube. If 
the infant was immediately successful and cooperated with the experimenter to open the 
tube then trial 2 was administered. However, if the infant was not successful within 30 
seconds E1 and E2 carried out the demonstration phase again. Following the second 
demonstration the infant was encouraged to participate again this time using verbal cues 
such as “Come and try” and “Look, tube!” If the infant was still unsuccessful the 
demonstration was repeated for a third time but this time E2 also encouraged the infant to 
stand by her and hold the handle together with her.  If the infant was unsuccessful after 
three demonstrations the task was discontinued. 
Experimental trial two: Following trial one, E1 produced another toy and placed 
it inside the tubes as before. The infant’s participation was then prompted by E1. Once the 
object was retrieved trial 3 was administered. If the infant was not successful after 60 
seconds then the task was discontinued.  
Experimental trial three: Following trial two, E1 produced another toy and 
placed it inside the tube, as before. The infant’s participation was once again prompted by 
E1. However, in this trial, unlike trials one and two, when the infant picked up their side of 
the tube E1 dropped her side of the tube and placed her hands and face downwards for an 
interruption period of 15 seconds. Following the interruption period E1 looked back up, 
picked up the tube and continued as before. If the infant had disengaged E1 prompted the 
infant’s participation to continue. After the infant had retrieved the object trial four was 
administered. 
Experimental trial three: The procedure for trial three was repeated. 





The procedure for the ‘trampoline’ task was very similar to the ‘tubes with handles’ 
task. However, in this task the infant’s goal was to bounce a wooden block up and down 
on a handheld trampoline. Importantly, due to joints on the side of the trampoline if two 
people did not hold it at the same time it would collapse. Therefore to be successful on this 
task the infant was required to ‘work together’ and cooperate with the experimenter.  For 
each infant the experimental procedure included a number of steps.  
 Familiarisation and demonstration: The task began with a brief familiarisation 
period where the infant was shown the trampoline and encouraged to hold it on each side. 
After the infant was familiar with the apparatus E1 and E2 demonstrated how a wooden 
block could be made to bounce up and down by shaking the trampoline at the rim.  
 Experimental trial one: Following the demonstration period E1 invited the 
infant’s participation by alternating gaze between the infant and the trampoline. If the 
infant was immediately successful and cooperated with the experimenter to bounce the 
block on the trampoline then trial 2 was administered. However, if the infant was not 
successful within 30 seconds E1 and E2 carried out the demonstration phase again. 
Following the second demonstration the infant was encouraged to participate again this 
time using verbal cues such as “Come and try” and “Look, trampoline!” If the infant was 
still unsuccessful the demonstration was repeated for a third but this time E2 also 
encouraged the infant to stand by her and hold the trampoline together with her.  If the 
infant was unsuccessful after three demonstrations the task was discontinued. 
 Experimental trial two: Following trial one, E1 briefly removed the wooden 
block then after a short period placed it back on the trampoline and invited the infant’s 
participation again. After 5 seconds of play, trial 3 was administered. If the infant was not 
successful after 60seconds then the task was discontinued.  




 Experimental trial three: Following trial two, E1 briefly removed the wooden 
block then after a short period placed it back on the trampoline. The infant’s participation 
was once again prompted by E1. However, in this trial, unlike trials one and two, when the 
infant picked up their side of the trampoline E1 dropped her side and placed her hands and 
face downwards for an interruption period of 15 seconds. Following the interruption period 
E1 looked back up, picked up her side, and continued as before. If the infant had 
disengaged, E1 prompted the infant’s participation to continue. After 5 seconds of play 
trial four was administered. 
 Experimental trial four: The procedure for trial three was repeated. 
 
4.3.5.5.3. Coding 
The same coding schema used by Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007) was used 
to code infant’s behaviour. For each trial of the ‘Tubes with handles’ task and 
‘Trampoline’ task infant’s behaviour was coded according to their level of coordination 















Table 6: Coding schema for level of coordination. 
Category Definition 
Tube with handles 
 
 
No success Tube is not being opened 
 
Uncoordinated Success after more than 5 seconds of inappropriate actions such as 
standing on wrong side, letting tube drop more than once, 
individual play, or individual attempts 
 
Coordinated Success, but some inappropriate actions, but not for more than 5 
seconds; releasing handle not more than once 
 
Very coordinated Success after immediate understanding of their role. Infant 
positions herself in correct location and performs the correct action 





No success Infant does not hold and lift trampoline 
 





Some stopping or not too excited 
 
High engagement Continuous play and rather excited (placing block on trampoline; 










Infant leaves apparatus or plays on apparatus without pursuing the 
goal by banging on the apparatus, climbing on it, etc 
 
Individual attempt Infant attempts to retrieve the object individually in problem 
solving tasks (infant attempts to hold both handles or peel it open 
on one side) or attempts to continue the game alone. 
 
Waiting Infant remains on correct side of the apparatus and is ready to 
perform their role. 
 
Reengagement Infant is ready to perform their role and in addition tries to re-
engage E1, for example, by pushing the tube, pointing at the object 
and vocalising while looking at the partner. 
 




4.3.5.5.4. Pass/ fail criterion and rationale   
For each infant a median cooperation score was calculated across the administered 
trials. In each trial ‘no success’ received a score of zero, ‘uncoordinated’/ ‘low 
engagement’ received a score of one, ‘coordinated’/ ‘medium’ engagement received a 
score of two, and ‘very coordinated’/ ‘high engagement’ received a score of three. Infants 
were coded as having passed the ‘tubes with handles’ task if they showed at least one re-
engagement attempt during interruption periods and their median cooperation score was 
three. Similarly, infants were coded as having passed the ‘trampoline’ task if they made at 
least one re-engagement attempt during interruption trials and their median score three. 
These criteria were decided upon for two reasons. Firstly, as highlighted in the previous 
literature the re-engagement attempt provided the indication that the infants possessed the 
social cognitive understanding to form a joint goal. Secondly, in the original experimental 
study it was not until 24 months, with the tubes with handles task, and later, with the 
trampoline task, that infants were able to coordinate their actions skilfully enough to 
execute a joint intention reliably towards a joint goal. A median cooperation score of three 
was decided upon as this represented ‘skilful and reliable coordination’ and would 




4.4.1. Analysis of control trials 
Although the main analysis involved examining whether the administered tasks 
formed a progressive developmental scale, two tasks had corresponding control trials to 
check for alternative explanations for behaviour. These control trials were examined to 
ensure that the tasks were working, at a group level, as expected. 




4.4.1.1. ‘Helping’ control trials 
For each helping trial there was a corresponding control trial in which the same 
basic situation was present but there was no indication that help was required. Results 
indicated that, out of the 76 infants that handed over an item during the experimental trials, 
only three also handed over an item in the control trials. Therefore, it was judged that the 
task was working as expected, infants were ‘helping’ rather than merely trying to reinstate 
the original situation or to get the adult to repeat the action. Furthermore, in order to ensure 
that infants were not collecting the object primarily for themselves rather than to help the 
experimenter, each infant’s behaviour was also coded for whether or not they took 
possession of the object before handing it over. The results indicated that out of the 76 
infants that handed over an item during the experimental trials, only two infants took 
possession of the item before handing it over. Therefore, it was judged that the task was 
working as expected and the infants were indeed ‘helping’ the adult rather than collecting 
the object primarily for themselves. 
 
4.4.1.2. ‘Gesture’ control trials 
To ensure that successful performance on this task was not due to low level 
attentional cueing, the control trials were analysed for the infants that passed the task 
(successful on 2/2 searches). Paired t tests were conducted to compare the number of 
correct vs. incorrect searches for both control cues. Results indicated that search 
performance did not differ significantly from chance for either cue type. [‘Control Point’:  
t (57) = .622, p=.54; ‘Control Gaze’: t (36) = .466; p=.64].  Therefore, it was judged that 
the infants passing this task were passing due to their understanding of intentions rather 
than due to low level cueing. 
 




4.4.2. Overall task performance 
 
Table 8: The percentage of infants that passed each task in the battery. 
 








‘Gestures’ (Point) 18 months 67% 
 
‘Re-enactment of intended acts’  18 months 63% 
 
‘Gestures’ (Gaze) 24 months 43% 
 
‘Cooperation’ (Tubes) 24 months 37% 
 
‘Seeing-is-knowing’  14 months 36% 
 
‘Cooperation’ (Trampoline) > 24 months 22% 
 
 
Table 8 is ordered from the easiest task (highest percentage of infants passing) to 
the hardest task (lowest percentage) and therefore outlines a progressive sequence.  A 
comparison between this sequence, and the preliminary sequence suggested in chapter 3, 
indicates that all tasks –except for the ‘seeing-is-knowing’ task - follow the hypothesised 
developmental progression.  According to the literature the ‘seeing-is-knowing’ task 
should have been one of the easiest tasks, but instead (based on the proportions of infants 
passing the task) it would appear to be one of the hardest. 
As noted in chapter 3, modifications were made to this task in attempt to make it 
more appealing for individuals with ID for later testing. However, following testing it 
appeared that altering the task materials may have affected performance. More 
specifically, based on infants’ reactions during testing it was thought that some of the toys 
used in the two trials may have been too appealing and subsequently caused infants to 
become too excited and distracted. For example, for some toys infants appeared reluctant 




to hand them back or attempted to reach for them again after another toy had been 
presented. Because it was unclear exactly what caused this task to be so much harder than 
originally expected it was removed from the subsequent scaling analyses.  
To explore differences in performance across age bands an initial one way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Each infant was given a total score representing the 
number of tasks that they passed in the scale (out of a possible six). Analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of age on the number of tasks passed, F (2,83) = 19.759, p <0.001. 
Tukey post hoc analyses revealed significant differences between each age band. Infants in 
age band one (M = 2.10, SD = 1.47) passed significantly fewer tasks than infants in age 
band two (M = 3.03, SD = 1.30), p=0.032. Furthermore, infants in age band two passed 
significantly fewer tasks than infants in age band three (M = 4.39, SD = 1.37), p=0.001. 
Therefore, with increasing age infants passed more tasks. 
 
4.4.2.1. Individual pairwise task comparisons: McNemar’s 
The proportions displayed in Table 8 appear to indicate that the tasks form a 
progressive scale of increasing difficulty. However, from these percentages alone it is not 
possible to ascertain whether the tasks do in indeed follow a reliable scale. To investigate 
whether the ordered tasks reliably followed a general progression, initial analysis used a 
series of paired task sequences. McNemar’s tests with Yate’s correction for continuity 
were conducted between each pair of tasks, increasing in difficulty, as ordered in Table 8.  
Furthermore, given that two of the pairs of tasks (‘Point’ and ‘Re-enactment of intended 
acts;  and ‘Gaze’ and ‘Tubes’) were estimated in the original literature to be of equal 
difficulty, additional comparisons were made between the tasks either side that spanned 
different age brackets but had not already been compared. Therefore, in total, eight 
pairwise comparisons were made- as outlined in Figure 5.  



















Figure 5 – McNemar pairwise comparisons. 
 
As multiple comparisons were being conducted, Bonferroni-Holm corrections were 
used to control for family wise error. As displayed in Figure 6, results indicated significant 
pairwise differences between the ‘helping’ task and ‘point’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 
12.04, p<.01); the ‘helping’ task and ‘REI’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 15.75, p<.01) the 
‘point’ task and ‘gaze’ task, (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 11.43, p<.01); the ‘gaze’ task and 
‘trampoline’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 9.03, p<0.05); the ‘REI’ task and the ‘gaze’ task, 
(McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 7.76, p<.05); and the ‘tubes’ task and the ‘trampoline’ task 
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More specifically, results showed that: the ‘helping’ task was easier than the ‘point’ 
task and ‘REI’ task; the ‘point’ task and ‘REI’ tasks were easier than the ‘gaze’ task; and 
the ‘gaze’ and ‘tubes’ tasks were easier than the ‘trampoline’ task. Importantly, no 
differences were found between the ‘point’ and ‘REI’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = .32, p=ns), 
and the ‘gaze’ and ‘tubes’ tasks (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = .52, p=ns), which is what would be 
expected given the ages of acquisition suggested by the original literature. 
 
4.4.3. Guttman scale 
The pairwise comparisons conducted indicate that the tasks form a reliable general 
progression.  However, this information does not capture whether infants pass each task in 
succession, reach a task that they fail, and then fail all subsequent tasks. Guttman (1944, 
1950) proposed a stringent and conservative method of scalogram analysis which outlined 
that for items to constitute a true scale they should be arranged in an order so that if an 
individual responds positively to one item they should also respond positively to all items 
of lower rank. Wellman and Liu (2004) used this conservative method of analysis in the 
construction of their ToM scale and consequently it was considered appropriate to analyse 
the current data in the same way. 
In scalogram analysis the amount by which a scale deviates from an ideal pattern is 
represented by the co-efficient of reproducibility. It measures the degree with which the 
distribution of task passes and failures corresponds to the distribution of the ‘perfect’ 
Guttman scale. More specifically, it measures the number of deviations from the scale 
made by the infants. For example, an ideal pattern of responses along the scale would be to 
pass, fail, fail, fail, fail, fail (+,--,--, --, --, --) or to pass, pass, fail, fail, fail, fail (+, +, --, --, 
--, --) and so on. One deviation from this scale could be to pass, fail, pass, pass, fail, fail 
(+,--, +, +,--,--) and so would be recorded. 




To calculate the co-efficient of reproducibility (rep) for the tasks in the battery, 
Green’s (1956) method of estimation was used.  For this method the first step is to 
eliminate ‘first order errors’ from the response pattern – these are adjacent items that 
follow the incorrect sub pattern, e.g. adjacent items that show fail – pass (--, +) instead of 
pass – fail (+,--).  The next step involves eliminating all (--, +) sub patterns from the newly 
reduced pattern; these are second order errors. This process then continues for third, fourth 
and higher order errors. So we have: 
 
Where N is the number of respondents, and k is the number of items. Simplified, the 
formula used is: 
 
Where E is the total number of errors, N is the number of respondents, and k is the number 
of items. In practice it is unlikely that any scale will be perfectly reproducible therefore in 
Guttman scaling an approximation of the perfect scale is set at 90% (0.90) reproducibility.    
Importantly, Guttman (1944, 1950) outlined that reproducibility by itself is not 
sufficient to constitute scalability. He argued that four other features should be taken into 
account, these included: a) The range of marginal distributions; b) the pattern of errors; c) 
the number of items in the scale; and d) the number of response categories.  However, 
Green (1956) highlighted that apart from the requirement regarding the random pattern of 
errors, the other features were borne out of the possibility that the co-efficient of 
reproducibility could be achieved by chance alone. Consequently, Green’s (1956) index of 
consistency is included to analyse whether the observed co-efficient of reproducibility is 
significantly greater than what could be achieved by chance alone. For this calculation, 
RepI (the rep that would be expected by chance if the items had their observed popularities 




but were mutually independent) is calculated first and then the index of consistency is 
calculated using the following formula: 
 
Items are considered scalable if Rep is significantly greater than RepI . For this, I should 
be .50 or more. 
The initial Guttman analysis was conducted with all six tasks in ranked order. 
Table 9 outlines the responses of infants on the six item battery. It shows that 56% of the 
sample fit the six item scale exactly. The coefficient of reproducibility for these data was 
0.92. However, the index of consistency was 0.40 and therefore these data could not be 
considered scalable.  
 
Table 9: Guttman scalogram for a six item scale. 
 
Pattern 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Other Patterns N 
‘Helping' task —         
‘Point' task — —        
‘REI’ task — — —       
‘Gaze' task — — — —      
‘Tubes’ task — — — — —     
‘Trampoline' task — — — — — —    
          
Age Band 1 3 6 4 4 3 2 0 7 29 
Age Band 2 0 1 3 3 3 1 0 18 29 
Age Band 3 0 0 0 1 4 4 6 13 28 
Total 3 7 7 8 10 7 6 38  
Average age (m) 14 16.9 19 20.3 22.9 25 27.8 22.8  









The subsequent analyses examined whether a subset of these items formed a strict 
Guttman scale. This was to allow for the fact, predicted in the literature and confirmed in 
the pairwise comparisons, that some of the tasks in the battery were of equal difficulty. To 
recap, no difference was found between the ‘pointing’ and ‘REI’ tasks; or ‘Gaze’ task and 
‘tubes with handles’ task and therefore it was considered likely that the majority of the 
deviations found within the scale would lie between these sets of tasks. Inspection of the 
data indicated that this was indeed the case.  Therefore, two further analyses were 
conducted on scales where the similarity of the age equivalent tasks was accounted for.  
In both analyses, similarity was accounted for by combining the tasks of equal 
difficulty. In the first analysis tasks were combined together by allocating a ‘pass’ if an 
infant had passed both the tasks of equal difficulty (i.e. passed the pointing task and REI 
task; or gaze task and ‘tubes with handles’ task). In the second analysis tasks were 
combined together by allocating a ‘pass’ if an infant had passed either one of the tasks of 
equal difficulty (i.e. passed the pointing task or REI task). 
Table 10 outlines the responses of infants on the scale as combined for analysis 
one, 80% of the sample fit this scale exactly. The co-efficient of reproducibility for these 
data was 0.95. However, the index of consistency was 0.40 and therefore these data could 
not be considered scalable. Table 11 outlines the responses of infants on the scale as 
combined for analysis two, 88% of the sample fit this four item scale exactly. The co-
efficient of reproducibility for these data was 0.96. The index of consistency was 0.5 and 









Table 10: Guttman scalogram patterns for analysis one. 
Pattern 0 1 2 3 4 Other Patterns N 
‘Helping' task —       
‘Point AND REI'  — —      
‘Gaze AND Tubes'  — — —     
‘Trampoline' task — — — —    
Age Band 1 6 14 6 2 0 1 29 
Age Band 2 2 9 8 1 0 9 29 
Age Band 3 0 3 8 3 7 7 28 
Total 8 26 22 6 7 17  
Average age (m) 16.1 19.3 22.7 24 27.6 25.2  




Table 11: Guttman scalogram patterns for analysis two. 
 
Pattern 0 1 2 3 4 Other Patterns N 
‘Helping' task —       
‘Point OR REI'  — —      
‘Gaze OR Tubes'  — — —     
‘Trampoline' task — — — —    
Age Band 1 4 6 9 7 0 3 29 
Age Band 2 0 1 8 9 3 8 29 
Age Band 3 0 0 2 13 11 2 28 
Total 4 7 19 29 14 13  
Average age (m) 14.8 16.9 19.7 23.6 27.1 21.5  
Age range 14-17 14-23 14-27 15-33 22-34 14-27  
 
 
4.4.4. Possible order effects 
 
 As outlined in section 4.3.3, the experimental battery was presented in one of four 
orders.  Each order began with two tasks deemed particularly engaging. This was to 
encourage the infant to feel comfortable and to avoid early frustration.  However, the result 
of this methodology meant that some tasks more often occurred earlier in the session. To 
rule out the possibility that order effects might be contributing to any observed effects, Chi 
square statistics were employed to examine whether the serial order of task administration 
affected pass rates. Results confirmed that task order did not influence task success for any 
of the six tasks included in the battery: Helping (Fisher’s exact probability = .24); REI (x2 




(3) = .51, p = .92); Point (x2 (3) = 4.97, p = .18); Gaze (x2 (3) = 3.10, p = .41); ‘Tubes’ (x2 
(3) = .96, p = .83); ‘Trampoline’ (x2 (3) = 2.87, p = .44). 
 
4.5. The Final Experimental Scale 
        In the final Guttman analyses, similarity of tasks was accounted for by combining the 
tasks of equal difficulty. The results indicated that these data formed a reliable Guttman 
Scale if tasks were combined together by allocating a ‘pass’ if an infant has passed either 
one of the tasks of equal difficulty.  However, these data did not form a reliable Guttman 
Scale if tasks were combined together by allocating a ‘pass’ only if an infant passed both 
of the tasks of equal difficulty.  
Guttman scaling is a stringent and conservative method of scaling which allows for 
very few deviations from a scale. Given the age of the infants included in the study a 
certain level of variability should be expected and allowed for. Therefore, based on the 
combination of results from the Guttman analysis and the initial pairwise comparisons it 
was considered that the six tasks could be ordered developmentally. The final experimental 












Figure 7: Final social cognition scale 
 
 Helping 
 Gestures (Point) 
 ‘Re-enactment of intended acts’ 
 Gestures (Gaze) 
 Cooperation (Tubes) 
 Cooperation (Trampoline) 





There is an increasing body of literature that outlines the age of acquisition of 
social cognitive skills that develop in infancy prior to fully fledged ToM understanding. 
However, until now no study has attempted to investigate whether these skills form a 
consistent developmental trajectory by examining the performance of several skills within 
each infant. This study took a set of tasks from the existing literature and arranged them to 
form a scaled battery predicted to be of increasing difficulty. Developmental progression 
was examined by administering the battery to infants of various ages.  
The findings of the current study demonstrated that six out of the seven original 
tasks followed the expected developmental scale. Empirically, the findings show that 
typically developing infants possess the social cognitive understanding and altruistic 
motivation to ‘help’ another before they possess the social cognitive ability to: a) 
understand the communicative intent of a pointing gesture and b) re-enact a person’s 
underlying intentions and goals. After these accomplishments, infants then develop the 
ability to: a) understand the communicative intent of a gaze gesture and b) coordinate their 
intentions and actions with another person to form a joint goal and cooperate skilfully in a 
problem solving ‘tubes’ game. Finally, after these accomplishments, infants then develop 
the ability to coordinate their intentions and actions with another person to cooperate 
skilfully in a social ‘trampoline’ game. 
The one task that did not ‘sit’ where the literature would have predicted was the 
‘seeing-is-knowing’ task; the task that accessed the point at which infants understood what 
others ‘have and have not seen’. In the original literature, findings indicated that at around 
the age of 14 months, infants would preferentially hand an adult the toy that they knew that 
that adult had not previously seen. Therefore, in the preliminary scale, it was predicted that 
the infants in the sample would demonstrate this ability at approximately the same time as 




the ‘helping’ task. However, the proportions of infants passing the task indicated that for 
the majority of infants this was not passed until much later.  
One possible explanation for this finding is that the original study may have 
included a set of infants that were simply more able than the majority of infants in the 
wider population, thus causing the age of acquisition to be unrepresentative and much 
lower than the general population. However, this possibility seems unlikely given that this 
study was conducted by the same research team that conducted the ‘helping’ study. In both 
of these studies participants were recruited from a database of parents from a German city 
who had volunteered to take part in child development studies. Given the publication dates 
of the studies it is likely that both studies contained a very similar, if not the same, cohort 
of infants. As the helping task was ordered in accordance with the literature it seems 
unlikely that the delayed performance seen in the ‘seeing-is-knowing’ task was caused by 
an unrepresentative sample of infants.  
A more plausible explanation is that methodological changes to the task caused the 
unexpected findings. In the original study the task objects included a gardening utensil, a 
birdcage item and a slide rule. When designing the battery it was decided that these items 
were unlikely to be appealing enough for individuals with ID and therefore more appealing 
items were selected. This was done to avoid the possibility that individuals with ID may 
become bored and disengage from the task. However, it seems that the new items may 
have been too appealing and thus caused the infants to become distracted by a preferred 
object. During testing several infants’ behaviour suggested that they had a strong 
preference for a particular toy. These behaviours included reaching for a toy after it had 
been placed on the tray and the reluctance to hand a toy back after the allocated play time. 
Although the preferred toy seemed to differ across infants, on many occasions it seemed 
that it was the preferred item that was selected when the adult experimenter returned to the 




room and requested an item.  Consequently, the later acquisition of this task in the current 
study may be due to an increased load on the infant’s cognitive processes. More 
specifically, unlike the original study where infants showed no preference between items, 
in this study the infants needed to not only reason about another person’s perspective but 
also inhibit their preference for a particular item. Despite this possible hypothesis, the 
exact cause for the delayed task acquisition still remains uncertain and therefore it was felt 
that the task should be removed from the battery. 
Although the final six tasks did not conform to a strict Guttman scale, the series of 
pairwise differences was sufficient to constitute a reliable and valid scale. Guttman scaling 
is a stringent and conservative method of scaling and due to its deterministic nature does 
not allow for the occurrence of items of equal difficulty. The use of pairwise comparisons 
allowed the exploration of task differences between the tasks without excluding those of 
equal difficulty. The results of the comparisons mirrored the predictions based on the 
findings from the previous literature. More specifically, significant differences were found 
between the tasks expected to be of differing difficulty and no differences were found 
between the tasks expected to be of equal difficulty. Given this agreement with the 
literature it was felt that these pairwise comparisons were sufficient to constitute a reliable 
and valuable scale. Additional support was provided when Guttman scaling was conducted 
with the items of equal difficulty combined together; either by allocating a ‘pass’ if an 
infant had passed either one of the tasks or; allocating a ‘pass’ only if an infant passed 
both of the tasks of equal difficulty. Although only the ‘passed either’ scale reached 
Green’s (1956) index of consistency for significance, it was found that high proportions of 
infants conformed to both scales. When taken together with the pairwise comparisons, 
obtaining such high proportions of scale conformity with infants allowed confidence that 




these tasks were developmentally ordered in this way. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that given the age of the infants included in this study, variability should be expected. 
The findings of this study support and extend the current literature describing early 
social cognitive abilities in infants. All of the tasks included in this study, with one 
exception, were developmentally stacked in accordance with the ages of acquisition 
reported by the previous studies. However, in addition to adding support to these studies, 
these findings extend the literature by moving away from the measurement of single social 
cognitive accomplishments to the measurement of developmental trajectories. This study 
has produced a reliable scale that maps the progressive development of social cognitive 
skills during infants’ early years that no single cognitive test or task could capture. The 
development of such a scale has important theoretical and clinical implications. 
Flavell (1972) proposed a classification system to explain the developmental 
sequences of cognitive acquisitions. He proposed that early developing cognitive items are 
likely to be related to later ones either by substitution, addition, modification, or mediation. 
The current data indicate that the infants’ development of early social cognitive skills was 
not one of substitution. Although the older infants passed later items they continued to 
pass the earlier items as well, showing that their later understanding did not replace their 
earlier understanding. Similarly, development was not by addition. The infants’ later 
understandings were not equivalent to their earlier understandings; the tasks tapped 
qualitatively different and seemingly more difficult skills.  Instead, these data would 
suggest that early social cognitive skills develop by modification or mediation. 
Modification involves the broadening and generalising of early understanding to 
encompass later understanding. The current data are certainly consistent with such an 
interpretation; the scale represents a progressive and broadening of developmental skills. 
However, mediation goes a little further and suggests that earlier insights enable or aid the 




acquisition of later insights through scaffolding. To this end, one might hypothesise that 
the earlier social cognitive abilities in the scale scaffold the development of the social 
cognitive abilities falling later in the scale. For instance, it may be that it is not possible for 
an infant to read another’s intentions and incorporate them together with their own 
intentions in order to ‘cooperate’ until they can understand another person’s intentions and 
unachieved goals to ‘help’. Similarly, it may be that the ability to make inferences 
regarding the communicative intention of pointing gestures is necessary to scaffold the 
ability to makes inferences regarding the communicative intention of gaze.  
At present, the current data cannot disentangle whether it is modification or 
mediation that occurs. However, it does provide a normative measure that can be used to 
examine further and possibly disentangle these different possibilities. For example, 
although it has been shown here that performance on these tasks follows a reliable 
developmental progression in typical development, it could be that atypical populations 
show a different developmental sequence. If this were the case, then one could argue that 
the acquisition of a given ‘later’ skill may not necessarily require, or be reliant upon, the 
sequential acquisition of a given ‘earlier’ skill. Such findings would not be possible using 
single task methodologies. 
The current scale may also enable the examination of the role that other known 
factors play in the development of social cognition, such as executive functioning, 
language, and social experience. Doherty (2009) outlines that “any cognitive task measures 
two factors: the conceptual competence that is being tested, and performance factors 
required to take the test” (p.132). ‘Emergence’ theorists argue that executive functions 
(EFs) play a fundamental role in the development of ToM (Doherty, 2009). For instance, 
one theory proposes that EFs are a necessary prerequisite for mental state development 
(Moses, 2005; Russell, 1996). Another theory proposes that young children possess mental 




state understanding but fail ToM tasks because they lack the necessary framework (i.e. 
EFs) to implement their understanding (e.g. Moses, 2001). Although it will not be possible 
to disentangle the intricacies of such theories, when used alongside Wellman and Liu’s 
(2004) ToM scale, the current scale may go some way to examining the influence of 
factors such as EF and language ability on ToM development in atypical populations. The 
current scale places comparatively few demands on executive functioning and language. 
Consequently, it may be that atypical individuals successfully pass these earlier tasks but 
then fail later tasks when the cognitive loading becomes greater. Alternatively it may be 
that individuals find tasks assessing mental states understanding difficult irrespective of 
the cognitive demands. Such an examination would not be possible using single task 
methodologies. 
Sociocultural accounts of social cognition argue that social experiences and 
conversational interactions are the building blocks of social cognitive development (e.g. 
Hughes et al 2005; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994). Therefore, if this scale is used to 
assess the social cognitive trajectory in individuals who show fractionated social profiles it 
may help further explore the relationship between social behaviour and social cognition. 
More specifically, one can compare whether individuals with atypical social behaviour 
show the same social cognitive development as typically developing individuals. Do 
atypical individuals follow the same progression or do they show a unique profile of social 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses? Is development ‘preserved’, advanced or delayed? If 
development is atypical or delayed, what impact may this difference have on social 
functioning? The answers to such questions will provide new insights into how the 
development of ToM relates to the social behaviour of syndrome groups that show 
fractionated social profiles.  




As the current scale taps very early social cognitive skills it will enable assessment 
of social cognition in individuals that previously would have not been assessed because 
their level of cognitive impairment meant ‘typical’ ToM tasks were unsuitable.  In terms of 
clinical implications, this may prove useful for highlighting early impairments in 
development and could consequently aid the early intervention of social cognitive 
difficulties. Furthermore, when used in conjunction with Wellman and Liu’s ToM scale, it 
will enable tracking of the development of social cognitive development over a much 
broader age range than has been possible previously. 
 
4.7. Summary 
Until now, there has been no scaled battery that enables the measurement of social 
cognitive development in individuals with ID who are too young or cognitively impaired 
to pass standard ToM tasks. Chapter 3 presented the development of preliminary scale 
incorporating tasks that assessed early social cognitive skills considered to be ‘precursors’ 
to fully fledged ToM. In the current chapter the scale was validated by examining the 
performance of a group of typically developing infants. Findings showed that six tasks 
formed a reliable scale. Typically developing infants possessed the social cognitive 
understanding and altruistic motivation to ‘help’ another before they possessed the social 
cognitive ability to understand the communicative intent of a pointing gesture and re-enact 
a person’s underlying intentions and goals. Infants then developed the ability to understand 
the communicative intent of a gaze gesture and coordinate their intentions and actions with 
another person to form a joint goal and cooperate skilfully in a problem solving ‘tubes’ 
game. Finally, infants developed the ability to coordinate their intentions and actions with 
another person to cooperate skilfully in a social ‘trampoline’ game. The current chapter 
outlined the potential theoretical and clinical implications of using the scale to assess 




atypical individuals. In the following chapter, these potential implications are explored for 
the first time by using the scale to assess the social cognitive development of a model 
syndrome group of interest, Rubinstein Taybi syndrome (RTS), a group that displays a 
fractionated social profile. Examining social cognitive development in this group, in this 
way, is important as it will contribute towards refining cognitive models of ASD by 
exploring how the development of ToM relates to the social behaviour of syndrome groups 
that show a high  prevalence of ‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles. Similarly, the study 
will also contribute to refining models of ToM more generally. If individuals with RTS 
demonstrate a different developmental sequence of social cognitive skills it may imply that 
‘later’ social cognitive skills do not require, or are not reliant upon, the sequential 
acquisition of earlier social cognitive skills.







































In chapter 1 it was argued that the study of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
phenomenology in genetic syndromes can aid understanding of the aetiological pathways 
underpinning ASD. It was subsequently highlighted how syndrome groups that displayed 
fractionated ASD profiles could provide a useful vehicle by which to study each aspect of 
the ASD triad separately. More specifically the chapter drew attention to the potential 
study of ToM development in syndrome groups that showed a high prevalence of ‘ASD’ 
but fractionated social profiles.  
In chapter 2, a total sample and then a group matching approach was used to 
highlight Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) as a syndrome of interest. Findings from this 
chapter confirmed that RTS showed a high prevalence of ASD but a dissociation across 
the ASD triad of impairments, notably a fractionated social profile.  
 The methodological constraints of studying ToM in genetic syndromes have been 
discussed throughout the thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 presented the development and 
validation of an ‘early’ social cognition scale that would enable the developmental 
assessment of ToM ‘precursors’ in individuals with intellectual disability (ID) who are too 
young or too cognitively impaired to complete traditional ToM tasks. The potential 
theoretical and clinical implications of using this ‘early’ scale in combination with 
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ‘later’ ToM scale were discussed. Consequently, the current 
chapter aims to explore these implications by piloting this new methodology to examine 










With the exception of ASD and Williams syndrome (WS) there has been relatively 
little research examining the social cognitive development of individuals with ID and 
genetic syndromes. Cebula, Moore and Wishart (2010) outline the current tendency for 
researchers to “focus more on studying children’s immediate social needs than exploring 
the socio-cognitive processes that underpin social behaviours and drive more complex 
forms of social learning” (p. 113) and “...focus on providing increasingly detailed 
behavioural descriptions, rather than on testing competing theoretical accounts” (p.123). 
Although understandable, this is certainly the case for RTS and the majority of research is 
limited to genetic studies and broad behavioural descriptions. At present, there is no 
research that examines the social cognitive profile of RTS.  
There are several benefits to examining social cognition in RTS. As has been 
discussed throughout this thesis (i.e. sections 2.5 and 2.6) the social cognitive abilities of 
RTS are of particular interest as they provide an opportunity to examine how the 
development of ToM relates to the social behaviour of syndrome groups that show a high 
prevalence of ‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles. Findings from chapter 2 showed that 
although a large proportion of individuals with RTS met the ‘cut off’ criteria for ASD, the 
profile of ASD symptomatology in the group showed a fractionated social profile relative 
to repetitive behaviour. For social aspects of the ASD triad, RTS was comparable to Down 
syndrome (DS) and significantly less impaired than an ASD group and a Fragile X 
syndrome (FXS) group. However, for repetitive behaviour, RTS was comparable to the 
ASD and FXS groups, and showed significantly higher levels of repetitive behaviour than 
the DS group.  
Given the link between ToM deficits and the social interaction and communicative 
impairments in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2000), it may be that the fractionated ‘sociable’ social 




profile reported in RTS is underpinned by a relative ‘sparing’ in social cognitive abilities.  
However, the WS literature discussed in section 1.7, suggests that the relationship between 
ToM and social behaviour may not be quite this simple i.e. ‘sociability’ may not 
necessarily represent ‘spared’ ToM.  More specifically, despite the phenotypic 
‘hypersociable’ behaviour in WS being considered the ‘polar opposite’ of ASD, recent 
findings suggest that ToM ability in WS may actually be delayed (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & Boshart, 1997). Consequently, it may be that 
despite the fractionated ‘sociable’ profile of RTS; social cognitive deficits may still be 
present in the group. Disentangling these different possibilities will contribute towards 
refining cognitive models of ASD phenomenology. Moreover, the use of a developmental 
trajectory approach will provide a much more detailed and informative contribution than 
has been possible previously with insight into developmental pathways and/or possible 
causal mechanisms. If developmental sequences differ in RTS, it may help pinpoint the 
processes involved in fractionated social profiles.   
The developmental study of social cognition in RTS also has the potential to 
inform models of ToM more generally. In typical development it has been shown that a 
number of social cognitive tasks follow a reliable developmental progression (see 
Wellman and Liu, 2004 and chapter 4). As discussed in section 4.6, it is possible that these 
developmental progressions may occur via the process of mediation, in which the 
acquisition of later social cognitive skills is dependent on the acquisition and scaffolding 
of earlier social cognitive skills. However, if individuals with RTS demonstrate a different 
developmental sequence when they are assessed using the same developmental batteries, 
then it may imply that ‘later’ skills do not require, or are not reliant upon, the sequential 
acquisition of ‘earlier’ skills.   




Studying social cognition in RTS may also contribute to the wider literature that 
implicates the role of other relevant factors in the development of social cognition, such as 
executive functioning, language, and social experience. As discussed in section 4.6, 
sociocultural accounts of social cognition argue that social experiences and conversational 
interactions are the building blocks of social cognitive development (e.g. Hughes et al. 
2005; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994). EF accounts propose that EFs are a necessary 
prerequisite for social cognitive development (e.g. Moses, 2005; Russell, 1996). Although 
it will not be possible to disentangle the intricacies of such theories by examining the 
developmental trajectory of RTS in isolation, the study of RTS may lead to deliberation 
and discussion about the relationship between ToM development and these factors. For 
example, taking the descriptions of RTS as “friendly” individuals who “love adult 
attention” together with the findings from chapter 2, that RTS show superior social 
interaction and social communication skills when compared to ASD and FXS, if social 
experiences are particularly influential, it could be that their social cognitive development 
is either ‘advanced’ or ‘spared’ relative to their mental age.  
Furthermore, as the scaled social cognition battery developed in chapters 3 and 4 
places very few demands on EF, when it is used alongside Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM 
battery it could provide useful information regarding the influence and importance of EFs. 
For instance, it may be that individuals with RTS pass early tasks but then fail later tasks 
when cognitive load becomes greater. Such findings would add to EF accounts and 
implicate EFs as necessary prerequisites for more sophisticated social cognitive 
development in RTS.   
There are also important clinical implications for studying social cognitive 
development in RTS. Although the behavioural descriptions of sociability noted in the 
literature (outlined above and in section 2.2) suggest that those with RTS are “happy”, 




“loving” and “friendly” individuals who “love adult attention” (Baxter & Beer, 1992; 
Hennekam, 2006; Padfield, et al. 1968; Rubinstein & Taybi, 1963; Stevens, Pouncey & 
Knowles, 2011; Stevens et al. 1990a), reports also state that individuals may be “over 
friendly” (Stevens, Pouncey & Knowles, 2011). More recently, parents and carers have 
expressed concern that the people they care for appear to lack “stranger danger 
awareness”, and there have been descriptions of instances where adults with RTS have 
been victims of exploitation, particularly with regards to money and inappropriate 
relationships (Oliver, 2007 personal communication). As outlined in section 3.2, the ability 
to attribute mental states to others is fundamental for successful social interactions as it 
allows a person to predict, explain, and manipulate the behaviour of others (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Quantifying the social cognitive abilities of RTS may provide important 
preliminary insights that could contribute towards explaining some of the emerging social 
difficulties in RTS. It could be that these difficulties are partly underpinned by social 
cognitive deficits. If this were the case, these findings would be invaluable for informing 
intervention strategies.  Furthermore, by using a developmental trajectory approach and a 
scale that incorporates the assessment of early social cognitive skills, it may be possible to 
pinpoint specific early abilities and/or deficits that could inform the focus of early 
intervention strategies. 
As discussed above, there are numerous possibilities and hypotheses that could be 
explored by examining the social cognitive development in RTS. Consequently, the 
current chapter aims to investigate these possibilities by addressing the following 
questions:  
 
 Do individuals with RTS demonstrate advanced, preserved or delayed social cognitive 
ability relative to their mental age?  





 Regardless of delay or ability, do individuals with RTS display the same social cognitive 
developmental trajectory as typically developing individuals or do they demonstrate some 




The participants were 32 children and adults with RTS (16 males, mean 
chronological age: 222 months; age range: 45-533 months; SD: 121.03) recruited via the 
RTS support group and from a syndrome database held at The University of Birmingham 
(see Appendix G for recruitment pack). All participants were mobile and had received a 
clinical diagnosis of RTS. As chromosomal or molecular abnormalities are only found in 
around 55% of cases (Hennekam, 2006), diagnosis is based largely on the identification of 
clinical characteristics. Consequently, the majority of individuals in the current study did 
not have a genetic confirmation of RTS. However, reports suggest that clinical differences 
between individuals with and without genetic confirmation are minimal (Bartsch et al, 
1999). Informed consent was obtained from all participants aged over sixteen years. For 
participants less than sixteen years informed consent was obtained from parents and carers. 




5.3.2.1. Mental age assessment 
Psychometric tests were administered to all individuals with RTS to assess mental 
age. Due to the range in age and ability across the sample, participants either completed 




the Mullen Scales of Early Learning (MSEL: Mullen, 1995) or the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scales of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-11: Wechsler, 1999). The MSEL is 
suitable for individuals aged from birth to a MA of 5:6 years and the WASI-11 is suitable 
for individuals with a MA between 6:0 years and 90:11 years. The examiners selected the 
appropriate assessment for each individual based on an estimation of their general ability. 
This was done during a discussion with the participant and participant’s family member 
prior to testing.  
Typically, when scoring these assessments, subscale raw scores are converted into 
t-scores that correspond to the participant’s chronological age. However, for the MSEL, 
normative data and subsequent t-scores are only available for participants with a CA of 66 
months or younger. As only two individuals with RTS were under 66 months of age, t-
scores could not be calculated. Furthermore, for global MAs to be calculated on the 
WASI-11, individuals need to obtain sufficient scores on all four subscales of the test.  As 
none of the participants assessed using the WASI-11 achieved this, a global MA score 
could not be calculated.  Due to these difficulties, the current study employed the method 
used by Richler, Bishop, Kleinke, and Lord (2007) to derive global MAs for participants 
assessed with the WASI-11.  More specifically, subscale MAs were calculated using raw 
score tables and then a mean overall MA was calculated from the subscale MAs. For the 
MSEL, overall MA was derived in a similar manner, by calculating the mean of the 
expressive language, visual reception, receptive language, and fine motor subscales. The 
gross motor subscale of the MSEL was omitted as the highest possible MA achievable on 
this subscale was 33 months and thus including it could have disproportionately decreased 
the overall MA and made it unrepresentative of a participant’s ability.  
 
 




5.3.2.2. Social cognitive development assessment 
Social cognitive development was assessed by utilising two experimental batteries: 
The Early Social Cognition Scale (ESCS); and the Theory of Mind Scale (ToMS, Wellman 
and Liu, 2004). The ESCS was developed in chapter 3 and validated with typically 
developing infants in chapter 4. The ESCS examines early social cognitive abilities that 
develop prior to fully fledged ToM. Typically the ESCS contains six experimental tasks:  
The ‘helping’ task; the ‘re-enactment of intended acts’ task; the ‘pointing’ and ‘gaze’ 
tasks; the ‘cooperation - tubes’ task; and ‘cooperation -trampoline’ task. However, it is of 
note that the ‘re-enactment of intended acts’ task was not included in the current study. 
The absence of this task was due to the task being added to the normative battery at a 
slightly later date. More specifically, data for both studies were collected in parallel and 
the ‘re-enactment of intended acts’ task was added because shortly after data collection 
started it was seen that administration time was quicker than expected. As time allowed, 
the ‘re-enactment of intended acts’ task was added to improve the battery by assessing an 
even broader range of skills. However, due to the fact that a number of RTS participants 
had already been assessed using the smaller battery and a need to retain maximum N in a 
rare syndrome group, it was decided that the ‘re-enactment of intended acts’ task would 
not be administered to this group. It is important to note here that removing an item from a 
scale does not affect scalability as reduction of item simply reduces variance. 
Consequently comparisons between the larger and smaller scales remain valid.  
The ToMS was developed by Wellman and Liu (2004) and contains five 
experimental tasks: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, Contents False 
Belief, and Real Apparent Emotions.  It has been shown that in typical development these 
tasks form a strict Guttman scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004). The co-efficient of 
reproducibility, using Green’s (1956) method of estimation is .96 (values greater than .90 




indicate scalable items). Green’s index of consistency, which tests that the reproducibility 
was over what could be achieved by chance, is .56 (values equal to or greater than .50 are 
significant). Therefore, typically developing preschool children pass earlier tasks, reach a 
task that they fail and then fail all subsequent tasks. Furthermore, as children get older they 
pass more tasks in succession.  
When used together the ESCS and ToMS span a developmental MA range from 
approximately 14 months to 5.4 years.  
 
5.3.2.3. Administration of the scales 
Individuals with RTS were tested in a quiet room in their home. Before each 
experimental session the experimenters conducted a warm up phase and either played or 
chatted with the participant for around 10-15 minutes. Due to differences in age and ability 
across the sample it was not always possible to administer all tasks (i.e. both scales) to 
each participant. More specifically, as the batteries spanned such as wide ability range, 
some of the tasks at the extreme ends of the batteries were not age or ability appropriate 
for the older/more able individuals or younger/less able individuals.  Therefore, there were 
two different administration start points – start point ‘A’ (The ESCS battery) and start 
point ‘B’ (the ToMS battery). The examiners selected the appropriate start point for each 
individual based on an estimation of their general ability. This was done during a 
discussion with the participant and participant’s family member prior to testing. 
The administration protocol is outlined in Figure 8. Participants who displayed 
limited receptive and expressive language skills started at point ‘A’(the ESCS Battery). 
Tasks 1-5 were then administered in one of four counterbalanced orders (outlined in Table 
12). Each counterbalanced order began with a task deemed particularly engaging. This was 
to encourage the participant to feel comfortable and to avoid early frustration. Participants’ 




performance was then used to determine whether any further tests would be administered. 
More specifically, if individuals passed tasks 4 or 5 they were then administered Tasks 6-
10 (The ToMS battery) in order. However, if it was deemed that the participant was 
finding the tasks in this battery far too difficult and failure was causing the participant to 
become frustrated the experimenter discontinued the battery following two consecutive 
fails. This discontinuation rule was implemented to reduce the risk of disengagement. 
However, if participants were happy and showed no signs of frustration, all tasks of the 
ToMS battery were administered. 
Participants who displayed good receptive and expressive language skills started at 
start point ‘B’.  Tasks 6-10 were then administered in one of four counterbalanced orders 
(outlined in Table 13). Each counterbalanced order began with either the Diverse Desires 
or Diverse Belief task. These tasks were simpler and were used first to encourage the 
participant to feel comfortable and to avoid early frustration. Participants’ performance 
was then used to determine whether any further tests would be administered.  More 
specifically, if individuals failed Task 6 they were then administered Tasks 5-1 in reverse 
order. However, if it was deemed that the participant was finding that the tasks were 
inappropriate for their age or ability the experimenter discontinued the battery following 
two consecutive passes. This discontinuation rule was implemented to reduce the risk of 
disengagement. However, if participants were happy to continue, all tasks of the ESCS 
battery were administered.  
All tasks were administered on the same day but frequent breaks were given 
between social cognition tasks and between the IQ assessment sub domains. This was to 
ensure participants did not become fatigued or disengaged.  







1. Helping Task 
2. Pointing Task 
3. Gaze Task 
4. Tubes Task 
5. Trampoline Task 
6. Diverse Desires 
7. Diverse Beliefs 
8. Knowledge Access 
9. Contents False 
Belief 
10. Real Apparent 
Emotion 
Start Point ‘A’ 
ESCS Battery 
Start Point ‘B’ 
ToMs Battery 
Reverse Administration  
 
Forward Administration  
 
Figure 8: Task administration order of the Social Cognition Scales 
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5.3.2.4. Individual task procedures 
 Full task descriptions and procedures for the ESCS are outlined in section 4.3.5. of 
chapter 4. However, as the ToMS has not been fully described elsewhere in the thesis the 
individual task descriptions and procedures are described below. For all tasks in the ToMS 
the participant sat at a table next to the experimenter. 
 
5.3.2.4.1. Diverse desires (DD) 
This task assessed the participants’ mental state understanding of ‘desire’ - the 
ability to reason that two persons (themselves and another) can hold different preferences 
(and thus different mental states) about the same object. This task forms the first task in 
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale and is derived from an original task devised by Repacholi 
and Gopnik (1997). 
The experimenter began the task by showing the participant a doll depicting a 
young boy, and two laminated pictures – one of a carrot, and one of a cookie. The 
experimenter then said to the participant: “This is Ben, it is snack time and Ben wants 
something to eat. Here are two snacks – a carrot and a cookie”. The participant was then 
asked an initial own desire question: “So, [name], which snack would you like best, the 
carrot or the cookie?” If the participant chose the cookie (the typical response) the 
experimenter then said “Well that’s a good choice [name], but Ben...Ben really likes 
carrots....he doesn’t like cookies.” The participant was then asked the target question: “So, 
now it’s time to eat. Ben can only choose one snack – what will he chose the carrot or the 
cookie?” (If the participant had initially responded that they liked carrots best, the script 
was altered so that they were informed that Ben liked cookies and disliked carrots). To be 
coded as correct, and subsequently pass the task, the participant was required to answer the 
target question with the opposite response to their own desire question response. 




5.3.2.4.2. Diverse beliefs (DB) 
This task assessed the participants’ mental state understanding of ‘belief’ - the 
ability to reason that two persons (themselves and another) can hold different beliefs about 
the same object, when they do not know which belief is true or false. This task forms the 
second task in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale and is derived from original tasks devised 
by Bartsch (1989) and Wellman, Hollander, & Schult (1996). 
The experimenter began the task by showing the participant a doll depicting a 
young girl, and a laminated picture of a garage and some bushes. The experimenter then 
said to the participant: “This is Mary. Mary wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding 
in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage (pointing to the picture). The participant 
was then asked an initial own belief question: “So, [name], where do you think the cat is -
in the garage or in the bushes?” If the participant chose the bushes the experimenter then 
said “Well that’s a good idea [name], but Mary thinks her cat is in the garage” (If the 
participant responded they thought the cat was in the garage the script was altered so they 
were informed Mary thought her cat was in the bushes). The participant was then asked the 
target question: “So, where will Mary look for her cat? In the garage or in the bushes?” To 
be coded as correct, and subsequently pass the task, the participant was required to answer 
the target question with the opposite response to their own belief question response.  
 
5.3.2.4.3. Knowledge access (KA) 
This task assessed the participants’ ability to reason about the knowledge state of 
another person who has not seen inside a box that they (the participant) have seen inside. 
This task forms the third task in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale and is derived from 
original tasks devised by Pratt & Bryant (1990) and Pillow (1989).  




The experimenter began the task by showing the participant a black box with a 
pull-out drawer -“Here’s a drawer, [name] what do you think is inside the drawer?” (The 
participant says whatever they like or states that they don’t know). The experimenter then 
opened the drawer to reveal what was inside – a small plastic duck. “Let’s see...oh, it’s 
really a duck inside!” The experimenter then closed the drawer and asked “Okay, what’s 
inside the drawer?” Following the participant’s answer, the experimenter then produced a 
doll depicting a young girl and said “This is Polly, Polly has never seen inside the 
drawer...” The experimenter then asked the target question – “So, [name], here comes 
Polly, does Polly know what is inside the drawer?” Regardless of the answer the 
experimenter then immediately asked the participant a memory question – “Did Polly see 
inside the drawer?” To be coded as correct, and subsequently pass the task, the participant 
was required to answer both the target and memory questions “no”.   
 
5.3.2.4.4. Contents false belief (CFB) 
This task assessed the participants’ mental state understanding of ‘false belief’, the 
ability to reason that another person can hold a belief that is at odds with what they (the 
participant) know to be true. This task forms the fourth task in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
scale and is derived from original tasks devised by Perner, Leekham & Wimmer (1987). 
The experimenter began the task by showing the participant a closed Smarties tube 
- “Here’s a smarties tube. What do you think is inside the smarties tube?” (typical response 
is ‘smarties’ or ‘sweets’). The experimenter then opened the smarties tube and revealed 
that there were actually pencils inside – “Let’s see...it’s really pencils inside”. The 
experimenter then closed the tube and asked “Okay, [name] what’s inside the smarties 
tube?” Following the participant’s answer, the experimenter then produced a doll depicting 
a young boy and said “This is John, John has never seen inside the smarties tube...” The 




experimenter then asked the target question – “So, [name], here comes John, what does 
John think is inside the tube? Smarties or pencils?” Regardless of the answer the 
experimenter then immediately asked the participant a memory question – “Did John see 
inside the tube?” To be coded as correct, and subsequently pass the task, the participant 
was required to answer the target question “smarties” and the memory question “no”.   
 
5.3.2.4.5. Real – apparent emotion (RAE) 
This task assessed the participants’ mental state understanding of ‘hidden 
emotions’ - the ability to reason that another person can feel one thing but display a 
different emotion. This task forms the fifth and final task in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
scale and is derived from an original task devised by Harris, Donnelly, Guz, and Pitt-
Watson (1986). 
The experimenter began the task by showing the participant a laminated sheet with 
three faces printed on it: a happy face, a neutral face, and a sad face. To check the 
participants’ knowledge of these emotional expressions they were asked which face was 
‘happy’, which was ‘sad’, and which was ‘just ok’. If participants were successful they 
were then presented with a laminated cut-out that depicted the back of a boy, so his facial 
expressions could not be seen. The experimenter said “I’m going to tell you a story about a 
boy. I’m then going to ask you how the boy really feels inside and how he looks on his 
face. He might really feel one way inside but look a different way on his face. Or, he might 
really feel the same way inside as he looks on his face. After the story, I want you to tell 
me how he really feels inside and how he looks on his face.” The experimenter paused 
briefly and then started the story: “This story is about Matt, Matt’s friends were all playing 
together and telling jokes. One of the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt 
and everybody laughed. Everyone thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt 




didn’t want the other children to see how he felt about the joke, because they would call 
him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how he felt”. Immediately after the story the 
experimenter asked two memory check questions – “What did the other children do when 
Rosie told a mean joke about Matt?” and “In the story, what would the other children do if 
they knew how Matt felt?” To pass the memory questions, participants needed to answer 
the first question “laughed/ thought it was funny” and the second question””call Matt a 
baby/tease him”. Following the participant’s responses the experimenter pointed towards 
the three emotion pictures and asked the target-feel question: “So how did Matt really feel, 
when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad or just ok?” The experimenter then asked 
the target-look question: “How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? 
Did he look happy, sad or just ok?” To be coded as correct, and subsequently pass the task, 
the participant was required to answer the memory questions correctly and then rate the 
target- feel question more negatively than the target-look question. 
 
5.3.2.5. Coding of the social cognition scales 
Performance on each task was coded as either ‘pass’ or ‘fail’. For the tasks in the 
ESCS battery the coding criteria used in chapter 4 was conducted. For the tasks in the 
ToMS battery the coding criteria used by Wellman and Liu (2004) was conducted, as 
outlined above.  It is of note that, for the KA, CFB and RAE tasks of the ToMS, to pass the 
tasks participants were required to pass the associated memory/control questions as well as 
the critical test questions. This was to ensure that the participants understood and 
remembered all the relevant information and that their answers were therefore based on 
meaningful reasoning rather than random responses or ‘guesses’.   
 
 




5.3.2.6. Inter-rater reliability for coding of the social cognition scales. 
All tasks were initially coded by the primary experimenter by reviewing video clips 
of participant’s performance on each task. To ensure this coding was accurate and reliable, 
a second coder was introduced and asked to code a random 25% of each administered task. 
Visual comparison between coding reports showed perfect agreement between both coders 
across all tasks. 
 
5.3.3. Overview of analysis and results sections 
As outlined in the introduction, the current chapter intended to fulfil two aims. 
Firstly, to describe the overall social cognitive level of individuals with RTS to ascertain 
whether their social cognitive abilities were preserved, advanced, or delayed relative to 
their mental age. Secondly, to examine whether, regardless of delay or ability, individuals 
with RTS followed the same social cognitive developmental trajectory shown in typical 
development, or whether they showed a different developmental path or pattern. The 
following sections of this chapter report the analyses and results of these aims.    
Both the ESCS and ToMS batteries included control trials and/or questions. 
Examination of the control trials for the ESCS are analysed and presented first to ensure 
that the tasks were working, at a group level, as expected. As the control questions in the 
ToMS were included to assess the influence of memory and general understanding on task 
failures, rather than whether or not the tasks were working per se, the examination of these 










5.4.1. Analysis of ESCS control trials. 
5.4.1.1. ‘Helping’ control trials 
For each helping trial there was a corresponding control trial in which the same 
basic situation was present but there was no indication that help was required. Results 
indicated that out of the 21 participants that handed over an item during the experimental 
trials, only two also handed over an item in the control trials. Therefore it was judged that 
the task was working as expected – participants were ‘helping’ rather than merely trying to 
re-instate the original situation or to get the adult to repeat the action. Furthermore, in 
order to ensure that participants were not collecting the object primarily for themselves 
rather than to help the experimenter, each participant’s behaviour was also coded for 
whether or not they took possession of the object before handing it over. The results 
indicated that out of the 21 participants that handed over an item during the experimental 
trials, none took possession of the item before handing it over. Therefore, it was judged 
that the task was working as expected and the participants were indeed ‘helping’ the adult 
rather than collecting the object primarily for themselves. 
 
5.4.1.2. ‘Gesture’ control trials 
To ensure that successful performance on this task was not due to low level 
attentional cueing, the control trials were analysed for the participants that passed the task 
(successful on 2/2 searches). Paired t tests were conducted to compare the number of 
correct vs. incorrect searchers for both control cues. Results indicated that search 
performance did not differ significantly from chance for either cue type. [‘Control Point’:  
t (16) = -.368, p=.72; ‘Control Gaze’ – t (11) = .000; p=1.00].  Therefore, it was judged 




that the participants passing this task were passing due to their understanding of intentions 
rather than due to low level cueing. 
 
5.4.2. Analysis: Description of overall social cognitive ability. 
There are various ways that can be used to investigate whether the cognitive 
abilities in genetic syndromes are typical or atypical.  The first of these involves the 
examination of whether behaviour is ‘age typical’. The second involves the examination of 
whether performance follows a typical developmental pattern.  
To examine whether behaviour is age typical, the strongest testing method is to 
compare performance on a cognitive task to two matched comparison groups, one matched 
for chronological age (CA) and one matched for mental age (MA). If the syndrome group 
demonstrates a deficit relative to the CA matched group, but not the MA matched group, 
the group is considered developmentally delayed on the task. Alternatively, if the 
syndrome group demonstrates a deficit relative to both the MA and CA comparison 
groups, it is instead considered to be developmentally atypical (Hodapp, Burack & Zigler, 
1990). However, an alternative, albeit weaker, approach to this method is to compare a 
group to age norms. Throughout this thesis, the added benefits of adopting a 
developmental trajectory approach have been discussed and subsequently this 
methodology was selected over recruiting matched comparison groups (see section 1.9 for 
discussion). Consequently, in this section the analysis of overall social cognitive ability in 
RTS is described using age norms derived from the typically developing literature.   
For this descriptive analysis, each participant with RTS was allocated a ‘scale 
position point’ based on how far they progressed through the social cognitive batteries. 
The allocated scale position was determined by the last task the participant successfully 
passed before failing two tasks consecutively. For example, if the participant passed the 




‘cooperation - trampoline’ task and Diverse Desires task but then failed the Diverse Belief 
and Knowledge Access tasks their scale position point would be 6. Similarly, if a 
participant passed the ‘helping’ task and ‘pointing’ task but then failed the ‘gaze’ task and 
‘cooperation – tubes’ task, their scale point position would be 2. If participants progressed 
to point 9 in the scale, but then failed at point 10, they were allocated a scale position point 
of 9. This was because it was not possible to accrue two consecutive fails.  
Each scale position point had a ‘corresponding MA’ based on the average age data 
derived from the typically developing literature. For the ESCS tasks, these were the ages 
of acquisition proposed by the original experimental studies reported in chapter 3. For the 
ToMS tasks, these were the average ages reported in Wellman & Liu’s (2004) original 
study.  Each participant’s scale position point could then be plotted alongside their mental 
age and the average age data derived from typical development studies to provide an 
overview of whether performance was generally advanced, preserved or delayed overall.  
 
5.4.3. Results: Description of overall social cognitive ability. 
Two individuals who reached ceiling (achieved a scale position point of 10), and 
two individuals who were nonverbal and had not accrued two consecutive fails before task 
6, were excluded from the analysis. For these individuals it was felt that it was not possible 
to accurately determine their level of social cognitive understanding.  More specifically, 
for the individuals who reached ceiling it was possible that they may have gone on to pass 
more complex tasks, therefore allocating a scale position of ‘10’ may have underestimated 
their ability. Similarly, for non verbal individuals it was not possible to progress past point 
6 in the scale as tasks 7 – 10 required verbal responses. Therefore, allocating a scale 
position of 6 might have underestimated their ability. Consequently, twenty eight children 
and adults with RTS were included in the analysis (14 males, mean chronological age: 221 




months; age range: 63 - 533 months; SD: 118.67).  The individuals who were excluded 
from the analysis due to reaching ceiling had mental ages of 147 and 144 months, and 
chronological ages of 353 and 361 months, respectively. The individuals who were 
excluded due to being nonverbal and not accruing two consecutive fails before task 6 had 
mental ages of 29 and 21 months, and chronological ages of 45 and 144 months, 
respectively.  
To provide a descriptive overview of whether ability was preserved, advanced, or 
delayed relative to mental age, individuals with RTS were ordered by increasing mental 
age and their scale position points plotted on a graph, alongside the average age data 
(Figure 9). 






Figure 9. The scale position points and corresponding mental ages for individuals with RTS together with average age 
data derived from typical development studies. 
RTS = Rubinstein Taybi syndrome ; TypDev = Average age data derived from developmental literature. 
 




Correlation analysis indicated that for individuals with RTS, scale position 
increased significantly with mental age: r (28) = .76, p<.01. Therefore, with increasing 
mental age, individuals with RTS progressed further up the social cognition scales and 
demonstrated more sophisticated social cognitive ability.  
Although interpretation requires caution, visual inspection of these data provides 
some potentially interesting findings. The graph indicates that at the lower end of the scale 
(scale points 1-7) there were 6 participants who reached scale point positions above what 
would have been predicted given their MA (i.e. their plotted points lay to the left of the 
‘typical’ average age plotted points), perhaps suggesting an advanced ability relative to 
MA. Conversely, at the higher end of the scale (scale points 8-10) there were no points 
lying to the left of the average age points. Twenty-two of the participants had scale point 
positions below what would have been predicted given their MA (i.e. their plotted points 
lay to the right of the ‘typical’ average age plotted points), perhaps suggesting that the 
majority of the group showed delayed ability relative to MA. However, the extent of this 
relative delay appears to vary substantially across participants, with some participant’s 
points lying relatively close to the average age points, and others lying much further away.    
 
 
5.4.4. Analysis: Social cognitive developmental pattern. 
The second aim for the thesis was to explore whether, regardless of delay, 
individuals with RTS progressed along the same developmental sequence as typically 
developing individuals or whether they showed an atypical developmental path or pattern.  
To achieve this, Guttman analysis of the data was required.  
Guttman analysis requires that each participant completes all tasks in a scale. 
However, as previously discussed, due to differences in age and ability across the sample it 
was not possible to administer all tasks from the ESCS and ToMS to each participant. To 




recap, participants who displayed limited receptive and expressive language skills started 
at point ‘A’ (The ESCS battery) and tasks 1-5 were administered. If these individuals 
passed task 4 or 5 they were then administered tasks 6-10 in order unless the experimenter 
deemed that the participant was frustrated or distressed due to repeated failure. In these 
cases the administration of tasks 6-10 was discontinued following two consecutive 
failures. Participants who displayed good receptive and expressive language skills started 
at start point ‘B’ (The ToMs battery) and tasks 6-10 were administered. If individuals 
failed task 6 they were then administered tasks 5-1 in reverse order unless the 
experimenter deemed that the participant was finding the tasks inappropriate for their age 
or ability. In these cases the administration of tasks 5-1 was discontinued following two 
consecutive passes. The result of this method of administration meant that some 
participants only completed one of the batteries fully (i.e. either the ESCS or the ToMS) 
and some completed both of the batteries fully (i.e. both the ESCS and the ToMS).  
Therefore, as only a small proportion of participants (n= 15) completed both batteries, 
Guttman analyses (and any necessary subsequent analyses) were conducted separately for 
the ESCS and ToMS batteries, and are described in turn.  
 
5.4.5. Results: Early social cognitive developmental pattern (the ESCS). 
Twenty one children and adults with RTS fully completed the ESCS battery (12 
males, mean chronological age: 179 months; age range: 45 - 403 months; SD: 95.20). 
According to the sequence reported and validated in chapter 4, if individuals with RTS 
showed the same developmental trajectory as typically developing individuals, the data 
should follow the developmental progression shown in Figure 10.   
 
 













Figure 10: The typical developmental progression through tasks in the ESCS.  
 
To ascertain whether individuals with RTS passed tasks in the same order as 
typically developing individuals, an initial Guttman analysis was conducted with all five 
tasks ranked in the order of difficulty outlined in Figure 10. As two of the tasks (‘gaze’ and 
‘cooperation’ -tubes) are considered to be of equal difficultly, an arbitrary order for these 
two tasks was adopted, as outlined by Green (1956). Table 14 reports the performance of 
individuals with RTS on this five item scale. It shows that only 43% of the sample fit the 
five item scale exactly. The coefficient of reproducibility for these data was 0.91 and the 
index of consistency was - 0.41, clearly showing that these data could not be considered 
scalable.  
 
Table 14: Guttman scalogram for five item ESCS battery. 
Pattern 0 1 2 3 4 5 Other Patterns N 
‘Helping' task —        
‘Point' task — —       
‘Gaze' task — — —      
‘Tubes’ task — — — —     
‘Trampoline' task — — — — —    
         
RTS 0 0 0 0 2 7 12 21 
Mean mental age 
(m) 0 0 0 0 35.5 49.9 41.7  
Age range (m)     19-52 31-80 15-89   
Helping Task 
Pointing Task 








The result that the RTS data did not conform to the progression shown in typically 
developing infants could have occurred for three reasons. It could be that individuals with 
RTS showed vast variance in performance across tasks and subsequently the data could be  
‘noisy’ and show no clear sign of any developmental pattern. Conversely, it could be that 
individuals do follow the same general developmental progression shown by typically 
developing infants, but as occurred in chapter 4, the stringent and conservative nature of 
Guttman scaling, which allows very few deviations from the scale, may not have allowed 
for a realistic level of variability. Finally, and perhaps more interestingly, it could be that 
individuals with RTS follow a different developmental pathway in their early social 
cognitive development.    
In an attempt to disentangle some of these possibilities, Table 15 was constructed 
to display the percentage of individuals with RTS that passed each task in the battery. The 
table is ordered from the ‘easiest’ task (highest number of individuals passing) to the 
‘hardest’ (lowest number of individuals passing). When compared to the task progression 
shown in typical development (Figure 10) the percentages in the table appear to suggest 
that individuals with RTS may find certain tasks easier (i.e. ‘Cooperation – tubes’ task) 
and certain tasks harder (i.e. ‘Gaze’ task) than typically developing infants. However, from 
these percentages alone it is not possible to ascertain whether the tasks do in indeed follow 











Table 15: The percentage of individuals with RTS that passed each task in the ESCS 
battery and corresponding order in typical development. 
 
Task RTS Pass Rate  ‘Typical’ Order (as 








‘Cooperation’ – tubes task 
 
100% # 3 = 
‘Pointing’ task 
 
81% # 2 
‘Cooperation’ – trampoline task 
 
81% # 4 
‘Gaze’ task 57% # 3 = 
 
 
To investigate whether the ordered tasks did reliably follow a general progression, 
analysis used a series of paired task sequences. As reflected in Table 15, two pairs of tasks 
yielded equal pass rates: ‘Helping’ and ‘Cooperation - tubes’; and ‘Pointing’ and 
‘Cooperation -trampoline’. Therefore, McNemar’s tests with Yates’s correction for 
continuity were conducted only between the tasks of increasing difficulty. In total, three 
pairwise comparisons were made, as outlined in Figure 11.  
 
‘Helping’ task / ‘Cooperation- tubes’ task 
 





Figure 11: McNemar pairwise comparisons. 
 
 
As multiple comparisons were being conducted, Bonferroni-Holm corrections were 
used to control for family wise error. Results indicated a significant pairwise difference 
between the ‘helping’ / ‘cooperation – tubes’ tasks and ‘gaze’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 
7.11, p<.05. No differences were found between the ‘helping’ / ‘cooperation- tubes’ tasks 
Sig ** p<.05 
NS 
NS 




and the ‘Pointing’ / ‘cooperation - trampoline’ tasks (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 2.25, p=ns) or 
the ‘Pointing’ / ‘Cooperation - trampoline’ tasks and the ‘Gaze’ task (McNemar’s χ2 (1) = 
1.45, p=ns).  
To clarify, results showed that the ‘gaze’ task was not significantly harder than the 
‘pointing’ and ‘cooperation - trampoline’ tasks, and the ‘pointing’ and ‘cooperation -
trampoline’ tasks were not significantly harder than the ‘helping’ and ‘cooperation - tubes’ 
tasks. However, results did indicate that the ‘gaze’ task was significantly more difficult 
than the ‘helping’ and ‘cooperation- tubes’ tasks (Figure 11)   
In the typically developing sample, the ‘cooperation - trampoline’ task was found 
to be significantly harder than the ‘gaze’ and ‘cooperation - tubes’ tasks; the ‘gaze’ and 
‘cooperation – tubes’ tasks were of equal difficulty but both were significantly harder than 
the ‘pointing’ task; and the ‘pointing’ task was significantly harder than the ‘helping task’ 
(i.e. Figure 10). The fact that these same progressive differences are not found in RTS is of 
interest. However, one cannot argue that these tasks do not show a general increase in 
difficulty in RTS, it may be that individuals were just performing near ceiling and 
therefore a more general developmental progression was not picked up. The high 
percentage pass rates would certainly suggest this as a possibility.  
The finding that the ‘gaze’ task was significantly harder than the ‘cooperation – 
tubes’ task is particularly interesting, as the typically developing data would suggests that 
these two tasks are of equal developmental difficulty. Therefore, even if individuals with 
RTS were performing at ceiling, if their developmental pathway was the same as typically 
developing individuals, given their success with the ‘cooperation - tubes’ task, one would 
expect them to have equal success with performance on the ‘gaze’ task.  However, they do 
not, the gaze task is significantly harder. Therefore it appears that, for early social 
cognitive development, individuals with RTS do follow a slightly different developmental 




progression than typically developing individuals, with gaze understanding developing 
later.  
 
5.4.6. Results: Later social cognitive developmental pattern (the ToMS) 
Twenty six children and adults with RTS fully completed the ToMS battery (12 
males, mean chronological age:  239 months; age range: 78 – 533 months; SD: 122.65). 
According to the sequence reported and validated by Wellman & Liu (2004) if individuals 
with RTS showed the same developmental trajectory as typically developing individuals, 











Figure 12: The typical developmental progression through tasks in the ToMS.  
 
To ascertain whether individuals with RTS passed tasks in the same order as 
typically developing individuals, a Guttman analysis was conducted with all five tasks 
ranked in the order of difficulty outlined in Figure 12. Table 16 reports the performance of 
individuals with RTS on this five item scale. It shows that 76% of the sample fit the five 
item scale exactly. The coefficient of reproducibility for these data was 0.94 and the index 
of consistency was 0.50 and therefore it was found that for the ToMS battery, individuals 
with RTS do follow the same developmental trajectory as typically developing individuals.  





 Real Apparent 
Emotion 




Table 16: Guttman scalogram for five item ToMs battery. 
Pattern 0 1 2 3 4 5 Other Patterns N 
Diverse Desires —        
Diverse Beliefs — —       
Knowledge Access  — — —      
Contents FB — — — —     
Real Apparent Emotion — — — — —    
         
RTS 2 4 6 3 2 2 7 26 
Mean mental age (m) 43.8 46.0 54.9 69.7 125.6 145.0 67.7  
Age range (m) 42-46 30-66 31-71 62-78 110-141 144-147 52-89   
 
 
To provide further information regarding the performance on individuals with RTS 
on the ToMS, the percentage pass rates for each task in this battery are displayed in Table 
17. This table shows that relatively high proportions of the individuals with RTS tested on 
this battery passed the tasks at the beginning of the scale. However, as the scale 
progressed, percentage pass rates decreased, with very few participants passing the final 
task.  
 
Table 17: The percentage of individuals with RTS that passed each task in the ToMS 
battery and corresponding order in typical development. 
 
Task RTS Pass Rate  ‘Typical’ Order (as 










65.4% # 2  
Knowledge Access 
 
46.2% # 3 
Contents False Belief 
 
19.2% # 4 








Results: Analysis of control/memory questions (the ToMS) 
As outlined in section 5.3.2.5 of this chapter, to pass the KA, CFB and RAE tasks, 
participants were required to pass the associated memory/control questions as well as the 
critical test questions. This was to ensure that the participants understood and remembered 
all the relevant information and that their answers were therefore based on meaningful 
reasoning rather than random responses or ‘guesses’.  Inspection of the control/ memory 
questions for these tasks indicated that a high number of the participants who failed the 
tasks also failed the associated control questions. For the KA task, for the 14 participants 
who failed the task, 10 also failed the control questions (71.4%). For the CFB task, out of 
the 21 fails, 11 also failed the control questions (52.4%). For the RAE task all of the 24 
participants that failed also failed the control questions (100.0%).  These findings suggest 
that although individuals with RTS follow the same developmental trajectory as typically 
developing individuals on the ToMS, a high proportion of failures may be attributable to 




The current chapter utilised two scaled experimental batteries to examine the social 
cognitive abilities in RTS. The first aim of the chapter was to explore whether individuals 
with RTS showed advanced, preserved or delayed social cognition relative to their MA. 
The second aim was to examine whether, regardless of delay or ability, individuals with 
RTS displayed the same social cognitive developmental trajectory as typically developing 
individuals or whether they displayed a unique developmental pathway or pattern.  
To describe social cognitive ability relative to MA, individuals were allocated a 
scale position point based on how far they progressed through the developmental batteries. 
This scale position point was then plotted alongside each individual’s MA as well as 
average age data derived from typical development studies. Descriptive visual analysis 




indicated that six participants reached scale position points above what would have been 
predicted given their MA. Twenty-two participants had scale position points below what 
would have been predicted given their MA. These findings suggest that a small proportion 
of the group may show advanced abilities relative to their mental age, but that the majority 
show delayed ability. The distribution of scale position points suggests that the extent of 
this delay varies substantially across participants.  
Of the six participants that evidenced relative ‘advanced’ ability, it is of interest 
that all six of these points were located at the lower end of the scale (points 1-7). At the 
higher end of the scale (8-10) no participants evidenced ‘advanced’ scale position points. 
Although interpretation requires appropriate caution, these findings may indicate that early 
social cognitive abilities in RTS could be relatively advanced, or ‘spared’ relative to 
mental age but then this ability then ‘slows down’ when social cognitive reasoning 
becomes more sophisticated. Considering the results of the later analysis of 
control/memory questions for these tasks (8-10), which indicated that a high proportion of 
individuals who failed these tasks did so because they failed the corresponding memory 
check questions, it could be hypothesised that this ‘slowing down’ may be attributable to 
memory difficulties rather than fundamental difficulties with social cognitive ability per 
se.  
The interpretation of these data must be treated cautiously. However, the benefits 
of this initial examination is that it provides a ‘first look’ and potential hypothesis that can 
be taken forward and examined more systematically in the future. Future studies could 
focus more specifically on early social cognitive abilities in younger individuals with RTS. 
If it is suspected that individuals with RTS display relatively preserved or advanced early 
social cognitive ability but this then slows down, this can be tested using research that uses 
a similar, but longitudinal follow up methodology. For instance, the six individuals who 




potentially display ‘advanced’ social cognitive ability could be followed up to ascertain 
whether their advanced abilities are maintained or whether they slow down when social 
cognitive reasoning becomes more sophisticated.  
To examine developmental trajectory, Guttman scaling and individual pairwise 
comparisons were utilised to ascertain whether individuals with RTS passed tasks in the 
ESCS and ToMS in the same general progression as typically developing individuals.  For 
the ESCS, findings revealed a different developmental sequence. Although a more general 
developmental progression was difficult to ascertain because individuals were performing 
near ceiling, pairwise comparisons showed that the ‘gaze’ task was significantly harder 
than both the ‘helping task’ and the ‘cooperation- tubes’ task. The finding that the ‘gaze’ 
task was harder than the ‘cooperation- tubes task’ is the finding of interest, as typically 
developing data would suggest that these two tasks are of equal developmental difficulty. 
It could be argued that this difference may have simply occurred because participants with 
RTS just viewed the task differently to typically developing children. For example, it could 
have been that those with RTS failed the task simply because they found it less engaging 
than the other tasks. However, this explanation seems unlikely given that the ‘point’ task 
trials were incorporated in the same experimental task but did not show the same 
difference. Consequently, it seems more likely that the difference was attributable to a 
difficulty with eye gaze understanding in RTS rather than any task idiosyncrasies.  
In chapter 4 it was shown that, in typical development, the tasks in the ESCS 
followed a reliable developmental progression. It was subsequently discussed in section 
4.6  that it was possible that these developmental progressions may occur via the process 
of mediation, where the acquisition of later social cognitive skills is dependent on the 
acquisition and scaffolding of earlier social cognitive skills. Baron-Cohen (1994, 1995) 
presents a neuro-cognitive model of infant social cognition that takes this position but 




specifically proposes that eye gaze has particular significance. The model implicates 
modules that operate in sequence during the first four years of life. The earliest mechanism 
is the Intentionality Detector (ID) which interprets actions as volitional and builds dyadic 
representations of behaviour. Another early mechanism is the Eye Direction Detector 
(EDD), which spontaneously detects and responds to eye-like stimuli, computing a dyadic 
communicative relationship between the ‘eyes’ and objects of attention. It is proposed that 
these two mechanisms then feed into a later developing Shared Attention Mechanism 
(SAM) which computes triadic representations. More specifically, it is held that the SAM 
takes information from the EDD about the perceptual state of others, to enable joint 
attention behaviours. The final mechanism, the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM), then 
feeds from the SAM with children developing mental state understanding by using triadic 
interactions from the SAM and converting them into meta-representations. This 
mindreading model therefore makes the claim that eye gaze detection and understanding 
(EDD) is necessary for the acquisition of joint attention behaviours (SAM). However, 
findings from the current study present a conflicting picture, individuals with RTS were 
able to demonstrate joint attention behaviours (i.e. cooperation), despite their gaze 
understanding being impaired. These findings therefore challenge the assumption that the 
SAM needs direct input from the EDD. Instead, the current findings would appear to 
suggest that these early social cognitive developments are more likely to occur via 
modification than mediation i.e. a progression and broadening of developmental skills 
rather than a sequential acquisition of skills than are dependent on the acquisition and 
scaffolding of earlier skills.  
Due to differences in age and ability across the sample it was not possible to 
administer all tasks from both the ESCS and ToMS to each participant and subsequently 
the batteries were analysed separately. Consequently, it is not possible to discuss any 




sequential ordering of earlier social cognitive skills (as measures by the ESCS) in relation 
to later ToM skills (as measures by the ToMS) and examine claims, such as those by 
Baron-Cohen’s model, that the development of mental state understanding (e.g. ToMM) is 
reliant upon triadic interactions such as joint attention behaviours (e.g. SAM). However, 
the separate analysis of the ToMS did provide other important information. Findings from 
the Guttman analysis indicated that individuals with RTS followed the same 
developmental trajectory as shown in typical development i.e. they passed earlier tasks, 
reached a task that they failed, and then failed all subsequent tasks. However, unlike in 
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) original study in which if children failed an item they tended to 
pass the relevant control questions, for individuals with RTS, analysis of control trials 
indicated that a high proportion of those that failed did so because they also failed the 
associated control questions. There are two possible interpretations of these results. Firstly, 
it is possible that individuals with RTS demonstrate independent problems with both ToM 
and working memory. Alternatively, it could be that individuals with RTS fail ToM tasks 
simply because they lack the necessary working memory abilities to pass them i.e. not 
because of an independent impairment to a specific neurocognitive module dedicated to 
mind reading. Although it is not possible to disentangle these two possibilities without 
further study, the findings of the current study seem to suggest that the latter presents a 
more realistic possibility. Gaze interpretation aside, pass rates showed that individuals with 
RTS generally showed good social cognitive ability with tasks that were less dependent on 
cognitive processes i.e. tasks in the ESCS and earlier tasks in the ToMS (i.e. DD and DB). 
Consequently, it seems more likely that ToM impairment in RTS is attributable to memory 
difficulties rather than difficulties with ToM per se. These findings are similar to those 
outlined by Grant et al. (2007) for FXS (see section 1.7 for discussion).  




In addition to their theoretical implications, the findings from the ESCS and ToMS 
have important clinical implications. Eye gaze perception and understanding is a crucial 
element in social interaction, as it is a medium through which humans transmit socially 
relevant information (Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe & Mason, 2002). For example, 
dependent on context it can be used to interpret signs of friendliness, attraction, general 
interest, hostility, and anger (Argyle & Cook, 1976). The finding that individuals with 
RTS may show difficulties with eye gaze has not previously been described in the 
literature. This novel finding is clinically important as it may contribute towards 
explanations of some of the emerging social difficulties that parents and carers have 
recently described (see section 5.2) and subsequently contribute towards planning 
appropriate intervention strategies. However, further research is required to determine the 
exact nature of this impairment in RTS. It may be that individuals with RTS are gaze 
avoidant and simply fail to look directly at the eyes of others. Alternatively, it may be that 
individuals with RTS do look at other’s eyes but fail to interpret the communicative 
intention of gaze.  
The finding that a large majority of individuals with RTS showed delayed social 
cognitive abilities relative to their mental age, together with the finding that high 
proportions of individuals showed difficulties with the memory check questions on the 
ToMS, is also of clinical interest. As has been described previously, the ability to attribute 
mental states to others is fundamental for successful social interaction as it allows a person 
to predict, explain, and manipulate the behaviour of others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 
Consequently, the fact that this ability is delayed in a number of individuals RTS, may 
contribute to explanations of some of the social difficulties recently described. Successful 
strategies to improve ToM understanding in children with autism include social stories and 
‘thought bubbles’ (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Wellman et al. 2002). However, the finding 




that the impairment in RTS may be attributable to working memory difficulties rather than 
ToM ability per se, would suggest that intervention strategies that aim to improve ToM 
understanding may be best to initially focus on training working memory. Cognitive 
training for individuals with ID has demonstrated the effectiveness of rehearsal strategies 
for increasing the amount individuals can retain in working memory (e.g. Broadley & 
MacDonald, 1993; Comblain, 1994; Loomes, Rasmussen, Pei, Manji & Andrew; Van der 
Molen, Van Luit, Van der Molen, Klugkist & Jongmans, 2010). There is also a growing 
number of studies that demonstrate that training-related increases in working memory can 
subsequently yield improvements in other important cognitive skills (Chein & Morrison, 
2010; Klingberg et al, 2005). Therefore, it is possible that working memory training could 
also help improve the ToM abilities in individuals with RTS. Future research is required to 
obtain more robust findings and to test these potential hypotheses.   
As discussed throughout this thesis, (e.g. sections 1.6, 1.12 and 2.2) it has been 
suggested that syndrome groups that display fractionated ASD profiles provide a vehicle to 
study each aspect of the ASD triad separately and consequently can aid our understanding 
of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD phenomenology. As previously outlined, 
there is a large body of literature that attributes the social interaction and communicative 
impairments in ASD to ToM deficits (Baron-Cohen, 2000). However, the current chapter 
has outlined that ToM deficits also occur in individuals with RTS, who despite showing a 
high prevalence of ‘ASD’ when using ‘cut off’ criteria, display a fractionated social profile 
and have been described anecdotally as ‘sociable’(see sections 2.2, 2.4.1.5, and 2.4.2.5). 
As discussed in section 1.7, similar findings have been found in WS, who show ToM 
deficits but also phenotypic ‘hypersociable’ behaviour. Although preliminary, when taken 
together these findings may suggest that ToM deficits alone cannot fully account for the 
specific presentation of the social deficits seen in ASD.  More specifically, it would appear 




that although ToM may contribute to the social difficulties in ASD, there may be other 
mechanisms that determine relative ‘sociability’, or ‘social motivation’ towards social 
interaction. Potentially different implications of pairing atypical social cognition together 
with varying degrees of social motivation are discussed further in the following general 
discussion.   
The findings and subsequent discussions of the current chapter need to be 
considered carefully alongside methodological limitations. For the initial analysis, to 
explore whether individuals with RTS showed advanced, preserved or delayed social 
cognition relative to their MA, individuals’ scale position point was plotted alongside their 
MA and average age data derived from typical development studies. This method was 
chosen as a compromise due to the benefits of prioritising a developmental trajectory 
approach. However, this method gives rise to two main methodological constraints.  
Firstly, as comparisons were drawn against average acquisition ages taken from 
typical development studies, rather than using matched comparisons, it is possible that 
these exact same ‘average ages’ may not ‘carry over’ to the current study and should 
therefore only be used as rough estimates. For instance, it is possible that even very small 
procedural differences between this study, and the original studies, may also affect 
‘typical’ age of acquisition. However, it is of note that during the development of the 
ESCS procedural changes were kept to minimum, and validation of the scale indicated that 
tasks stacked developmentally as expected. Given that the typical age of acquisition of the 
sequential tasks are only 4-6 months apart, it would seem unlikely that they would 
continue to developmentally stack in accordance with the typically developing literature, if 
ages of acquisition were widely different. Secondly, due to difficulties with calculating 
MAs on the WASI and MSEL for individuals with ID, the MAs of individuals with RTS 
should only be considered as estimates also. Although these methodological limitations are 




of note, it is felt that this analysis is still helpful as, as discussed above, it provides a ‘first 
look’ at findings that can then followed up using research that adopts more rigorous 
methods.  
An important caveat of the current study is that it did not include any other groups 
matched for degree of disability.  Consequently it is not possible to conclude that the 
pattern of results and subsequent social cognitive profile shown in this study is specific to 
RTS. It could be that other groups associated with ID also show the same developmental 
pathway. Further research using the same developmental batteries should be conducted to 
examine this possibility and subsequently ascertain the specificity of these results to RTS. 
Other groups of interest, and potential future studies are discussed further in the following 
general discussion.   
 
5.6. Summary 
Throughout this thesis it has been argued that syndrome groups that display 
fractionated ASD profiles could provide a useful vehicle to study each aspect of the ASD 
triad separately. More specifically, the thesis has drawn attention to the study of ToM 
development in syndrome groups that showed a high prevalence of ASD but fractionated 
social profiles. However, until now there has been no scaled battery that enables the 
measurement of social cognitive development in individuals with ID who are too young or 
cognitively impaired to pass standard ToM tasks. Consequently, chapters 3 and 4 
presented the development and validation of the ESCS, an ‘early’ social cognition scale 
that would enable the developmental assessment of ToM ‘precursors’. In the current 
chapter the ESCS was used alongside Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToMS to examine the 
social cognitive development of RTS, a syndrome group that was highlighted in chapter 2 
as displaying a fractionated social profile.  




The first aim of the chapter was to explore whether individuals with RTS showed 
advanced, preserved, or delayed social cognition relative to their MA. Findings from 
descriptive visual analysis showed that early social cognitive abilities may be relatively 
advanced or ‘spared’ but then slow down when social cognitive reasoning becomes more 
sophisticated. As results indicated that a high proportion of individuals failed 
corresponding ‘memory check’ questions in later tasks, it was proposed that this ‘slowing 
down’ may be attributable to memory difficulties.  
The second aim was to examine whether, regardless of delay or ability, individuals 
with RTS displayed the same social cognitive developmental trajectory as typically 
developing individuals or whether they displayed a unique developmental pathway or 
pattern. Findings from the ToMS indicated that individuals with RTS displayed the same 
developmental trajectory as typically developing infants. However, for the ESCS, findings 
revealed a different developmental sequence. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the 
‘gaze’ task was significantly harder than expected.  
The current chapter discussed these findings in relation to theoretical implications 
for models of ToM and ASD, clinical implications for individuals with RTS, and potential 








































The review in chapter 1 provided a synthesis of key research findings that 
influenced the development of the empirical work described in this thesis. The association 
between autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) and genetic syndromes was introduced and it 
was argued that ‘broad level’ diagnostic descriptions can often mask important qualitative 
differences that exist between genetic syndromes and idiopathic ASD. Evidence was 
presented for Angelman syndrome (AS), Cornelia de Lange syndrome (CdLS) and Fragile 
X syndrome (FXS) that highlighted how subtle differences, such as fractionated social 
profiles, exist when ‘finer grained’ comparisons are made (section 1.3). In line with these 
findings, the review then introduced evidence for fractionation of the ASD triad of 
impairments at the behavioural, genetic, cognitive and neural levels (sections 1.4 and 1.5). 
It was argued that research examining the core impairments in ASD, and the potentially 
separate pathways underpinning them, may be better understood if studied separately.  
The review proposed that syndrome groups that displayed fractionated ASD 
profiles could provide a useful vehicle by which to study to each aspect of the ASD triad 
separately. Given the link between Theory of Mind (ToM) and the social interaction and 
communicative impairments in ASD (see Baron-Cohen, 2000 for a review), the review 
drew attention to the specific study of ToM development in syndrome groups that showed 
a high prevalence of ASD but fractionated social profiles. The following question was 
posed: How does the development of ToM relate to the social behaviour of syndrome 
groups that show a high prevalence of ‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles?  
Although the question posed appeared to be a relatively simple one, the review 
highlighted two main methodological constraints that needed to be addressed; the use of 
single task methodologies and the cognitive demands of ‘typical’ ToM tasks. It was 





compared performance on a single standard false belief task to the performance of matched 
controls. Yet, it was outlined how the attainment of false belief understanding represents 
just one of many social cognitive developments that emerge progressively (e.g. Flavell & 
Miller, 1998; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) and consequently it was argued that such single 
task methodologies provide very limited information with no insight into the 
developmental pathway or causal mechanisms that occur prior to, or following false belief 
acquisition. Instead, it was proposed that a developmental approach, as used by Wellman 
and Liu (2004) in their ‘ToM scale’ (ToMS), provided a preferential platform to examine 
the interplay between social cognitive development and related factors in individual 
difference research.  However, despite the potential benefits of the ToMS it was 
highlighted how the tasks included in this scale were not suitable for individuals with ID.  
It was discussed in section 1.9 how these ‘typical’ ToM tasks not only require an 
individual to reason about belief but that they also place substantial demands on working 
memory and executive inhibitory control (e.g. Moses, 2005; Russell, 1996), yielding them 
unsuitable for individuals with ID who are too young or too cognitively impaired to 
complete them. It was argued that this was of critical importance for the question posed 
above, as many genetic syndromes are associated with moderate to severe ID and deficits 
expressive and receptive language. Drawing from the developmental literature, the review 
presented a potential solution: the scaling and assessment of early social cognitive 
‘precursors’ that develop prior to fully fledged ToM.   
On the basis of the review, the thesis had four broad aims. First, in chapter 2 the 
aim was to highlight Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) as a potential syndrome of interest 
by extending the behavioural phenotype through the examination of characteristics of 
ASD, affect, and overactivity. In chapter 3, the aim was to develop a ‘ToM precursor’ 





with ID who are too young or too cognitively impaired to complete more ‘traditional’ ToM 
tasks.  The aim of chapter 4 was to validate this proposed scale using a normative sample 
of typically developing infants. Finally, in chapter 5 the aim was to explore the potential 
theoretical and clinical implications of this new methodology by piloting the approach 
with individuals with RTS.  
In this general discussion, the main findings of the current thesis are revisited.  
Clinical and research implications are then considered and the possibilities for future study 
are suggested. Finally, the work is evaluated by considering the strengths and limitations 
of the methodologies used.  
 
6.2. Main Findings 
In the introduction to chapter 2, it was highlighted that the behavioural profile of 
RTS noted in the literature suggested that these individuals may present with dissociation 
across the triad of impairments, the presence of repetitive behaviours but a fractionated 
‘sociable’ social profile. Both total group and matched group approaches were utilised to 
position RTS relative to an idiopathic ASD group, a Down syndrome (DS) group and an 
FXS group on characteristics of autism spectrum phenomenology, affect, and overactivity. 
These groups were selected as it allowed the positioning of ASD phenomenology in RTS 
relative to idiopathic ASD as well as two genetic syndromes of known aetiology with 
differing behavioural profiles and associations with ASD. It was hypothesised that if the 
repetitive behaviour and social profile of RTS described in the literature was correct, then 
when compared to ASD, FXS, and DS, one might expect for RTS to be positioned more 
closely to ASD and FXS with regards to repetitive behaviour, but closer to DS on 
measures of social behaviour.  Findings from the study confirmed this prediction. It was 





triad of impairments. More specifically, 64.9% and 65.7% of the individuals with RTS 
reached ‘cut off’ criteria for ASD for the total and matched group samples respectively. 
This was in comparison to 83.5% and 100% in FXS, and 19.2% and 29.4% in DS, for total 
and matched samples respectively. For social aspects of the ASD triad, RTS was 
comparable to DS, and significantly less impaired than the ASD and FXS group. However, 
for repetitive behaviour, RTS was comparable to the ASD and FXS groups but showed 
significantly higher levels of repetitive behaviour than the DS group. Overall, the current 
chapter provided evidence that highlighted RTS as a syndrome of interest from which to 
study the development of ToM and its relationship to social behaviour.  
 In the introduction to chapter 3 it was highlighted that developmental psychologists 
have argued that early social cognitive skills such as joint attention and shared 
intentionality lay the foundations for later ToM development (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989, 
1995; Charman et al. 2000; Tomasello et al. 1993, 2005). Consequently, assessing these 
early social cognitive skills could provide a useful means from which to examine the 
development of social cognition in individuals with ID who were too young or too 
cognitively impaired to complete traditional ToM tasks. A review of the literature was 
conducted to select a set of tasks that, when combined together, would potentially form a 
developmental scale. Five experimental tasks were selected that assessed seven early 
social cognitive abilities. By arranging the tasks in terms of increasing age, a preliminary 
scale was proposed with estimated ages of acquisition ranging from approximately 14 
months to over 24 months.  
 In chapter 4, the proposed preliminary scale was examined using a normative 
sample. Based on findings from the review in chapter 3, it was predicted that the tasks 
would be of increasing difficulty and thus form a progressive developmental scale. Results 





the expected developmental scale. It was found that typically developing infants possessed 
the social cognitive understanding and altruistic motivation to ‘help’ another before they 
possessed the social cognitive ability to: understand the communicative intention of a 
pointing gesture; and re-enact a person’s underlying intentions and goals. Infants then 
developed the ability to: understand the communicative intention of a gaze gesture; and 
coordinate their intentions and actions with another person to form a joint goal and 
cooperate skilfully in a problem solving ‘tubes’ game. Finally, infants developed the 
ability to coordinate their intentions and actions with another person to cooperate skilfully 
in a social ‘trampoline’ game. The one task that was not positioned as predicted was the 
task that assessed the point at which infants understood what others ‘have and have not 
seen’. Findings showed that infants passed this task much later than expected. It was 
subsequently argued that the later age of acquisition was most likely due to the 
methodological changes made to the task and consequently the task was removed from the 
final experimental battery entitled the ‘early social cognition scale’ (ESCS).  
 In the introduction to chapter 5, the potential theoretical and clinical implications of 
applying the ESCS together with the ToMs to assess the social cognitive development in 
RTS were discussed. Given the link between ToM deficits and the social interaction and 
communicative impairments in ASD, one of the possible hypotheses presented was that the 
fractionated ‘sociable’ social profile reported in RTS may be underpinned by a relative 
‘sparing’ in social cognitive abilities. However, an alternative hypothesis was also 
presented based on findings from studies examining ToM in Williams syndrome (WS). 
Studies have shown that ToM deficits are present in WS despite their phenotypic 
‘hypersociable’ behaviour (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & 
Boshart, 1997). Consequently, it was hypothesised that social cognitive deficits could also 





visual analysis that compared participant’s social cognitive performance to ‘typical’ ages 
of acquisition are tentative but suggested that six participants showed ‘advanced’ abilities 
relative to their mental age and 22 showed ‘delayed’ abilities. Of the six participants that 
evidenced relative ‘advanced’ ability, all were located at the lower end of the scale (tasks 1 
– 7). At the higher end of the scale (tasks 8- 10), no participants evidenced ‘advanced’ 
scale position points. It was subsequently proposed that these findings may indicate that 
early social cognitive abilities in RTS could be relatively advanced, or ‘spared’, but then 
‘slow down’ when social cognitive reasoning becomes more sophisticated. Together with 
results from the later analysis of control/memory questions for tasks 8-10 (which indicated 
that a high proportion of individuals failed corresponding memory check questions) it was 
proposed that such ‘slowing down’ could be attributable to memory difficulties. These 
findings are similar to those outlined by Grant et al. (2007) for FXS (see section 1.7 for 
discussion). 
 In chapter 5 it was proposed that the developmental study of social cognition in 
RTS also had the potential to inform models of ToM more generally. In section 4.6 it was 
suggested that social cognitive developmental progression may occur via the process of 
mediation, in which the acquisition of later social cognitive skills are dependent on the 
acquisition and scaffolding of earlier social cognitive skills. However, it was argued that if 
individuals with RTS demonstrated a different developmental sequence, then it may imply 
that ‘later’ social cognitive skills do not require, or are not reliant upon, the sequential 
acquisition of ‘earlier’ social cognitive skills. Findings from the ESCS implied that this 
was the case. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the ‘gaze’ task was significantly harder 
than expected, and consequently RTS followed a different developmental trajectory.  It 
was argued that the findings implied that the early social cognitive developments assessed 





progression and broadening of developmental skills rather than a sequential acquisition of 
skills that are dependent on the acquisition and scaffolding of earlier skills.  
 Findings from Guttman analysis of the ToMS indicated that individuals with RTS 
followed the same developmental trajectory as typically developing infants. As each 
battery was analysed separately, it was not possible to consider the sequential ordering of 
earlier social cognitive skills (as measured by the ESCS) in relation to later ToM skills (as 
measured by the ToMS). However, analysis of ToMS control trials indicated that a high 
proportion of those who failed the ‘later’ tasks did so because they also failed the 
associated control questions. Given that the pass rates were good for tasks that were less 
dependent on cognitive processes (i.e. tasks in the ESCS and the ‘earlier’ tasks in the 
ToMS), it was proposed that ToM difficulties in RTS were more likely to be attributable to 
memory impairment than to difficulties with ToM per se.  
 
6.3. Implications of Findings 
The current research has a number of implications. For clarity, the following 
section discusses these in turn. Firstly, the clinical implications for individuals with RTS 
are highlighted. Secondly, the implications for a wider population of individuals with ASD 
are discussed. Finally, the theoretical implications for models of ToM are outlined.  
 
6.3.1. Implications for individuals with RTS 
As highlighted in chapter 2, the research literature regarding RTS is in its infancy. 
Prior to this thesis the majority of studies detailing the behavioural characteristics of RTS 
have involved case studies or cohort descriptions only. There had been no studies that had 
examined the social cognitive abilities of the group. The implication of the studies 





literature that is available for individuals with RTS, their families, and the professionals 
who support them. The studies have provided novel findings and have opened up further 
questions to be answered that will promote future work in the area.  
The findings of chapter 5 have important clinical implications for individuals with 
RTS with regards to their social vulnerability. Jawaid et al. (2012) discuss how the 
combined effect of ID and atypicalities of social cognition may put individuals at increased 
risk of vulnerability in their social environment.  It would seem reasonable to suggest that 
this risk may be further compounded with increased levels of social motivation.  For 
instance, if a person is particularly motivated to engage in social interactions (i.e. is “over 
friendly”), but they also have social cognitive deficits, they could become ‘easy targets’ for 
exploitation and abuse. More specifically, the person may engage in and solicit 
interactions but then lack the necessary social cognitive understanding to reason if, and 
when, someone’s intentions may not be honourable. It could be argued that these instances 
would occur more frequently for people who ‘seek out’ social interaction than for people 
who are socially withdrawn (i.e. individuals with idiopathic ASD). Indeed, it has been 
found that the rate of sexual abuse is particularly high in individuals with WS (20%; 
Rosner et al. 2004) and it has been hypothesised that this problem may occur as a result of 
the combined effect of people misinterpreting their ‘overfriendly’ demeanour and 
individuals with WS making inappropriate social evaluations of people (Jawaid et al. 
2012). In a recent study examining ‘stranger danger’ awareness using a video vignette 
task, Riby, Kirk, Hanley & Riby (2013) showed that young people with WS displayed 
difficulties making judgements about whether or not to trust and engage in interactions 
with unfamiliar people. Importantly, qualitative data showed that individuals with WS 





consequently discuss the importance of future research that explores the relationship 
between stranger danger awareness and ToM ability. 
Given the recent concerns of parents and carers of those with RTS regarding 
exploitation and a lack of “stranger danger awareness” (Oliver, 2007 personal 
communication), the finding that social cognitive atypicalities are present in the group 
offers an important potential point for intervention. The finding that memory difficulties 
may be causal in these ToM deficits may help to target these interventions more 
effectively.  
 
6.3.2. Implications for the wider ASD population. 
In chapter 1, it was argued that ‘broad level’ diagnostic descriptions can often mask 
important qualitative differences that exist between genetic syndromes and idiopathic 
ASD. Findings from chapter 2 provide further evidence that this is the case, and thus 
emphasise the importance of conducting fine-grained analysis of ASD in genetic 
syndromes.  
The fact that RTS showed a dissociation across the triad of impairments (a 
fractionated social profile) adds to literature that points towards a fractionation in the triad 
of impairments and so has implications for the debate regarding how ASD is studied and 
conceptualised. Happé and Ronald (2008) propose that perhaps it would be more helpful if 
individuals were mapped separately “...along three orthogonal, dimensions: social 
interaction, communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviours.” (p. 299). When 
taken together with the previous literature that outlines evidence for the fractionation in the 
ASD triad of impairments (e.g. Happé & Ronald, 2008; Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006), 
the findings of the current thesis challenge the assumption that all aspects of the ASD triad 





research examining these three core impairments, and the pathways underpinning them, 
would be better understood if studied separately. 
The finding that individuals with RTS show social cognitive impairments has 
important implications for theories of ASD. As discussed throughout this thesis, there is a 
wide body of evidence linking the characteristic social interaction and communicative 
impairments in ASD to deficits in ToM (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2000). In this account, social 
impairments are explained by the fact that individuals with ASD struggle to understand 
their social world. However, the fact that ToM impairments also exist in groups that show 
fractionated social profiles (i.e. WS and now RTS) suggests that the ToM hypothesis alone 
cannot fully account for the specific presentation of social deficits seen in ASD. More 
recently, an alternative ‘social motivation theory’ of ASD has been suggested (Chevallier, 
Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Chevallier and colleagues present evidence to  
propose that social motivation is subserved by dedicated biological mechanisms including 
the ventral striatum, amygdala, and orbital and ventromedial regions of the prefrontal 
cortex (e.g. Adolphs & Spezio, 2006; Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; Klein, 
Shepherd, & Platt, 2009; Lin,Adolphs, & Rangel, 2011; Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007). 
They argue that for individuals with ASD, social motivation may be diminished as a result 
of disruptions to the orbitofrontal-striatum-amygdala circuitry and disregulation of 
neuropeptide signalling (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Modi & Young, 2012). Based 
on this framework, the authors propose that social cognitive deficits are a downstream 
consequence of social motivational deficits rather than the cause. It is hypothesised that 
reduced social motivation deprives the individual of the necessary social learning 
opportunities to develop their expertise in social cognition.  
As the authors themselves admit, many questions remain regarding this theory. 





thesis; that it is other mechanisms, rather than simply ToM, that determine relative 
‘sociability’. Perhaps it is the case that although the social cognitive ‘end result’ may be 
similar in ASD and RTS (i.e. impaired ToM), the cause of these impairments may actually 
be quite different.  For ASD, it could well be the downstream affect of diminished social 
interaction; but for ‘sociable’ RTS, the impairments may be more attributable to memory 
difficulties. Although more research is necessary to examine these potential theories, the 
findings presented in this thesis provide new insights and a new methodology that can be 
used to further our understanding of the aetiological pathways underpinning ASD.  
 
6.3.3. Implications for theoretical models of ToM 
The findings of the current research have implications for models of early social 
cognition and ToM. Firstly, the findings add support to the literature that implicates the 
importance of executive functions in the development and acquisition in ToM (Moses, 
2005; Russell, 1996). Secondly, the findings provide new insights into the possible cause-
effect sequence of early social cognitive understanding. As discussed in section 5.5, Baron 
– Cohen’s (1994, 1995) neuro-cognitive model of infant social cognition makes the claim 
that eye gaze detection and understanding is a necessary prerequisite for the acquisition of 
joint attention behaviours. However, findings from this thesis demonstrate that individuals 
with RTS were able to demonstrate joint attention behaviours (i.e. cooperation), despite 
their gaze understanding being impaired. Consequently, these findings potentially 
undermine Baron-Cohen’s sequential pathway and suggest that there may be alternative 
pathways implicated in early social cognitive development.   
The development of the ESCS in chapters 3 and 4 has more general implications 
for models of ToM due to its potential application in future research. Wellman and Liu 





development of ToM in a way that had not previously been possible. They discussed how 
it enabled a more comprehensive assessment of the potential interplay between ToM 
understanding and other relevant factors such as family conversations, language, and 
executive function in individual difference research.  However, the ToMS is centrally 
concerned with preschool developmental accomplishments and so cannot offer insight into 
the earlier developments that occur in infancy. The development of the ESCS means that it 
will now be possible to assess a much wider range of ages and abilities, capture a much 
broader array of social cognitive skills, and may provide a more continuous means to 
assess the relationship between early social cognitive skills in infants and preschool ToM.  
 
6.4. Future Research 
 As the chapters in this thesis have progressed, more specific questions and further 
ideas for future research have emerged as a result. For example, future research should be 
conducted to examine the nature of the gaze deficit in RTS. Simple eye tracking 
methodologies could be utilised to disentangle whether deficits exist because individuals 
with RTS are simply gaze avoidant or whether they do look at others’ eyes but 
subsequently fail to interpret the communicative intention of a person’s gaze.   
One of the main limiting factors in this research is the lack of a syndrome or 
idiopathic ASD comparison group in chapter 5. Consequently, future research should 
examine the specificity of findings to RTS by mapping the developmental trajectories of 
other syndrome groups and idiopathic ASD. Given reports that individuals with CdLS 
show prolonged eye gaze (Collis, Oliver & Moss, 2006), and individuals with FXS show 
gaze avoidance (Turk & Graham, 1997; Udwin & Dennis, 1995), it would be of interest to 
map the developmental trajectory of these groups using the ESCS and examine if the 





outlined in chapter 3, given that some of the tasks in the ESCS vary with regard to the 
level of social motivation that they require (i.e. the ‘helping’ and ‘cooperation’ tasks, see 
sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.5.1), it would be of interest to examine whether the position of 
these tasks vary across groups that show differing levels of social motivation, such as a 
‘socially withdrawn’ idiopathic ASD group, and a ‘hyper sociable’ WS group.  
Although the current thesis refers to anecdotal descriptions of RTS as ‘sociable’ 
and ‘overfriendly’, and cites evidence to suggest that individuals with RTS were more 
sociable than a number of other syndrome groups (see section 2.2) it is of note that there 
has yet to be a study that specifically aims to characterise the social phenotype of RTS 
more systematically. Future work should be conducted that utilises observational 
assessments and group comparison designs to more accurately describe the social 
behaviour of the group.  
 
6.5. Research Strengths 
One of the main strengths of the current research is the unique use of such a broad 
range of experimental methods to investigate behaviour in a rare genetic syndrome group.  
In the first instance, the use of standardised measures together with the matched and total 
group comparison designs used in chapter 2 enabled the consideration of the specificity of 
findings to RTS, while controlling for the influence of ID. The subsequent use of a 
developmental scaling methodology in chapter 5 allowed the examination of the cognitive 
underpinnings of a behaviour of interest to be considered in much more comprehensive 
way than has previously been attempted.  
Another main strength of this research is that it demonstrates a ‘proof of principle’.  





methodological constraints, and subsequently how this can then generate findings that may 
have otherwise been missed, or may have taken longer to reveal. 
 
6.6. Research Limitations 
The findings of the current thesis need to be considered alongside methodological 
limitations. Although certain methodological considerations have been mentioned above, 
and more generally throughout the thesis, a number of limitations require further attention 
and discussion.  
Firstly, although is it the case that the ESCS and ToMS capture a much broader 
array of social cognitive skills over a much wider age range than has previously been 
possible, it is important to highlight that the tasks still only capture a subset of social 
cognitive skills. The tasks selected for the ESCS were required to fit inclusion criteria to 
enable them to be suitable for administering in participants’ homes over the course of one 
day, meaning that it was not possible to include large numbers of tasks or tasks that 
required more complex apparatus. Similarly, the items in the ToMS were selected by 
Wellman and Liu (2004) specifically because they were comparable in testing format, few 
in number, and easily understood by young children. Therefore, not only does the ToMS 
not encompass all preschool ToM insights but there is a ‘ceiling’ effect for the use with 
older children who show more sophisticated ToM understanding. It is possible that there 
may be other social cognitive skills that are relatively ‘advanced’, ‘spared’ or ‘impaired’ in 
RTS but the current scales were unable to identify these. However, it is felt that limitations 
such as these should be expected given the novel and exploratory nature of the empirical 
work and the constraints of examining an area as complex as social cognition. As outlined 





such as Pons, Harris, and de Rosnay’s (2003) battery assessing children’s understanding of 
emotional states, into future research would be informative. 
There are limitations relating to the samples used in this thesis. Firstly, the 
generalisabilty of the current findings to all individuals with RTS should be considered as 
participants with RTS were recruited via a syndrome support group. It could be suggested 
that families and carers may be more likely to access support groups if the person they care 
displays greater difficulties. Therefore, it is possible that the findings reported may not be 
representative of the wider population of individuals with RTS. Secondly, it is of note that 
the sample sizes used in the thesis were relatively small. It is possible that some results 
may not have reached statistical significance because power was affected by a small N. 
This problem was illustrated in chapter 2, where even though the RTS group evidenced a 
much higher proportion of individuals meeting the ASD cut off than the DS group, this 
difference only approached significance. It is possible that additional results may have 
been uncovered in chapter 5, if a larger group of individuals with RTS, with a wider range 
of abilities was sampled. More specifically, if a greater number of younger or less able 
individuals with RTS were recruited, who were not at ‘ceiling’ on the ESCS, then it may 
have been possible to determine a more ‘general developmental progression’ of early 
social cognitive skills in RTS. However, difficulties with recruitment and sample size are a 
common and often unavoidable problem in research focusing on individuals with rare 
genetic syndromes. It is important to consider that despite these difficulties, the current 
thesis has highlighted that it is possible to obtain meaningful and clinically important 
findings from relatively small samples. 
Limitations regarding the measures used in the studies should also be considered. 
In chapter 2, informant based questionnaire assessments were used to measure 





have been found to demonstrate good levels of reliability and have been developed for use 
with individuals with ID specifically, findings are still dependant on subjective ratings 
which may threaten the construct validity of conclusions drawn. Further support gathered 
through observational data would strengthen the validity of these findings. It is also 
important to consider the sole reliance upon a single screening tool to evaluate ASD 
phenomenology and subsequently highlight RTS as a group of interest. The Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999) is 
considered to be a robust measure of ASD symptomatology; however the validity of the 
measure in individuals with rare genetic syndromes such as RTS is not well understood. 
Consequently, although confidence in the findings is warranted from the convergent 
reports noted in the literature, further ‘gold standard’ ASD diagnostic assessments should 
be conducted to more fully understand ASD phenomenology in the sample.  
 
6.7. Concluding Remarks. 
At the beginning of this thesis, a question was posed:  How does the development 
of ToM relate to the social behaviour of syndrome groups that show a high prevalence of 
‘ASD’ but fractionated social profiles? The research presented in this thesis attempted to 
overcome methodological constraints and move closer to answering this question.  
 The thesis illustrated the benefits of using a broad range of methodological 
approaches to examine behaviour and cognition. In an initial study, both total and matched 
group approaches were utilised to highlight RTS as a syndrome of interest. The thesis then 
outlined the development of an early social cognition scale that would enable a 
developmental approach to be applied to the assessment of social cognition in individuals 
with ID. The scale was later examined and validated with typically developing infants. In a 





 As well as having important theoretical and clinical implications, the findings of 
thesis have produced a validated scale that will facilitate future research in this area. It is 
hoped that further research will be conducted to explore the questions and possibilities that 
have emerged as a result of this research and consequently may enable us to move closer 
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We are writing to inform you of a new research project that is being carried out at 
the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders at the University of 
Birmingham. We would like to invite you and the person you care for to take part in 
this new research project. Briefly, the research is a questionnaire study looking at 
different behaviours in children and adults with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome that 
have received minimal attention within the literature.  
 
We have contacted you through the Rubinstein Taybi syndrome support group. 
Your personal details will not be known to us unless you decide to take part in the 
study. There is an information sheet enclosed that gives you more details about 
why the research is being carried out and what participation will involve. If you feel 
it is appropriate you may wish to discuss the research with the person you care for 
before a decision is made about taking part.  
 
There is an information sheet enclosed that gives you more details about why the 
research is being carried out and what it will involve. If you and your child/person 
you care for would like to take part in the study then please complete the enclosed 
consent form and questionnaire pack and return them in the pre-paid envelope 
provided. 
 
Please read the information sheets before completing the questionnaires 
and if you are unclear about any aspect of the study or have any questions 
then contact Professor Chris Oliver at the address below or on 0121 414 
7206.  
 
Thank you for your time and we look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
                                                                                                                 
                                 
Chris Oliver 
Professor of Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
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Understanding behaviour in Neurodevelopmental Disorders:  Information Sheet  
 
Please read this information carefully before deciding whether you wish to take part in the 
study.  If you have any further questions please contact Professor Chris Oliver on (0121) 
414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk. If you have any medical/ other 
problems which make it difficult for you to read this information, please contact Professor 
Chris Oliver for a verbal explanation of the research. 
 
When you are happy that you have all of the information you need to be able to decide 
whether or not you and the person you care for would like to take part in the study, please 
complete the enclosed consent form and questionnaire pack return them to us in the 




We would like to invite you to take part in a questionnaire study being conducted at the 
Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders, University of Birmingham. This research work, 
which is led by Professor Chris Oliver, looks at a range of behaviours, skills and 
impairments in individuals with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome including: Repetitive 
behaviour, Hyperactivity, Mood, Challenging behaviour, Social functioning and Health. We 
will also ask some questions that are related to family well-being and the impact that 
having a child with a disability has on the family.  
 
We hope that this information will enable us to further understand the behaviours, skills 
and impairments associated with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome including challenging 
behaviour, social functioning, mood, hyperactivity and health and the impact that these 
behaviours have on the family. The more people that take part in this research, the more 
meaningful the results will be. A good response will provide new and valuable information 
about Rubinstein Taybi syndrome. In the future we hope to follow up the progress of the 
people who take part in this study. However, participation in this stage of the project will 
not mean that you are obliged to participate in further surveys in the future. 
 
Aims of the study 
 
1. To further our understanding of challenging behaviour, repetitive behaviour, 
hyperactivity, mood and social functioning in individuals with Rubinstein Taybi 
syndrome. 
2. To understand what happens with regard to these behaviours as children and adults 
develop. 
3. To understand what, if any, changes may occur with regard to these behaviours when 
the individuals reach a certain age.  
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What will happen if you and your child/the person you care for decide(s) to 
participate? 
 
Where will the research take place? 
 
The research will involve completing the enclosed questionnaire pack. This can be 
completed by you in your own time. 
 
Who will be involved in collecting the data? 
 
Members of the research team at the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental disorders 
including Professor Chris Oliver and Dr. Joanna Moss.  
 
How long will participation in the study take? 
 
The questionnaire pack will take approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
 
In the future you may be asked if you would like to complete the questionnaire again so 
that we can start to understand what happens to people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome 
across their lifetime. We will only contact you with this invitation if you have previously 
agreed to be contacted by the research team at the University of Birmingham with 
information about research studies conducted by the team. 
 
Sometimes after you have completed the questionnaire, we may need to contact you 
again in order to clarify any information that you have provided or to ask you for further 
information regarding the diagnosis of the person you care for. This helps us to ensure 
that our data is as useful and as accurate as possible. If this happens then we would 
contact you again within 6 months of receiving your questionnaire pack to ask whether or 
not you would be willing to provide us with the extra information.  
 
What will participants be required to do during the study? 
 
We will ask parents and caregivers to complete the enclosed questionnaire pack and 
return it to us alongside the consent form in the pre-paid envelope provided.  
 
Are there any risks that individuals taking part in the study might face? 
 
There will not be any risks associated with participation in this study.  
 
What are the potential benefits for participants from taking part? 
 
You will receive a personalised feedback regarding your child/ the person you care for. 
This study will help us to find out more about the lives of people with Rubinstein Taybi 
syndrome and the difficulties that these people face.  The results might help us to improve 
things for people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome in the future.  
 
Where will data be stored? 
 
The data collected will be kept in locked or password protected storage at the University 
of Birmingham.  Only members of the research team at the University of Birmingham will 
have access to information that we collect about you.  Information will be treated as 
strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
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If you/ the person you care for decide(s) to participate, what will happen after that 
participation? 
 
You and your child/ person you care for will receive an individual feedback report 
describing the results of all of the assessments that were carried out during the study.   If 
requested, this feedback report will be circulated to other interested individuals.  
Descriptions of research findings will be published in newsletters of the relevant family 
support groups and educational institutions involved.  Any request for advice concerning 
the person you care for will be referred to Professor Chris Oliver, Clinical Psychologist. 
The researchers will publish the findings from the study in scientific journals and will 
present the results at relevant conferences. 
 
What will happen to the data afterwards? 
 
The information that you provide will be locked in a filing cabinet at the University of 
Birmingham or held on a password protected database. Participants will be identified by a 
unique number so that the information you provide us with cannot be traced to your 
personal details.  You will be able to decide whether or not you want to make your 
research data available to any professionals or clinicians working with you and the person 
you care for should they wish to see it. This is optional and will not affect your 
participation in the current study. If you agree to this, then your research data will only be 
made available to relevant clinicians or professionals should they contact us directly and 
request to see it. If you do not agree to this then research data will not be made available 
to anyone other than the research team at the University of Birmingham. 
 
After 6 months of receiving your questionnaire pack, your personal details will be 
destroyed unless you tell us otherwise.  This means that we would no longer be able 
to trace the results of your assessments back to you.  The section below on ‘The 
Regular Participant Database Information’ gives information about a database that we 
use to store the personal details of some participants.  Please read this section in order to 
decide if you would like to join that database. 
 
 
Regular Participant Database Information: 
 
What is the regular participant database? 
 
We have a database that we keep in the Cerebra Centre where we store the names and 
contact details of some previous participants.  If you would like us to, we can add your 
details to this database.  We would use this information for two things: 
1) We will contact you with information about future research work to find out whether 
or not you would like to participate. 
2) It is often important to find out how things change over time.  By keeping your 
details we would be able to trace the results of the previous assessments that you 
have done with us back to you.  This means that if you take part in other studies 
with us we would be able to look at how things have changed over time. 
 
Who would have access to my details? 
 
Only approved members of our research team would have access to your details.  We 
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When would I be contacted? 
 
You would only be contacted by an approved member of the research team when we are 
starting another study or phase of a study that we think you might like to participate in or 
when we need to clarify some information that you have provided us with from 
participation in a research study.  
 
 
What happens if I decide that I want my details to be added to the database but then I 
change my mind? 
 
All you would need to do is contact Chris Oliver on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-
enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk or at the School of Psychology, University of 





After having read all of the information and having received appropriate responses to any 
questions that you may have about the study you and the person you care for will be 
asked to give your and your child’s/ person you care for’s consent to participate in the 
study if you decide that you do wish to participate.  The section below on ’Giving 
consent’ will explain this process.  We need to receive consent from/ on behalf of 




Even after consent has been granted, participants can request to be withdrawn from the 
study at any time, without giving a reason. Even after participation has taken place, 
consent can be withdrawn and any data collected will be destroyed.  This will not restrict 
the access of you/ the person you care for to other services and will not affect their right to 
treatment. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researchers who will do their best to answer your questions. Please contact Chris Oliver 
on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk in the first instance. If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact: Professor Chris 
Miall; Head of School; School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 
2TT, by email: hos.psychology@contacts.bham.ac.uk  or by phone on 0121 414 4931 
 
Confidentiality                  
The confidentiality of participants will be ensured.  If published, information on the 
participant will be presented without reference to their name or any other identifying 
information.  All personal details will be kept separately from the information collected so 
that it will only be possible to connect results to individuals via a special code.  This will 
ensure that results are kept anonymous.  In the unlikely event of any evidence of abuse 
being identified, this information will be disclosed by the research workers. 
 
Review 
The study has been approved by Coventry NHS Research Ethics Committee. For any 
queries or concerns regarding the ethical approval of this study please contact Pauline 
Pittaway on 02476967529 quoting study reference number: 10/H1210/1. 




You need to decide whether your child/the person you care for is able to understand enough about 
the study to make an ‘informed’ decision independently about whether or not they would like to 
participate and to communicate this decision to you.  If you are unsure whether or not your 
child/person you care for is able to understand enough to make a decision independently then we 
can provide you with some guidelines to help you to assess this A symbol information sheet can also 
be made available to you if this would be of help. Please contact Professor Chris Oliver 0121 414 




If you would like any more information about the study please contact Professor Chris 
Oliver on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk.  Or write to Chris 





Now it is up to you whether you decide that you and your child/the person you care for 
would like to participate.  The decision about whether or not to take part in the study must 
be ‘informed’.  This means that anyone making the decision must understand exactly 
what is involved in the study, what will be required from participants and why.   
 
Please choose from one of the following options: 
 
1. My child/ the person I care for is able to understand what is 
involved in the study and what will be required from them if 
they participate and has communicated their decision to me: 
 
If you think that the person is able to understand enough about the study in order to make 
an ‘informed’  
decision and they decide that they would like to participate then please ensure that they 
complete Section 1 of Consent Form A coloured YELLOW enclosed, or that you 
complete it with them, on their behalf.  A parent/carer will need to complete Section 2 of 
Consent From A coloured YELLOW in order to indicate that they also agree to 
participate in the study. A symbol information sheet can be made available in order to 
support your child/person you care for in making this decision if it would be of help. 
Please contact the research team if you would like a copy of the symbol consent form or if 
you need us to adapt this information further, in order to suit your child’s needs. Please 
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2. My child/ the person I care for is unable to understand what is 
involved in the study and what will be required from them if 
they participate (either because they are too young to 
understand or because they are unable to understand) and 
cannot communicate their decision to me: 
 
If you are reading this information on behalf of someone you care for who is under the 
age of 16 years and you decide that the person is not able to make an ‘informed’ and 
independent decision about whether or not they would like to participate, then we would 
like to ask you to decide whether or not you think that it is in your child’s best interests for 
them to participate in the study and whether you would like to provide your consent to 
participation on their behalf. If you would like your child/person you care for to participate 
in this study, please complete Consent Form B coloured PURPLE enclosed. Please 
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Understanding behaviour in Neurodevelopmental Disorders:  Information Sheet  
 
Please read this information carefully before deciding whether you wish to take part in the 
study.  If you have any further questions please contact Professor Chris Oliver on (0121) 
414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk. If you have any medical/ other 
problems which make it difficult for you to read this information, please contact Professor 
Chris Oliver for a verbal explanation of the research. 
 
When you are happy that you have all of the information you need to be able to decide 
whether or not you and the person you care for would like to take part in the study, please 
complete the enclosed consent form and questionnaire pack return them to us in the 




We would like to invite you to take part in a questionnaire study being conducted at the 
Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders, University of Birmingham. This research work, 
which is led by Professor Chris Oliver, looks at a range of behaviours, skills and 
impairments in individuals with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome including: Repetitive 
behaviour, Hyperactivity, Mood, Challenging behaviour, Social functioning and Health. We 
will also ask some questions that are related to family well-being and the impact that 
having a child with a disability has on the family.  
 
We hope that this information will enable us to further understand the behaviours, skills 
and impairments associated with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome including challenging 
behaviour, social functioning, mood, hyperactivity and health and the impact that these 
behaviours have on the family. The more people that take part in this research, the more 
meaningful the results will be. A good response will provide new and valuable information 
about Rubinstein Taybi syndrome. In the future we hope to follow up the progress of the 
people who take part in this study. However, participation in this stage of the project will 
not mean that you are obliged to participate in further surveys in the future. 
 
Aims of the study 
 
1. To further our understanding of challenging behaviour, repetitive behaviour, 
hyperactivity, mood and social functioning in individuals with Rubinstein Taybi 
syndrome. 
2. To understand what happens with regard to these behaviours as children and adults 
develop. 
3. To understand what, if any, changes may occur with regard to these behaviours when 
the individuals reach a certain age.  
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What will happen if you and your child/the person you care for decide(s) to 
participate? 
 
Where will the research take place? 
 
The research will involve completing the enclosed questionnaire pack. This can be 
completed by you in your own time. 
 
Who will be involved in collecting the data? 
 
Members of the research team at the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental disorders 
including Professor Chris Oliver and Dr. Joanna Moss.  
 
How long will participation in the study take? 
 
The questionnaire pack will take approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
 
In the future you may be asked if you would like to complete the questionnaire again so 
that we can start to understand what happens to people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome 
across their lifetime. We will only contact you with this invitation if you have previously 
agreed to be contacted by the research team at the University of Birmingham with 
information about research studies conducted by the team. 
 
Sometimes after you have completed the questionnaire, we may need to contact you 
again in order to clarify any information that you have provided or to ask you for further 
information regarding the diagnosis of the person you care for. This helps us to ensure 
that our data is as useful and as accurate as possible. If this happens then we would 
contact you again within 6 months of receiving your questionnaire pack to ask whether or 
not you would be willing to provide us with the extra information.  
 
What will participants be required to do during the study? 
 
We will ask parents and caregivers to complete the enclosed questionnaire pack and 
return it to us alongside the consent form in the pre-paid envelope provided.  
 
Are there any risks that individuals taking part in the study might face? 
 
There will not be any risks associated with participation in this study.  
 
What are the potential benefits for participants from taking part? 
 
You will receive a personalised feedback regarding your child/ the person you care for. 
This study will help us to find out more about the lives of people with Rubinstein Taybi 
syndrome and the difficulties that these people face.  The results might help us to improve 
things for people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome in the future.  
 
Where will data be stored? 
 
The data collected will be kept in locked or password protected storage at the University 
of Birmingham.  Only members of the research team at the University of Birmingham will 
have access to information that we collect about you.  Information will be treated as 
strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
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If you/ the person you care for decide(s) to participate, what will happen after that 
participation? 
 
You and your child/ person you care for will receive an individual feedback report 
describing the results of all of the assessments that were carried out during the study.   If 
requested, this feedback report will be circulated to other interested individuals.  
Descriptions of research findings will be published in newsletters of the relevant family 
support groups and educational institutions involved.  Any request for advice concerning 
the person you care for will be referred to Professor Chris Oliver, Clinical Psychologist. 
The researchers will publish the findings from the study in scientific journals and will 
present the results at relevant conferences. 
What will happen to the data afterwards? 
 
The information that you provide will be locked in a filing cabinet at the University of 
Birmingham or held on a password protected database. Participants will be identified by a 
unique number so that the information you provide us with cannot be traced to your 
personal details.  You will be able to decide whether or not you want to make your 
research data available to any professionals or clinicians working with you and the person 
you care for should they wish to see it. This is optional and will not affect your 
participation in the current study. If you agree to this, then your research data will only be 
made available to relevant clinicians or professionals should they contact us directly and 
request to see it. If you do not agree to this then research data will not be made available 
to anyone other than the research team at the University of Birmingham. 
 
After 6 months of receiving your questionnaire pack, your personal details will be 
destroyed unless you tell us otherwise.  This means that we would no longer be able 
to trace the results of your assessments back to you.  The section below on ‘The 
Regular Participant Database Information’ gives information about a database that we 
use to store the personal details of some participants.  Please read this section in order to 
decide if you would like to join that database.  
 
 
Regular Participant Database Information: 
 
What is the regular participant database? 
 
We have a database that we keep in the Centre where we store the names and contact 
details of some previous participants.  If you would like then we can add your details to 
this database.  We would use this information for two things: 
3) We will contact you with information about future research work to find out whether 
or not you would like to participate. 
4) It is often important to find out how things change over time.  By keeping your 
details we would be able to trace the results of the previous assessments that you 
have done with us back to you.  This means that if you take part in other studies 
with us we would be able to look at how things have changed over time. 
 
Who would have access to my details? 
 
Only approved members of out research team would have access to your details.  We 
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When would I be contacted? 
 
You would only be contacted by an approved member of the research team when we are 
starting another study or phase of a study that we think you might like to participate in or 
when we need to clarify some information that you have provided us with from 
participation in a research study.  
 
What happens if I decide that I want my details to be added to the database but then I 
change my mind? 
All you would need to do is contact Chris Oliver on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-
enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk or at the School of Psychology, University of 





After having read all of the information and having received appropriate responses to any 
questions that you may have about the study you and the person you care for will be 
asked to give your and your child’s/ person you care for’s consent to participate in the 
study if you decide that you do wish to participate.  The section below on ’Giving 
consent’ will explain this process.  We need to receive consent from/ on behalf of 




Even after consent has been granted, participants can request to be withdrawn from the 
study at any time, without giving a reason. Even after participation has taken place, 
consent can be withdrawn and any data collected will be destroyed.  This will not restrict 
the access of you/ the person you care for to other services and will not affect their right to 
treatment. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researchers who will do their best to answer your questions. Please contact Chris Oliver 
on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk in the first instance. If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact: Professor Chris 
Miall; Head of School; School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 
2TT, by email: hos.psychology@contacts.bham.ac.uk  or by phone on 0121 414 4931 
 
Confidentiality    
               
The confidentiality of participants will be ensured.  If published, information on the 
participant will be presented without reference to their name or any other identifying 
information.  All personal details will be kept separately from the information collected so 
that it will only be possible to connect results to individuals via a special code.  This will 
ensure that results are kept anonymous.  In the unlikely event of any evidence of abuse 
being identified, this information will be disclosed by the research workers. 
Review 
 
The study has been approved by Coventry NHS Research Ethics Committee. Ref: 
10/H1210/01. Tel: 01527 587688 
 
 




You need to decide whether your child/the person you care for is able to understand enough about 
the study to make an ‘informed’ decision independently about whether or not they would like to 
participate and to communicate this decision to you.  If you are unsure whether or not your 
child/person you care for is able to understand enough to make a decision independently then we can 
provide you with some guidelines to help you to assess this A symbol information sheet can also be 
made available to you if this would be of help.  
 
Please contact Professor Chris Oliver 0121 414 7206 or cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk  to 
request a copy of this.  
Further information 
 
If you would like any more information about the study please contact Professor Chris 
Oliver on 0121 414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk.  Or write to Chris 





Now it is up to you whether you decide that you and your child/the person you care for 
would like to participate.  The decision about whether or not to take part in the study must 
be ‘informed’.  This means that anyone making the decision must understand exactly 
what is involved in the study, what will be required from participants and why.   
 
Please choose from one of the following options: 
 
3. My child/ the person I care for is able to understand what is 
involved in the study and what will be required from them if 
they participate and has communicated their decision to me: 
If you think that the person is able to understand enough about the study in order to make 
an ‘informed’ decision and they decide that they would like to participate then please 
ensure that they complete Section 1 of Consent Form A coloured YELLOW enclosed, 
or that you complete it with them, on their behalf.  A parent/carer will need to complete 
Section 2 of Consent From A coloured YELLOW in order to indicate that they also 
agree to participate in the study. A symbol information sheet can be made available in 
order to support your child/person you care for in making this decision if it would be of 
help. Please contact the research team if you would like a copy of the symbol consent 
form or if you need us to adapt this information further, in order to suit your child’s needs. 
Please return the consent form along with the questionnaire pack to us in the prepaid 
envelope provided.  
 
4. My child/ the person I care for is over the age of 16 and cannot 
understand what is involved in the study or cannot 
communicate their decision to me: 
If you are reading this information on behalf of someone you care for who is over the age 
of 16 and you decide that the person is not able to make an ‘informed’ decision about 
whether or not they would like to participate, then we would like to invite you to act as a 
‘personal consultee’ (or ‘nominated consultee’ where an unpaid carer e.g. parent, legal 
guardian etc is not able to act as a ‘personal consultee’) for that person.  Please read the 
enclosed ‘Personal and Nominated Consultee Information Sheet’ coloured PINK.  Once 
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you have finished reading the ‘Personal and Nominated Consultee Information Sheet’ 
please decide whether or not you feel able to act as a personal or nominated consultee 
for the person you care for. 
 
If you feel able to act as a personal or nominated consultee for the person you care for 
please think about whether the person would decide to participate if they were able to 
make an ‘informed’ decision themselves about whether or not to participate.  If you decide 
that the person would decide to participate, please complete Consent Form C coloured 
BLUE enclosed and return it to us alongside the questionnaire pack in the prepaid 
envelope provided.
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Consent Form A :  For individuals who are able to provide consent to participate 
in the study 
 
Understanding behaviour and family adjustment in individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disorders 
 
Study Director: Professor Chris Oliver 
 
SECTION 1:  Please complete this section if you are a person with Rubinstein Taybi 
syndrome: 
 
1. Has somebody else explained the project to you?   YES/NO 
2. Do you understand what the project is about?     YES/NO 
3. Have you asked all of the questions you want?     YES/NO 
4. Have you had your questions answered in a way you understand?  YES/NO 
5. Do you understand it is OK to stop taking part at any time?   YES/NO 
6. Are you happy to take part?       YES/NO 
 
If any answers are ‘no’ or you don’t want to take part, don’t sign your name! 
 
If you do want to take part, you can write your name below 
 
You can also choose if you want to say ‘yes’ to these questions: 
7. If your Dr asks to see your results from this project is that OK?  YES/NO 








The person who explained this project to you needs to sign too. If you are under the age of 
16, this should be your parent/guardian. 
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SECTION 2: Please complete this section if you are a parent/carer/guardian of a 
person with PMS  
who has provided their consent to participate in the study.  Please initial box… 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation and that of my child/person I care for is 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any 
reason, without my or that of my child’s/person I care for’s medical care or 
legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my child’s/person I care for’s GP medical 
notes or records confirming genetic diagnosis and health status may be looked 
at by members of the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
research team at the University of Birmingham, where it is relevant to this 
research project. I give permission for these individuals to have access to these 
records. 
 
4. I agree to my child’s/person I care for’s GP being informed of my participation 
and that of my child/person I care for’s in the study, where access to my 
child’s/person I care for’s medical records is required. 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Optional clause: The statement below is optional:    
  
 
1. I agree to the University of Birmingham research team sharing my research 
data with any professionals or clinicians working with me and the person I care 
for should they request to see them. 
 
Print Name: ________________________________________  
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SECTION 3: This is optional and allows you to provide consent for us to keep your 
personal details on the Regular Participant Database.  See section titled ‘Regular 
Participant Database’ in the information sheet.       
                                                                                                                                                          
Please initial box… 
1. I have read and understood the section titled ‘Regular Participant Database’ 
and I would like my personal details to be added to the database. 
 
2. I understand that my name and contact details will be kept by the research 
team at the University of Birmingham in accordance with the provisions of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and I will be contacted by an approved member of 
the team with information about future research that I and the person I care for 
may like to participate in. 
 
3. I understand that if my details are held on the database it will be possible for 
the research team to trace the results of the assessments that I complete in this 
project back to me and my child/person I care for so that they can look at 
changes over time if I take part in future projects. 
 
4. I understand that even after I have agreed for my details to be added to the 
database, I can request that they be removed by contacting Chris Oliver on 0121 
414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk or by post at the School of 
Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT. 
 
5. I understand the Professor Chris Oliver holds ultimate responsibility for the 
database. 
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Consent Form B: For Children under the age of 16 who are not able to provide 
consent. 
 
Understanding behaviour and family adjustment in individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disorders 
Study Director: Professor Chris Oliver 
SECTION 1: Please complete this section if you are a parent/ guardian of a child 
(under 16 years) with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome who is not able to provide consent. 
Please initial box… 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
01.02.2007 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation and that of my child/person I care for is 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any 
reason, without my or that of my child’s/person I care for’s medical care or 
legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my child’s/person I care for’s GP medical 
notes or records confirming genetic diagnosis and health status may be looked 
at by members of the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
research team at the University of Birmingham, where it is relevant to this 
research project. I give permission for these individuals to have access to these 
records. 
 
4. I agree to my child’s/person I care for’s GP being informed of my participation 
and that of my child/person I care for’s in the study, where access to my 
child’s/person I care for’s medical records is required. 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Optional clause: The statement below is optional:      
   
2. I agree to the University of Birmingham research team sharing my research 
data with any professionals or clinicians working with me and the person I care 
for should they request to see them. 
 




Telephone number:__________________Relationship to participant: ___________________  
 
Signature: ________________________Date: __________________ 
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SECTION 2: This is optional and allows you to provide consent for us to keep your 
personal details on the Regular Participant Database.  See section titled ‘Regular 
Participant Database’ in the information sheet.  
           
                                                                                                         Please initial box… 
 
6. I have read and understood the section titled ‘Regular Participant Database’ 
and I would like my personal details to be added to the database. 
 
7. I understand that my name and contact details will be kept by the research 
team at the University of Birmingham in accordance with the provisions of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and I will be contacted by an approved member of 
the team with information about future research that I and the person I care for 
may like to participate in. 
 
8. I understand that if my details are held on the database it will be possible for 
the research team to trace the results of the assessments that I complete in this 
project back to me and my child/person I care for so that they can look at 
changes over time if I take part in future projects. 
 
9. I understand that even after I have agreed for my details to be added to the 
database, I can request that they be removed by contacting Chris Oliver on 0121 
414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk or by post at the School of 
Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT. 
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Consent Form C: For individuals over the age of 16 who are not able to provide 
consent. 
Understanding behaviour and family adjustment in individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disorders 
Study Director: Professor Chris Oliver 
 
SECTION 1: Please read the following statements:     
               Please initial box… 
  
1. I (your name)___________________have been consulted about (name of 
participant)_______________’s participation in the above research project. I 
have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and understand what 
is involved. 
 
2. In my opinion he/she would have no objection to taking part in the above study. 
 
3. I understand that I can request he/she is withdrawn from the study at any time 
without giving any reason and without his/her care or legal rights being 
affected. 
 
4. I understand that relevant sections of his/her GP medical notes or records 
confirming genetic diagnosis and health status may be looked at by members 
of the Cerebra Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders research team at the 
University of Birmingham, where it is relevant to this research project. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to these records. 
 
5. I agree to his/her GP being informed of their participation in the study, where 
access to medical records is required. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Optional clause: The statement below is optional:      
   
 
3. I agree to the University of Birmingham research team sharing his/her research 
data with any professionals or clinicians working with them should they 
request to see them. 




Relationship to participant________________Signature: _______________Date: _______ 
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SECTION 3: This is optional and allows you to provide consent for us to keep your personal 
details on the Regular Participant Database.  See section titled ‘Regular Participant 
Database’ in the information sheet.  
           
                                                                                                                                                             
Please initial box… 
 
11. I have read and understood the section titled ‘Regular Participant Database’ and I 
would like my and the person I care for’s personal details to be added to the 
database. 
 
12. I understand that my name and contact details will be kept by the research team at 
the University of Birmingham in accordance with the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and I will be contacted by an approved member of the team 
with information about future research that I and the person I care for may like to 
participate in. 
 
13. I understand that if my details are held on the database it will be possible for the 
research team to trace the results of the assessments that I complete in this project 
back to me and the person I care for so that they can look at changes over time if 
we take part in future projects. 
 
14. I understand that even after I have agreed for my details to be added to the 
database, I can request that they be removed by contacting Chris Oliver on 0121 
414 7206 or at cndd-enquiries@contacts.bham.ac.uk or by post at the School of 
Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT. 
 
15. I understand the Professor Chris Oliver holds ultimate responsibility for the 
database. 
 
Print Name: ___________________________Signature: ____________________________ 
Date: _______________







1. Today’s date: ________________________ 
 
2. Gender:     Male    Female  
 
3. Date of Birth: ___/___/____  Age:______________  
 
4. Is the person you care for verbal? (i.e. more than 30 signs/words in their vocabulary)  
 
  Yes/No (delete as appropriate) 
 
5. Is the person you care for able to walk unaided? 
 
  Yes/No (delete as appropriate) 
 
6. Has the person you care for been diagnosed with a syndrome?  Yes/No (delete as appropriate)  
 
 If yes, please indicate which syndrome in 5a. and answer questions 6 to 8.  If no, please move 
on to question 9 
  
6.a Cornelia de Lange syndrome  Cri du Chat syndrome    
  Prader-Willi syndrome   Rubinstein Taybi syndrome   
  Fragile X syndrome   Down syndrome    
  Lowe syndrome    Soto Syndrome     
Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome                       9q34 deletion 
8p23deletion     Tuberous Sclerosis 
Other _____________________________ 
 
7. What is the genetic mechanism causing the syndrome in the person you care for? 
  
  Uni-parental disomy    Sequence repetition 
  Deletion     Translocation 
  Unknown     
Other __________________________________ 
 
8. When was the person you care for diagnosed? ____________________________________ 
 
9. Who diagnosed the person you care for?     
  
  Paediatrician       Clinical Geneticist 
  GP        
 Other ____________________________ 
 
10.   Has the person you care for had any medical/health difficulties in the last six months? If yes, 




In the information sheet and consent form we informed you that we may need to contact your 
child’s/person you care for’s GP in order to clarify any information regarding your child’s health and 
diagnostic status (see consent form and information sheet for more information). If you have already 
Please tick or write your response to these questions concerning background details: 
 
Please answer the following about the person you care for: 
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indicated on the consent form that you are happy for us to do this, please complete the relevant details 
below: 
 




GP Telephone number_______________________________ 
 
 
1. Are you male or female? Male            Female    
 
2. What was your age in years on your last birthday? _____________ years 
  
3. Please tick the highest level of your educational qualifications.  
     
No formal educational qualifications............................................................................    
Fewer than 5 GCSE’s or O Level’s (grades A-C), NVQ 1, or BTEC First Diploma…   
5 or more GCSE’s or O Level’s (grades A-C), NVQ 2, or equivalent……….……..   
3 or more ‘A’ Levels, NVQ 3, BTEC National, or equivalent......................................   
Polytechnic/University degree, NVQ 4, or equivalent...................................................   
Masters/Doctoral degree, NVQ 5, or equivalent…………............................................   
 
4. What is your relationship to your child with a genetic syndrome (e.g. mother, 




5. In total how many people currently live in your home? ________  Adults  _______  Children 
 
6. Does your child with a genetic syndrome normally live with you? Yes   No     
 
If no, then where do they live?______________________________________________ 
 
 
7. What is your current marital status? 
 
Married, and living with spouse...................................................................   
 
Living with partner.......................................................................................   
  
Divorced/Separated/Widowed/Single and NOT living with a partner.........   
 
If living with partner/spouse, please answer the following questions, if not, please go to question 
12. 
 
     The following questions ask for background information about you and your family. Please 
tick the appropriate boxes or write in the spaces provided. 
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8. Is your partner male or female?                 Male            Female       
 
9. What was their age in years on their last birthday? _____________ years 
 
10. Please tick the highest level of your partner/spouse’s educational qualifications.  
            No formal educational qualifications........................................................................  
Fewer than 5 GCSE or O Level (grades A-C), NVQ 1, or BTEC First Diploma.....   
5 or more GCSE or O Level (grades A-C), NVQ 2, or equivalent…………..…  
3 or more ‘A’ Levels, NVQ 3, BTEC National, or equivalent.................................   
 Polytechnic/University degree, NVQ 4, or equivalent.............................................  
Masters/Doctoral degree, NVQ 5, or equivalent…………......................................  
 11. What is your partner/spouse’s relationship to your child with a genetic syndrome 
(e.g., mother, father, stepmother, adoptive parent)?______________________________ 
 
12. Recent data from research with families of children with special needs has shown that 
a family’s financial resources are important in understanding family member’s views and 
experiences. With this in mind, we would be very grateful if you could answer the 
additional question below. We are not interested in exactly what your family income is, 
but we would like to be able to look at whether those with high versus lower levels of 
financial resources have different experiences.  
 
What is your current total annual family income? Please include a rough estimate of 
total salaries and other income (including benefits) before tax and national 
insurance/pensions. Please tick one box only: 
Less than £15,000…………………………………………………………………….…………..…  
£15,001 to £25,000……………………………………………………………………...………….   
£25,001 to £35,000………………………………………………………………..…….……….       
£35,001 to £45,000………………………………………………………………….…..…………    
£45,001 to £55,000……………………………………………………………..…………….……    
£55,001 to £65,000…………………………………………………….………………….…..           
£65,001 or more……………….………………………………….…                                                









These items refer to the person you care for. For each question (A, B, C, D etc …), please 
enter the appropriate code in each box. 
 
(Frequently = more than once a week) 
 
A) Wetting (nights)  1 = frequently  2 = occasionally     3 = never   
B) Soiling (nights)  1 = frequently  2 = occasionally     3 = never 
C) Wetting (days) 1 = frequently  2 = occasionally     3 = never 
D) Soiling (days) 1 = frequently  2 = occasionally     3 = never 
E) Walk with help 1 = not at all  2 = not up stairs     3 = up stairs  
                    and elsewhere 
 
(note: if this person walks by himself upstairs and elsewhere, please also code ‘3’ for ‘walk 
with help’) 
 
F) Walk by himself    1 = not at all  2 = not up stairs  3 = up stairs and 
                                         elsewhere  
G) Feed himself         1 = not at all  2 = with help      3 = without help 
H) Wash himself        1 = not at all  2 = with help      3 = without help 
I)   Dress himself        1 = not at all  2 = with help      3 = without help 
 
J) Vision                   1 = blind or almost   2 = poor        3 = normal   
K) Hearing          1 = deaf or almost     2 = poor      3 = normal 
 
L) Speech         1 = never a word        2 = odd words only 
          3 = sentences and normal    4 = can talk but doesn’t  
 
If this person talks in sentences, is his/her speech: 
1 = Difficult to understand even by acquaintances, impossible for strangers? 
2 = Easily understood for acquaintances, difficult for strangers? 
3 = Clear enough to be understood by anyone? 
M) Reads 1 = nothing 2 = a little 3 = newspapers and/or books 
N) Writes 1 = nothing 2 = a little 3 = own correspondence 
O) Counts 1 = nothing 2 = a little 3 = understands money values 
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THE MOOD, INTEREST AND PLEASURE QUESTIONNAIRE –  
SHORT FORM (MIPQ-S) 
 
Instructions for completing the MIPQ-S 
 
This questionnaire contains 12 questions – you should complete all 12 questions.  Each 
question will ask for your opinion about particular behaviours, which you have observed 
in the last 2 weeks.  For every question you should circle the most appropriate response 
e.g. 
 
6) In the last two weeks, how interested did the person appear to be in his/her 
surroundings? 
 
interested all interested most interested 
about 
interested some never 
of the time of the time half of the time of the time interested 
 
 
The Mood, Interest and Pleasure Questionnaire - Short Form 
 
1) In the last two weeks, did the person seem… 
 
sad all of sad most sad about half sad some never sad 
the time of the time of the time of the time  
 
Please comment if anything has happened in the last two weeks which you feel might explain 
sadness if it has been observed (e.g. a bereavement): 
 
2) In the last two weeks, how often did you hear positive vocalizations* when the 
person was engaged in activities*? 
 
all of the most of the about half of some of the never 
time the time the time time  
 
*positive vocalizations: e.g. laughing, giggling, “excited sounds” etc. 
*engaged in activities: i.e. when someone is actively involved in any activity such as a 
mealtime, a social interaction, a self-care task or social outing etc. 
 
3) In the last two weeks, do you think the facial expression of the person looked 
“flat”*… 
 
all of the most of the about half of some of the never 
time the time the time time  
 
*flat expression: expression seems lifeless; lacks emotional expression; seems 
unresponsive. 
 
4) In the last two weeks, would you say the person… 
 
cried every cried nearly cried 3-4 times cried once or cried less than 
day every day each week twice each week once each week 
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5) In the last two weeks, how interested did the person appear to be in his/her 
surroundings? 
 
interested all interested most interested about interested some never 
of the time of the time half of the time of the time interested 
 
6) In the last two weeks, did the person seem to have been enjoying life… 
 
all of the most of the about half of some of the never 
time the time the time time  
 
Please comment if there are any reasons why this person might not have been enjoying him/herself 
e.g. illness, being in pain, experiencing a loss etc.: 
 
7) In the last two weeks, would you say the person smiled… 
 
at least once at least once 3-4 times  once or  twice less than once 
every day nearly every day each week each week each week 
 
8) In the last two weeks, how disinterested did the person seem to be in his/her 
surroundings? 
 
disinterested disinterested disinterested about  disinterested never 
all of the time most of the time half of the time some of the time disinterested 
 
9) In the last two weeks, when the person was engaged in activities*, to what extent 
did his/her facial expressions* suggest that s/he was interested in the activity? 
 
interested all interested most interested about interested some never 
of the time of the time half of the time of the time interested 
         
*engaged in activities: i.e. when someone is actively involved in any activity such as a 
mealtime, social interaction, self-care task or social outing etc. 
*facial expressions: interest might be indicated by the degree to which the person’s gaze is 
being directed at the person/things involved in an activity. 
 
10) In the last two weeks, would you say that the person… 
 
laughed laughed nearly laughed 3-4 laughed once or laughed less than 
every day every day times each week twice each week once each week 
 
11) In the last two weeks, how often did you see gestures which appeared to 
demonstrate enjoyment* when the person was engaged in activities*? 
 
all of the most of the about half of some of the never 
time the time the time time  
 
*gestures which appear to demonstrate enjoyment: e.g. clapping, waving hands in 
excitement etc. 
*engaged in activities: i.e. when someone is actively involved in any activity such as a 
meal time, social interaction, self-care task or social outing etc. 
 
12) In the last two weeks, did the person’s vocalizations* sound distressed… 
 
all of the most of the about half of some of the never 
time the time the time time  
 
*vocalizations: any words, noises or utterances. 
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THE ACTIVITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
                  Instructions: 
 
• Please read each item carefully and circle the appropriate number on the scale, for 
the person you care for. 
• Please ensure that you indicate a response for every item.  If the particular 
behaviour does not apply, 












































1. Does the person wriggle or squirm about when 
seated  or lying down? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. Does the person fidget or play with their hands 
and/or  feet when seated or lying down? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. Does the person find it difficult holding still? 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Does the person find it difficult to remain in their 
seat  even when in situations where it would be expected? 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Does the person prefer to be moving around or
 becomes    
                 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. When the person is involved in a leisure activity (e.g. 
 watching TV, playing a game etc.) do they make a 
lot  of noise? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. When the person is involved in an activity, are they 
 boisterous and/or rough? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. Does the person act as if they are “driven by a 
motor”  (i.e. often very active)? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. Does the person seem like they need very little rest 
to  recharge their battery? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. Does the person often talk excessively? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. Does the person’s behaviour seem difficult to 
 manage/contain whilst out and about (e.g. in town, in 
 supermarkets etc.)? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. Do you feel that you need to “keep an eye” on the  
         person at all times? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. Does the person you care for seem to act/do things  
         without stopping to think first? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. Does the person blurt out answers before questions 
 have been completed? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. Does the person start to respond to instructions 
before  they have been fully given or without seeming to    
 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. Does the person want things immediately? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. Does the person find it difficult to wait? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. Does the person disturb others because they have 
 difficulty waiting for things or waiting their turn? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
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SOCIAL COMMUNICATION QUESTIONNAIRE © Rutter et al 2003           
1.  Is she/he now able to talk using short phrases or sentences? If no, skip to question 8.
  
Yes      
No 
  
2.  Can you have a to and fro “conversation” with her/him that involves taking turns or 
building on what you have said?      
  
Yes      
No 
  
3. Has she/he ever used odd phrases or said the same thing over and over in almost exactly 
the same way (either phrases that she/he has heard other people use or ones that she/he 
has made up?  
Yes      
No 
  
4.  Has she/he ever used socially inappropriate questions or statements?  For example, has 
she/he ever regularly asked personal questions or made personal comments at 
awkward times? 
Yes      
No 
  
5.   Has she/he ever got her/his pronouns mixed up (e.g., saying you or she/he for I)? 
 
Yes      
No 
  
6.  Has she/he ever used words that she/he seemed to have invented or made up 
her/himself; put  things in odd, indirect ways; or used metaphorical ways of saying 
things (e.g., saying hot rain for steam)? 
 
Yes      
No 
  
7.  Has she/he ever said the same thing over and over in exactly the same way or insisted 
that you say the same thing over and over again?  
Yes      
No 
  
8.  Has she/he ever had things that she/he seemed to have to do in a very particular way or 
order or rituals that she/he insisted that you go through?  
Yes      
No 
  
9.   Has her/his facial expression usually seemed appropriate to the particular situation, as 
far as you could tell? 
Yes      
No 
  
10. Has she/he ever used your hand like a tool or as if it were part of her/his own body 
(e.g., pointing with your finger, putting your hand on a doorknob to get you to open 
the door)?     
Yes      
No 
  
11. Has she/he ever had any interests that preoccupy her/him and might seem odd to other 
people (e.g., traffic lights, drainpipes, or timetables)? 
Yes      
No 
  
12. Has she/he ever seemed to be more interested in parts of a toy or an object (e.g., 
spinning the wheels of a car), rather than using the object as it was intended? 
Yes      
No 
  
13. Has she/he ever had any special interests that were unusual in their intensity but 
otherwise appropriate for her/his age and peer group (e.g., trains, dinosaurs)? 
Yes      
No 
  
14. Has she/he ever seemed to be unusually interested in the sight, feel, sound, taste, or 
smell of things or people? 
Yes      
No 
  
15. Has she/he ever had any mannerisms or odd ways of moving her/his hands or fingers, 
such as flapping or moving her/his fingers in front of her/his eyes? 
Yes      
No 
  
16. Has she/he ever had any complicated movements of her/his whole body, such as 
spinning or repeatedly bouncing up and down? 
Yes      
No 
  
17. Has she/he ever injured her/himself deliberately, such as by biting her/his arm or 
banging her/his head? 
Yes      
No 
  
18. Has she/he ever had any objects (other than a soft toy or comfort blanket) that she/he 
had to carry around? 
Yes      
No 
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19. Does she/he have any particular friends or a best friend? Yes      
No 
  
20. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever talk with you just to be friendly (rather than to 
get something)? 
Yes      
No 
  
21. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever spontaneously copy you (or other people) or 
what you were doing (such as vacuuming, gardening, or mending things)? 
 
Yes      
No 
  
22. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever spontaneously point at things around her/him 
just to show you things (not because she/he wanted them)? 
Yes      
No 
  
23. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever use gestures, other than pointing or pulling 
your hand, to let you know what she/he wanted 
Yes      
No 
  
24. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he nod her/his head to mean yes? Yes      
No 
  
25. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he shake her/his head to mean no? Yes      
No 
  
26. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he usually look at you directly in the face when doing 
things with you or talking with you? 
Yes      
No 
  
27. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he smile back if someone smiled at her/him? Yes      
No 
  
28. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever show you things that interested her/him to 
engage your attention? 
Yes      
No 
  
29. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever offer to share things other than food with you? Yes      
No 
  
30. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever seem to want you to join in her/his enjoyment 
of something? 
Yes      
No 
  
31. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever try to comfort you if you were sad or hurt? Yes      
No 
  
32. When she/he was 4 to 5, when she/he wanted something or wanted help, did she/he 
look at you and use gestures with sounds or words to get your attention? 
Yes      
No 
  
33. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he show a normal range of facial expressions? Yes      
No 
  
34. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever spontaneously join in and try to copy the 
actions in social games, such as The Mulberry Bush or London Bridge Is Falling 
Down? 
Yes      
No 
  
35. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he play any pretend or make-believe games? Yes      
No 
  
36. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he seem interested in other children of approximately 
the same age whom she/he did not know? 
Yes      
No 
  
37. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he respond positively when another child approached 
her/him? 
Yes      
No 
  
38. When she/he was 4 to 5, if you came into a room and started talking to her/him without 
calling her/his name, did she/he usually look up and pay attention to you? 
Yes      
No 
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39. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he ever play imaginative games with another child in 
such a way that you could tell that they each understood what the other was 
pretending? 
Yes      
No 
  
40. When she/he was 4 to 5, did she/he play cooperatively in games that required joining 
in with a group of other children, such as hide-and-seek or ball games? 




Please check your answers and go on to the next questionnaire.
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 1st December 2009 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
We are writing to tell you about a research project we are currently conducting. Back in 2008 XXX 
Day Nursery in XXXX helped us gather pilot data for our study looking at the early development 
of social understanding in infancy. The pilot study was extremely successful and consequently we 
are hoping to run our full study across several nurseries in Birmingham. 
 
To introduce ourselves – Sarah Beck and Ian Apperly are lecturers in developmental psychology 
and Laurie Powis is working with them as a PhD student. We wondered whether you would be 
happy for us to run some of our research with the 9 month – 3 year olds at your nursery.  
 
The research we are currently running is concerned with children’s early ‘Theory of Mind’ 
abilities. ‘Theory of Mind’ constitutes a high level social – cognitive component that involves 
inferring the mental states (beliefs, desires, feelings and intentions) of others. This ability has been 
implicated as essential for effective social understanding and is thought to develop progressively 
through childhood. We are interested in the social skills that young infants acquire as they develop 
this ability.  
 
The testing we would like to carry out at your nursery would involve the children playing very 
simple games and tasks with the researchers. For example, in one task - looking at ‘cooperation’ 
skills - the infants will have to ‘work together’ with the researcher to get a toy out of a big tube. 
 
To run the study we would test children individually for about 5-10 minutes. Laurie will contact 
you by phone to see if it would be possible for us to visit, and to answer any questions you may 





Laurie Powis, Dr Sarah Beck & Dr Ian Apperly 
PhD Student & Lecturers in Developmental Psychology 
















My name is Laurie Powis and I am a PhD postgraduate researcher at the School of 
Psychology, University of Birmingham.  I am writing to ask your permission for your child 
to participate in a study investigating children’s thinking about social situations. The study 
is due to take place the week beginning the 25th February and will take place during the 
school day. I will briefly explain the purpose of the study below.   
 
My research is looking at the extent in which both typically developing children and 
children with various genetic syndromes understand the behaviours and thoughts of 
others. The ability to relate to other people, understand their needs and feelings, 
empathize, and ability to express ones own thoughts/feelings are crucial developmental 
skills and I wish to investigate how individuals develop these important skills. 
 
Your child may be invited to play some enjoyable games with myself, followed by a short 
story which involves answering several simple questions at the end.  The stories and 
games are age appropriate and would take no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
 
The results will contribute to the slowly-growing body of scientific research on children’s 
psychological development and specifically our understanding of how children learn 
important skills for handling information in the world.  No individual child will be 
identifiable in any report of the results. 
 
If you prefer that your child does not participate, please return the form below and return it 













I would prefer that my child _________________________ (name) of year ____ (class) 
does not participate in this study. 
 
Signed ___________________________ (parent/guardian)





                                            
 
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM RESEARCH INTO 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH  
RUBINSTEIN TAYBI SYNDROME 
 
THE KEYSTONE PROJECT 
 
This booklet should contain: 
 
1. Letter of invitation 
2. Professor Chris Oliver’s contact details (See letter of invitation) 
3. Information sheet  
4. Background Questionnaire 
 
 
Instructions for Completing Booklet: 
 
1. Please read the booklet before deciding whether you want to take 
part in the study. 
 
2. If you would like to take part in the study, please fill in the 
background questionnaire and return it to us in the freepost 
envelope provided. 
 











Appendix G: Study two recruitment pack. 
231 
 










Dear [name of caregiver],  
 
Re: Thought and Interaction Study 
 
You may remember that you have previously taken part in research with the University of 
Birmingham.  Thank you for your participation in that research.  We are now writing to inform you 
of a new research project that is being carried out by the research team at the University of 
Birmingham that you and [name of participant] are being invited to take part in. Before you decide 
whether to participate, you may want to know why the research is being carried out and what it 
will involve. Enclosed is an information sheet which describes the aim of the project and what will 
happen during the study. 
 
Please take the time to read the information sheet before agreeing to take part in the study. If 
you are unclear about any aspect of the study or have any questions, feel free to contact 
Professor Chris Oliver at the above address or by phone on 0121 414 4909 or by e-mail on 
c.oliver@bham.ac.uk. 
 
In brief, the research project is an experimental study that aims to investigate how people with 
Rubinstein Taybi think about and interact with their environment.  We feel that [name of person] 
would be appropriate for the study and we are writing to ask you whether you would like [name of 
participant] to participate in the study.  If you feel that it is appropriate, you may wish to discuss 
the nature of the research with [name of participant].  You will receive a personalised feedback 
report for your interest which will contain information about [name of participant] and the results 
of the study. 
 
If you would like [name of participant] to participate in the study then please complete the 
enclosed background questionnaire and return it to us in the freepost envelope provided. 
 









Jane Waite Laurie Powis   Chris Oliver                          Dr. Sarah Beck          Dr. Ian 
Apperly 










Project Director: Professor Chris Oliver 
Tel: 0121 414  
E-mail: c.oliver@bham.ac.uk 
 






A team at the University of Birmingham is carrying out an experimental study to look at how 
people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome think about and interact with their environment. The study 
aims to improve our understanding of these processes and how they may differ between 
individuals. The study will aim to examine individuals’ short term memory, the way in which they 
generate novel ideas, plan, initiate and inhibit actions and shift from one idea to another. The study 
will also assess the way in which people with Rubinstein Taybi syndrome understand other 
people’s thoughts and beliefs  
  
What does it involve? 
 
The following section has been included to give you an idea of the types of tasks we may ask 
the person you care for to complete.  However, whether or not the person you care for will be 
asked to complete these two tasks will depend on their level of ability.  If you feel that the 
person you care for would find these tasks too easy or too difficult do not worry.  We have 
tests to suit all abilities and we also have tests that are suitable for adults. 
 
The person will be assessed at the University or at home.  Testing will take place over two 
days.  The person will then be asked to complete several tasks that are used to examine 
people’s general ability, short-term memory, the way in which people with RTS generate 
novel ideas, plan, initiate and inhibit an action, maintain attention on a task and shift from 
one idea to another.  For example, in the bear/dragon task the person will be introduced to 
a ‘nice’ bear puppet and a ‘naughty’ dragon puppet and told that they should do what the 
‘nice’ bear says but not what the ‘naughty’ dragon says (e.g. touch your nose).  The 
purpose of this game is to test the person’s ability to suppress an unwanted response (to 
avoid responding on dragon trials).    
 
The person will also be asked to complete several tasks that are used to examine people’s ability to 
understand other people’s thoughts and beliefs.  For example, in the Tubes with Handles task the 
person with RTS and the researcher must work together to retrieve a toy that is inside a tube.  The 
tube has a handle on each end and can only be opened by two persons simultaneously pulling at 
each end.  The length of the tube will make it impossible for person with RTS to grasp both 
handles at the same time, therefore, in order to succeed on the task the person with RTS must 
understand the intentions of the researcher and incorporate them into their own intention.     
 
Withdrawal: 
Should you or your child / the person you care for decide that you no longer wish to be involved in 
the study, the information that you have provided can be withdrawn at any time without you giving 
a reason. Even after your child / the person you care for has taken part in the study, consent can be 
withdrawn and any data collected will be destroyed. This will not restrict access to other services 
and will not affect the right to treatment. 
 
Confidentiality: 
All details collected during this study will be kept on a confidential database that is only accessible 
to those working on the project.  Anonymity is ensured by storing the questionnaire data separately 
from any material that identifies the participant.  If published, information will be presented 
without reference to any identifying information. 
 
At the end of the study: 
Each parent/ carer will receive a personalised feedback report on their child or the person they care 
for. A summary of the project’s findings will be circulated to anyone involved who wishes to see a 
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copy and a report will be written for the RTS newsletter. Any requests for advice concerning your 
child/ the person you care for will be referred to Professor Chris Oliver, Clinical Psychologist. It is 
possible that you may be invited to participate in further research after the study however, 
consenting to participate in this study does not mean that you are obliged to do so.  
 
Review: 
This study has been reviewed by the University of Birmingham, School of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this study please 
contact Prof. Chris Oliver at the Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders, School of 
Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT.  
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information 
 
If you would like the person you care for to take part in the project then please complete the 









































1. Today’s date: ________________________ 
 
2. Parent / carer’s name: __________________________ 
 
3. Name of person you care for: __________________________________ 
 
5. Age of person you care for: __________________________ 
 
6. I would be interested in taking part in the current study      Yes    No 
 





LEVEL OF ABILITY 
 
Please complete the following items to assist us in choosing the most appropriate tests 
for the person you care for. 
 
The person you care for: 
  
1.  Points to at least three major body parts when asked (for example, nose, mouth, 
hands, etc.). 
Usually  Sometimes or partially  Never  
 
2.  Points to common objects in a book or magazine as they are named (for example, 
dog, car, cup, key etc.)           
Usually  Sometimes or partially  Never  
 
3.  Follows instructions with one action and one object (for example, “bring me the 
book”; “Close the door”; “Touch your head”; etc. 
Usually  Sometimes or partially  Never  
 
4.  Takes turns when asked when playing simple games 
Usually  Sometimes or partially  Never  
 
Has the person you care for had a formal IQ test?  If yes, what was the score? 
 
IQ Test Score  ______ 
 
Thank you for completing these items. 

